and the statute known as Lyndhurst's Act, being the Marriage Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. Iv. c. 54:

A MAN MAY NOT MARRY HIS

1. Grandmother.

2. Grandfather's wife. 3. Wife's grandmother.

4. Father's sister.

5. Mother's sister.

6. Father's brother's wife.

7. Mother's brother's wife.

8. Wife's father's sister.

9. Wife's mother's sister. 10. Mother.

11. Stepmother.
12. Wife's mother.
13. Daughter.

14. Wife's daughter.

15. Son's wife. 16. Sister.

17. Wife's sister.

18. Brother's wife.
19. Son's daughter.
20. Daughter's daughter.
21. Son's son's wife.
22. Daughter's son's wife.
23. Wife's son's daughter.

24. Wife's daughter's daughter.
25. Brother's daughter.
26. Sister's daughter.

27. Brother's son's wife.

28. Sister's son's wife.

29. Wife's brother's daughter. 30. Wife's sister's daughter.

A WOMAN MAY NOT MARRY HER

1. Grandfather.

2. Grandmother's husband.
3. Husband's grandfather.
4. Father's brother.

5. Mother's brother.

6. Father's sister's husband. 7. Mother's sister's husband. 8. Husband's father's brother. 9. Husband's mother's brother. 10. Father.

11. Stepfather.

12. Husband's father.

13. Son.

14. Husband's son.

15. Daughter's husband.
16. Brother.

17. Husband's brother.

18. Sister's husband.

19. Son's son.

20. Daughter's son.

21. Son's daughter's husband.

22. Daughter's daughter's husband. 23. Husband's son's son.

24. Husband's daughter's son. 25. Brother's son.

26. Sister's son.

27. Brother's daughter's husband. 28. Sister's daughter's husband. 29. Husband's brother's son.

30. Husband's sister's son.

But by the Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage Act, 1907, 7 Ed. VII. c. 47, it has been provided that no marriage heretofore or hereafter contracted between a man and his deceased wife's sister, within the realm or without, shall be deemed to have been or shall be void or voidable, as a civil contract, by reason only of such affinity, except that, where before August 28, 1907 (the date of the passing of the Act) any such marriage shall have been annulled, or either party thereto (after the marriage and during the life of the other) shall have lawfully married another, it shall be deemed to have become and to be void upon and after the day upon which it was so annulled, or upon which either party thereto lawfully married another as aforesaid (s. 1). But, notwithstanding the Act, a man may not marry the sister of his divorced wife, or of his wife by whom he has been divorced, during the lifetime of such wife (s. 3); and the word "sister" in the Act is to include a sister of the half-blood (s. 5).

NATURE OF THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION. The writ of prohibition is a prerogative writ issued out of a Court of superior jurisdiction, and directed to the judge of an inferior Court, or to a party to a suit in an inferior Court, or to any other person whom it may concern, commanding that no further proceedings be had in a particular cause.

Prohibition is a writ of ancient origin, and was the prerogative remedy provided by the common law for encroachment of jurisdiction by any inferior tribunal. It is, as is the case with most of the institutions of the common law, impossible to gauge accurately the antiquity of the writ of prohibition; to do so, indeed, would serve no useful purpose; but it may be mentioned that Glanville, writing in the reign of Henry II. (circ. 1181), refers to cases of prohibition issued to the Ecclesiastical Courts (see Glanville, De Legibus, lib. iv. chaps. xii.-xiv.), and there is an authentic instance of the grant of a writ of prohibition against a bishop in the third year of the reign of Edward I. (see 2 Rolle, Abr., 1668, p. 281); nor is there any reason for supposing that these were by any means the earliest instances of its issue.

Formerly the most important application of the writ of prohibition was in cases arising in the Ecclesiastical Courts, at a time when the jurisdiction of those Courts was very much more extensive than at present. The superior Courts of common law have from the earliest times, exercised a controlling influence over the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and jealously restrained any excess of jurisdiction by means of prohibition. Frequent instances are to be found of prohibitions being issued to the Ecclesiastical Courts, not only where they had trespassed upon the jurisdiction of the common law, but also in every other case of excess of authority, even though the cognisance of the matter did not properly belong to any other tribunal (see Registrum Brevium, 1634; Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium; Comyns, Dig., tit. "Prohibition (F 1)). And it has always been held sufficient, in order to give the temporal Courts a right of interfering, to show a want of jurisdiction in the Ecclesiastical Courts, without pointing out any other remedy (see Lloyd on Prohibition, 1849, chap. vii. p. 24).

Sir Edward Coke in his Institutes states that prohibitions by law are to be granted at any time to restrain a Court to intermeddle with or execute anything which by law they ought not to hold plea of, and the King's Courts that may award prohibitions, being informed either by

the parties themselves or by any stranger that any Court, temporal or ecclesiastical, doth hold plea of that whereof they have not jurisdiction, may lawfully prohibit the same as well after judgment and execution as before (2 Inst., 602).

Sir Matthew Hale, writing of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and other inferior Courts, and the general superintendence of the common law in relation to those Courts, says: "First, as the laws and statutes of the realm have prescribed to those Courts their bounds and limits, so the Courts of common law have the superintendency over those Courts to keep them within the limits and bounds of their several jurisdictions, and to judge and determine whether they have exceeded those bounds or not; and in case they do exceed their bounds, the Courts at common law issue their prohibitions to restrain them, directed either to the judge or party, or both; and also, in case they exceed their jurisdiction, the officer that executes the sentence, and in some cases the judge that gives it, are punishable in the Courts at common law, sometimes at the suit of the King, sometimes at the suit of the party, and sometimes at the suit of both, according to the variety and circumstances of the case. Secondly, the common law and the judges of the Courts of common law have the exposition of such statutes or Acts of Parliament as concern either the extent of the jurisdiction of those Courts, whether ecclesiastical, maritime, or military, or the matters depending before them; and therefore, if those Courts either refuse to allow these Acts of Parliament, or expound them in any other sense than is truly and properly the exposition of them, the King's great Courts of the common law who next under the King and his Parliament have the exposition of those laws may prohibit and control them" (History of the Common Law, chap. ii.).

This supervision of the Common Law Courts over the jurisdiction and acts of the various inferior Courts has now, since the Judicature Act, 1873, devolved upon the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice. The jurisdiction with regard to the granting of the extraordinary remedy by means of the prerogative writ of prohibition is now, as will appear in the course of this article, to a large extent discretionary.

The remedy by prohibition is preventive rather than corrective. In this respect prohibition is to be distinguished from mandamus, for a mandamus is issued to compel the performance of some act which ought to be done, and which has not been done (see MANDAMUS); and a prohibition, on the other hand, is issued to prevent the doing of an act which ought not to be done, or, in other words, to restrain the doing of an act in excess of jurisdiction.

Prohibition being an extraordinary remedy of a prerogative nature, the jurisdiction in prohibition is only to be resorted to in the absence of any other adequate legal remedy, and the existence of another complete remedy would be a ground for refusing the writ. It follows therefore that prohibition will not lie in any case where there is a sufficient remedy by appeal from the judgment or order of the inferior Court (see further on this point the cases referred to post, under the head Wrong Decision of Inferior Court).

COURTS FROM WHICH PROHIBITION ISSUES.-A prohibition, says Blackstone, is a writ issuing properly only out of the Court of King's Bench, being the King's prerogative writ; but for the furtherance of

justice it may now also be had in some cases out of the Court of Chancery, Common Pleas, or Exchequer, directed to the judges and parties of a suit in any inferior Court, commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof, upon a suggestion that either the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction, but to the cognisance of some other Court (Black. Com., bk. iii. p. 112).

Under the old system, therefore, applications for prohibition might have been made to the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, or to the Court of King's Bench separately. Since the merger of those Courts by the Judicature Act, 1873, it is the usual practice for writs of prohibition to be moved for from the Crown side of the King's Bench Division. There is, however, as has recently been pointed out, nothing necessarily confining prohibition to Crown practice, and it is incorrect to say that it essentially and virtually belongs to the Crown side of the King's Bench Division (see per Bowen, L.J., The Recepta, [1893] P. (C. A.), at p. 263). Writs of prohibition have been granted by the Chancery Division (see Jones v. Slee, 1886, 32 Ch. D. (Č. A.) 585; In re Briton Medical and General Life Association, 1888, 39 Ch. D. 61). And it has recently been held that by virtue of the Judicature Act, 1873, a judge of the Admiralty Division has all the powers as to prohibition of a judge of the High Court (The Recepta, [1893] P. (C. A). 255).

There appears to have been a practice of issuing writs of prohibition out of the Petty Bag Office on a mere formal affidavit that there was no cause of action within the jurisdiction of the inferior Court. That a writ should issue prohibiting a County Court without any judicial sanction was an anomaly. It was held that a judge of the High Court sitting at chambers had jurisdiction to set aside a writ of prohibition issued out of the Petty Bag Office directed to a County Court (see Amstell v. Lessor, 1885, 16 Q. B. D. 187).

COURTS TO WHICH PROHIBITION LIES.-With regard to the question of what Courts may be restrained by prohibition, it was stated by Coke, C.J., in the Court of King's Bench in the reign of James I., that "we here in this Court may prohibit any Court whatsoever, if they transgress and exceed their jurisdiction. And there is not any Court in Westminster Hall but may be by us here prohibited, if they do exceed their jurisdictions, and all this is clear and without any question (Warner v. Suckerman and Coates, 1615, 3 Bulst., at p. 120). Notwithstanding this general statement, however, there appear to be very few, if any, reported cases in which a prohibition was actually granted by the Court of King's Bench to any of the Common Law Courts at Westminster, or to the Court of Chancery (see Shortt on Informations, Mandamus, and Prohibition, p. 427). But the question is now of no practical importance, the old Courts of Common Law and Chancery having been merged in the High Court of Justice by the Judicature Act, 1873, and it being expressly provided by that Act (s. 24 (5)) that no cause or proceeding at any time pending in the High Court of Justice or before the Court of Appeal, shall be restrained by prohibition or injunction.

There is no decision as to whether a prohibition will lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There has, indeed, been a strong expression of opinion that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, so long as it is exercising ecclesiastical jurisdiction, is subject

to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench by way of prohibition (see per Cockburn, C.J., Martin v. Mackonochie, 1878, 3 Q. B. D., at p. 747).

Lord Blackburn, in his judgment in the same case, in the House of Lords, said: "I think that there is authority for saying that the temporal Court proceeding in prohibition to restrain excess of jurisdiction in the Court ecclesiastical is not bound by a decision of even the highest Court of Appeal in ecclesiastical matters" (ibid., 1881, 6 App. Cas., at p. 447; see also per Lord Denman, C.J., Chesterton v. Farlar, 1838, 7 Ad. & E., at p. 719). On the other hand, there is no case to be found in which prohibition has been granted against the Privy Council, and the jurisdiction was doubted in some of the judgments in the House of Lords in the case of Martin v. Mackonochie, though that case leaves the question undetermined.

It may be stated generally that prohibition will lie to all Courts of inferior jurisdiction, and even to a pretended Court (see per Holt, C.J., Chambers v. Jennings, 1702, 2 Salk. 553).

The writ has from time to time been granted to numerous Courts that have now ceased to exist, which it is therefore needless to specify. A prohibition may issue to a Court exercising criminal jurisdiction, as well as to a civil Court (see R. v. Hereford, 1860, 3 El. & El. 115). So the writ will lie to a coroner (ibid.), to a recorder (see Liverpool United Gas Light Co. v. The Overseers of the Poor of Everton, 1871, L. R. 6 C. P. 414), to petty sessions (see R. v. Higgins, 1843, 8 Q. B. 149, note), to Quarter Sessions (see R. v. Justices of Middlesex, 1881, 45 J. P. 420; see also Pomfraye's Case, 1629, Lit. 163; R. v. London Justices, [1893] 2 Q. B. 476; to Licensing Justices at the General Annual Licensing Meeting, R. v. Tolhurst, [1905] 2 K. B. 478), and to naval and military courts-martial and prize Courts (see Grant v. Gould, 1792, 2 Black. (H.), at p. 100; see also Smart v. Wolff, 1789, 3 T. R. 323). And, among Courts of civil jurisdiction, prohibition has been granted to the various Ecclesiastical Courts, the University Courts (see Chancellor, etc., of Oxford v. Taylor, 1841, 1 Q. B. 952), the Palatine Courts, the County Courts, the Mayor's Court of the City of London (see Alderton v. Archer, 1884, 14 Q. B. D. 1; see also The Mayor, etc., of London v. Cox, 1866, L. R. 2 H. L. 239; Kutner v. Phillips, [1891] 2 Q. B. (C. A.) 267), the Salford Hundred Court (see Farrow v. Hague, 1864, 3 H. & C. 101; Chadwick v. Ball, 1885, 14 Q. B. D. 855; Whitehead v. Butt, 1891, 7 T. R. 609), and the Liverpool Court of Passage (see R. v. The Mayor, etc., of Liverpool, 1887, 18 Q. B. D. 510; Fellowes v. The Lord Stanley, [1893] 1 Q. B. 98).

Moreover, of recent times prohibition has been granted to prevent acts by various public bodies of statutory creation, such, for example, as Railway Commissioners (see South-Eastern Rly. Co. v. The Railway Commissioners and Mayor, etc., of Hastings, 1881, 6 Q. B. D. 586), Inclosure and Improvement Commissioners (see Church v. The Inclosure Commissioners, 1862, 11 C. B. N. S. 664), Tithe Commissioners (see In re Ystradgunlais Tithe Commutation, 1844, 8 Q. B. 32; see, however, In re Appledore Tithe Commutation, 1845, ibid. 139; Commissioners of Income Tax (see R. v. General Commissioners of Taxes for Clerkenwell, [1901] 2 K. B. 879).

And it has been said that the Court should not be chary of exercising the power of prohibition, and that whenever the legislature intrusts to any body of persons, other than to the superior Courts, the power