nervous system. And so far as we means this state of consciousness, I have no means of forming a rational opinion on the question.

Happily we are not nervous systems. Life is not an agitation of the nervous system. We act, we work, we teach, we inspire love, in places where we are not, where we have never been, and in souls which we have not seen in the body. We are not as the beasts that perish. And the social nature of man is not bestial. The soul of man has a subtle faculty of incorporating itself with the souls of our fellow-men. We are immortal by virtue of the intricate organism of which we are part. Nervous system, digestive apparatus, and locomotive organs are essential as a basis of life; but in due course that life can be practically continued by the agency of other bodies than those in which it begins. It cannot be continued, so far as we can see, without other like bodies, natures, and souls, such as ours, and therefore not in Dante's and Milton's Paradise. The organism, Man and Woman, is mortal truly; but the organism, Humanity, is immortal. We know of nothing that can destroy it within the conditions of our Solar sphere.

A good life in the flesh becomes thus incorporate with the mighty Organism, and becomes immortal with it. Not an act of ours, not a look, nor a thought, is utterly lost and wasted in space. For good or for evil it forms us, and our character, and our work. It forms some other brother or sister near us for good or for bad. If it be strong and noble, it shapes many. If it be weak and evil, it is gradually expunged. It may be not remembered, not recorded, and not distinguished. But it continues, eternally pulsating unknown through generations of Humanity. It may be a drop in the ocean of human life. But as surely as every drop which falls on an Alp will pass on ultimately into the ocean, so every human life, every act of life, every kind word, every good deed, every clear thought, lives in the life to come. We live, and we live for ever, the greatest and the feeblest. We do not continue to have nervous sensations; we do not eat and drink; we do not think or act, it may be, and we do not add to our work on earth. But we live. Our lives remain here and continue our work. The Humanity which nursed us as infants, trained us as children, and shaped our lives as men, prolongs that life in a collective eternity, when it has closed our eyes with reverent sorrow, and said in hope and love the last words over our bones. And it makes us as immortal as itself.

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF SKEPTICISM.

BY J. OWEN.

IN commencing the Lecture I have undertaken to deliver to you, I must start with definition: What is a Skeptic? The usual signification of the word is "A man who disbelieves and denies what he ought to believe and affirm"; for I do not think it can be disputed that in its common acceptation the word has nearly always a connotation of blame attached to it. We find, however, that this meaning of the word, together with its imputation of blameworthiness, comes to us through a special channel. Like "infidel" and one or two other opprobrious terms, whose meaning has been fixed by the "Odium Theologicum," it bears stamped on its surface the impress which Theology thought fit to place upon it. Unlike, however, certain terms which were actually coined in that mint, the word Skepticism has an independent origin and history. It is, in fact, a philosophical term, and comes to us from that general store of philosophical thought and nomenclature to which our modern culture owes so much, viz., Greek Philosophy. The mental function for which it stands is as old as the first rudimentary exercise of the human reason. The word Skepticism is itself a pure Greek word; and it is to Greek thought that we must appeal to find the thing signified in its initiatory shape, its evolutionary growth, and full | maturity.

Turning, then, to Greek Philosophy, we find that the word σkétoμai means, to see, to examine inquisitively, or with a desire of knowledge. Hence the σKETTIKÓS implies merely the thoughtful or reflective man, though, as reflection may imply hesitation, the notion of suspense is also included in its meanings. What is, however, of importance to notice, is, that the term in its first derivative sense has nothing to do with either affirmation or denial. It merely indicates a process which may lead to one or the other, without attempting to forecast the decisive result. A man who intently views a distant object may ultimately pronounce an affirmative or negative judgment respecting it, or he may remain in suspense; but this contingent result of his investigation is something apart from the method by which he arrives at it. The method is pure investigation; and this, and this alone, is the primary meaning of the term Skepticism.

But having fixed this original signification we may advance a step further, wherein we have the inestimable advantage of following in the track of Greek thinkers.

Living, as we do, in a world wherein ourselves and our thought are alike charged with impenetrable mysteries, in which our finite being is the

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centre of more than one infinity, we find, as Greek Philosophy found long ages ago, that our investigation into truth is feeble and untrustworthy; that on speculative subjects, even those in which we have the deepest interest, it falls far short of demonstration, and therefore that in these subjects our only possible achievement is suspense, qualified, however, in some cases, by a greater or less degree of likelihood or approximate assurance, enough to warrant belief and even to justify action, but not enough to establish absolute certainty.

We thus arrive at the complete Greek definition of Skepticism which we find in the Hypotyposes of Sextos Empeirikos, the thinker who, more than any other, erected Greek Skepticism into a system. He terms it the equilibration or perpetual counterpoising of antagonistic ideas and arguments by means of which a man may arrive at suspense, and afterwards at Ataraxia, or complete mental serenity. Further analysis shows us that Greek Skepticism was characterized by these four qualities :—

1. It was a condition of search-a perpetual energy of investigation. 2. Its proper sphere was not the practical exigencies or duties of human life, but the speculative problems surrounding that life on every side.

3. Its object was truth, however much it might happen that its ultimate outcome was some measure of suspense.

4. It was resolutely opposed to dogma and finality on all issues wherein demonstrative proof was unattainable.

Here, then, we come to the reason of the animus with which theology has always regarded Skepticism.

Theology, together with every scheme of thought based upon authoritative claims, demands unquestioning belief. This is true of theology, even when the idea of an actual revelation remains more or less in the background. Truth being already communicated, further inquiry is regarded as superfluous, if not impious. Now, this unquestioning faith Skepticism refuses to yield. Nay, more, it denounces the demand for it as an insult. Regarding the human reason as a divine gift, and remembering also the fallible conditions, both in its origin and exercise, of human authority, even of the most unimpeachable kind, it refuses to renounce that primordial faculty of questioning and investigating by the exercise of which man is a reasoning being.

Now let us mark how theology, -understanding by that term that with which we are most conversant, the ecclesiasticism of Christianity,—has treated Skepticism. As we have seen, Skepticism claims the right of investigation. It does not imply nor necessarily lead up to denial. On the other hand, it holds aloof from dogmatic negation on undemonstrable subjects, just as it does from dogmatic affirmation. But theology, for its own selfish purposes, has misrepresented the skeptic attitude. It has confounded the wholly distinct positions of inquirer and negationist. In order to prejudice the character of the skeptic, it has made him what no genuine skeptic could be-a negative dogmatist, an absolute denier on VOL. I.-pt. 2.

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uncertain issues.

It has taken from him his original and true character of inquirer, questioner, or reasoner.

This prejudice, born of theology, has, moreover, passed beyond its limits. It is found in every department of human thought in which dogmatism is assumed to be possible. Philosophers and scientists are nearly as apt as theologians to assume an attitude of infallibility on subjects inherently incapable of it. We cannot, therefore, in view of the interests of human speculation of every kind, lay too much stress on the fact that Skepticism proper has as little to do with absolute denial as with absolute affirmation. Theoretically, it stands at an equal distance from both extremes; practically, it may advance more or less in the direction of either. In any case it protests against the infallibility of negation as much as against the absolute certitude of affirmation. It refuses to accept dogma or finality whenever the conditions and circumstances are inherently undetermined and uncertain. To accuse a skeptic of denial, to make Skepticism synonymous with Atheism or any other form of negation, however much it may subserve the interests of an unscrupulous theology, is merely to confess a profound ignorance of what genuine Skepticism really is.

But why, it may be demanded, not unfairly, should theology have been permitted to pervert and misrepresent the true function of Skepticism? That it should endeavour to induce a condition of mind so favourable to its interests as unquestioning acceptance of dogma is not surprising; but why should it have succeeded, as it would seem it has done, in persuading the bulk of mankind that systems of dogmatic faith are more suited to the circumstances and needs of men than methods of inquiry and conclusions of a more or less suspensive character. The truth, I fear, is, that most mer are by the very conditions of their knowledge-acquisition predisposed to dogma. They needlessly transfer to the region of speculation the coercion which pertains to the immediate evidence of their senses, or the needs of their practical life. Men are compelled to submit without question or argument to the undeniable witness, e.g., of their eye-sight or hearing; they are obliged to act, to choose between different courses of action, whether they will or not, and this coercion seems to have generated a belief that a similar obligation attaches to their speculation, though a moment's con sideration might suffice to show any reasonable being that such an inference is wholly illegitimate.

We must not, however, suppose that all men are alike in this particular In harmony with Coleridge's well-known demarcation of all men into bom Platonists or Aristotelians, we might divide most thinking men into bor; dogmatists or skeptics, or, adopting another distinction of the same purpor into synthetic and analytic thinkers. Limiting our observation to our ow: country, I fear it must be added, that the law of the nearly equal birth a 1 the sexes does not obtain here-the proportion of born dogmatists to bor skeptics is overwhelmingly great. Judging at least from the literature of

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the subject, and comparing it with the similar literature of France and Germany, we might almost affirm that the characteristic of the average Englishman is dogmatic; that the John Bullism which dominates over his practical conclusions, his doggedness and obstinacy, his impatience of halftruths or merely probable conclusions, his dislike of ratiocination, when it does not terminate speedily in some practical issue, the idiosyncrasy, in short, which has excluded "not proven" from the scope of English legal verdicts, all tend to prove that his inborn tendencies are not favourable to inquiry for its own sake, or for the sake of purely speculative truth. At the same time I do not wish to impute to Englishmen more than a special share of a vis inertia which seems common to men of every age and country. The inaptitude of mankind in general for independent truth-search is a complaint which we meet, e.g., among the foremost thinkers of Greece; if we find it somewhat intensified by English thinkers, it may perhaps be attributed to the special causes to which I have adverted. Thus Locke, one of the noblest and most earnest of English truth-seekers, remarks:

"The impartial lovers and searchers of truth are much fewer than one would wish or imagine"; while another English thinker, not so well known or so widely read as his admirable works deserve, Samuel Bailey, of Sheffield, re-echoes the same complaint in his "Essay on the Pursuit of Truth" (p. 62) :

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"However unaccountable it may at first sight appear, it is a fact that few human beings in their moral, religious, and political inquiries are possessed with this simple desire of attaining truth. Their strongest wishes are directed to the discovery of new grounds for adhering to opinions already formed, and they are as deaf to arguments on the opposite side as they are alive to evidence in favour of their own views. The pure wish to arrive at truth is indeed as rare as the integrity which strictly observes the golden rule to act towards others as we would wish others to act towards us."

Skepticism being then the synonym of truth-search, and opposed in matters of speculation to Dogma, it is important to ascertain the specific grounds on which it appeals as a mental habit or method to the reason of thinking men.

These grounds are twofold, and using terms which, however objectionable to some Englishmen, seem almost imperative in any broad discussion of a philosophical subject:-they are: I. Objective, II. Subjective; inherent, ie, in the external circumstances wherein the truth-seeker is placed, or in the conditions of his own thought.

I. Every thinker who has attained a just sense of his position in the universe is aware that he is surrounded by infinities. He inhabits a point of universal space so infinitesimally minute as to be indescribable. His life at its longest is a moment of time which, in view of the twain eternities, past and future, is absolute nothingness. As a sentient being, he knows himself to be surrounded by myriads of other beings sentient and non