EARL RUSSELL DURING THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1853-1855. WHILE the Eastern Question again causes such grave anxiety, and the minds of men naturally revert to the last great crisis of the Question, it can scarcely be unimportant to consider certain much-discussed passages in the history of that period, and among them the grounds of the course then taken by so eminent a statesman as Lord Russell. I should not myself have presumed to enter on this task, had I not been favoured by the sight of despatches and memoranda not yet published. As might be expected, in looking over those of Lord Russell, one finds that same unswerving resolution, high-hearted courage, and sense of duty, which led him with steady step through years of patient toil and watching, undisturbed by factious agitation, undismayed by party opposition, until at last he stood victor in the forefront of the Reform party; which supported him at the Colonial Office in the darkest period of Canadian troubles, and made him come forward at a critical moment of the Corn Law struggle as the champion of Free Trade. Nor is the tact wanting-such tact as many must call to mind who have heard him handle some difficult problem before the House of Commons, or make one of his terse offhand replies to the sallies of an opponent; nor his patriotic belief in the English race destined to be the greatest among races;' nor the glory in the imperii porrecta majestas' of England, which inspired the desire for an ever-closer union with the colonies, their direct representation in London, and their perfect consolidation with England into one British Empire. Knowing that to be weak is miserable,' he did not cease to urge that there should be no niggardliness with regard to armaments, he being convinced that we should, if need were, be able to stand alone as the friend of oppressed nationalities. These, though it might be impossible to help with our arms against the giant Continental armies, we could nevertheless strengthen by our advice and by a firm attitude, and he proved it in his own advocacy of Italian freedom. 1 6 1 England, from her neutral position, has exceptional scope for political action in Europe; it was on this account that Lord Russell wished that the study of the history of international politics was more general among Englishmen. His constant faith in the individuality of states, and its advantage to the world, rendered him always anxious to prevent the absorption of the smaller by the larger. He seemed to look upon it as an hereditary privilege of Great Britain to assert the natural independence of the states of Europe; for has not the nationality of Holland, of Portugal, of Spain, of Germany, of Greece, of Belgium, been at various times upheld by the influence of England, and sometimes supported by her arms?' It must not be supposed that this faith in the independence of nationalities, coupled with his general distrust in the policy of exclusive alliances, induced him to neglect our national friendships and obligations. On the contrary, it made him keenly alive to the want of continuity in English foreign policy. For instance, he was grieved at any needless coldness on our part towards Austria, not only because the maintenance of the Austrian monarchy is so bound up with European interests and so conducive to the continuance of European peace;' but also because for some years English statesmen have more or less endeavoured to preserve friendly relations with Austria in spite of her slow and timorous movement, believing her likely, as an improving nation, to become an effectual bulwark for Eastern Europe, and moreover, because the English people are naturally fond of the Austrians. Yet, however strong the feeling for the continuity of our policy, it had from its very essence definite bounds. While he regarded Russia's proposed partition of Turkey with the dislike, if not with the pity and horror, aroused by the partition of Poland, no one would have taken more stringent measures for her reform, for the overthrow of that despotism of the harem,' more destructive than the plague in her cities, than the simoom in her deserts.' 3 'If the Turk wishes to remain in Europe,' Lord Russell would say, 'she must admit the Christian to share in the government, and reserve nothing but the throne to the disciples of Mahomet. Will she do so? Is there yet any vitality in the feeble monarchy of the race of Ottoman? If there is, it will be well with the Turk. If not, there are Christians enough in Roumelia and Greece to govern at Constantinople without the necessity of a conquest or the disgrace of a partition.' He has even been heard in later years to suggest that as an ultimate expedient Constantinople would become a free port. Anyhow neither Turkey nor any other nation can be permitted to be the centre of disturbance to Europe, if Europe can prevent it. 2 With such ideas of international duty, it is not surprising he should have held that 'no English foreign minister who does his duty faithfully by his country can, in difficult circumstances, escape the blame of foreign statesmen.' Happy indeed may he esteem himself if he escapes the blame of his own countrymen; and assuredly in • Lord Russell to Lord Westmoreland, January 1, 1853. • Establishment of the Turks in Europe, p. 116. Lord Russell (1828). Lord Russell's own public career they were measures of foreign policy wearing the guise of paradox' which were most severely criticised.4 It was in January 1853, that Lord Russell wrote his famous despatch about the Holy Places. The Holy Places were the Bethlehem Church of the Nativity, and the shrine of the Virgin at Jerusalem, and the other Holy Buildings of Palestine. The French averred that the Holy Places were consigned to the care of the Latin monks in the reign of Francis the First. The Greeks, it was said, subsequently asserted equal claims and obtained firmans from the reigning Sultan. The French on behalf of the Latin Church, the Russians on behalf of the Greek Church, came to words in 1819, as they had often done in bygone days. Nevertheless, the adjustment of these privileges was adjourned, and in 1850 the French renewed the quarrel. The Porte now resolved to permit the Latin Church to celebrate their services in the shrine of the Virgin, and gave them the keys of the Church of the Nativity. The Sultan, however, would not allow any exclusive claims to the other Holy Buildings, but issued a firman, accompanied by an autograph letter to the Emperor of Russia, which confirmed eertain privileges possessed by the Greeks in the Holy Land.' Russia then took a new point of departure. Angered by the judgment of the Porte in Palestine, and by the threatening attitude of France, she demanded that her rights of protectorate over the Greek Church throughout Turkey should be defined-rights claimed from the treaty of Kainardji, made in 1774 between Catharine the Second and the Sublime Porte. By this treaty protection was insured by the Porte for the Christian religion and its churches; and the ministers of the Russian Empire were privileged to 'make representations' in favour of the new Greek Church at Constantinople. On this promise on the part of Turkey to protect her Christian subjects, the Russians based their claims to a sole protectorate over the fourteen million Christians of the Greek Church under the dominion of the Sultan. Prince Menschikoff, who was the reverse of a conciliatory diplomatist, was negotiating at Constantinople. The Porte would not listen; Russia persisted. She marched her troops, in July 1853, across the Pruth into the Danubian Principalities. The Russian manifesto set forth that the occupation was not to be considered as a declaration of war, but as a 'security' for what was due to Russia. Constraint was put upon the Porte by the great Powers not to declare war. A conference was being held at Vienna, and the See a fine passage in Lord Russell's History of Christianity in the West of Europe: 'He had too deep an acquaintance with the practical course of things not to be aware that the skill of the logician is not omnipotent over the affairs of life, and that he who would rightly avail himself of men and things must sometimes be content to wear that guise of paradox which the actual constitution of the world often exhibits in itself.' • Lord Aberdeen to Lord Russell, January 31, 1853. "Vienna note' was the result. The English Cabinet also drew up a draft Convention. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Russell: The Cabinet, yesterday agreed provisionally to an amended draft of Convention to be proposed for Russia and Turkey, simply renewing the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople without any extension. This Convention made no mention of the Holy Places, because the French would not agree to a Convention between Russia and Turkey on that matter. All this is very well for effect and for a Blue Book, but in my opinion the course which the Emperor has pursued in these matters from his overtures for a partition of Turkey, and especially the violent, abusive, and menacing language of his last manifesto, seem to show that he has taken his line, and that nothing will satisfy him but complete submission on the part of Turkey; and we ought therefore not to disguise from ourselves that he is bent on a stand-up fight. The Vienna note proved acceptable at Petersburg-not acceptable at Constantinople. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe read between the lines that it virtually embodied a formal acknowledgment of the sole Russian protectorate over all the Christian subjects of Turkey, to which we could never consent in consideration both of the progress of liberty in Europe and of the welfare of the Principalities. Turkey modified the note; Russia would not admit the modifications. A difference sprang up in our Cabinet as to the indulgence to be given respectively to Turkey and Russia. 6 The failure of the attempts to avoid war (according to Lord Russell) did not arise from any reluctance of Lord Aberdeen to insist on the signature of the Austrian note by Turkey, but from a fundamental difference of opinion between Lord Palmerston and me, on the one side, and Lord Aberdeen, Sir James Graham, and various members of the Cabinet on the other, upon the respective claims of Turkey and Russia which arose after the refusal of the note by Turkey. This difference of opinion caused hesitation in our language and bearing, and probably encouraged the Emperor of Russia in his aggression. The Emperor of Russia was at this time in a state of frenzy, and would not have been content with anything less than the total destruction of the independence and dignity of the Sublime Porte. The real cause of the war was the discovery that the Vienna note as interpreted by Russia, and a project of treaty which was framed by the Russian Ambassador, were in effect a surrender of the whole government of the Christians of Turkey into the hands of Russia. ... Lord Aberdeen also gives the same reason for the origin of the war in a letter to Lord Russell. "When the Emperor gave his reasons for rejecting the modifications, we found that he interpreted the note in a manner quite different to ourselves, and in a great degree justified the objections of the Turks.' On the 5th of October the Porte announced to Russia that unless she evacuated the Principalities in fifteen days, she would declare war. On the 14th of October the English and French fleets went to Constantinople. La paix entre l'Angleterre et la France est la paix du monde,' had been the mot of Lord Russell to Sir Arthur Gordon, February 1875. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but the wholesale destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope by the Russians roused England. We could not do otherwise than take command of the Black Sea.' The Emperor Napoleon wrote a letter to the Czar, and suggested an armistice on conditions. The Czar of all the Russias' rejected his overtures. "Few then doubted of the necessity of the war.' Whether the war had grown out of our shortsighted vacillation or not, most people in England now argued thus: The attempt to rule over Turkey, to weaken first by assuming the protection of her Christian subjects, then to reduce Moldavia and Wallachia under Russian sway, and lastly to govern either directly or indirectly at Constantinople, was an enterprise not suddenly, not obscurely, but openly cherished by the Sovereigns of Russia.' Our steps were a treaty with France; a convention with Turkey; the preparation of two fleets, one for the Baltic, the other for the Black Sea; and an expedition to the Black Sea.' The British Government sent its ultimatum to Russia insisting upon her evacuation of the Principalities before April 30 (1854). No answer was returned. The allied armies sailed first to Constantinople, thence to Varna. A war Budget was brought in by Mr. Gladstone doubling the income tax and laying an extra duty on malt and spirits. In June advices were despatched by the Duke of Newcastle to Lord Raglan, urging him to proceed to Sebastopol. Lord Russell moved for a vote of credit of 3,000,000l. There was no great debate. No one just then dared to hamper the Ministry. England was enthusiastic for the war. Austria had approved the course of France and England, though she did not act, reserving her power for probable wars of independence in Hungary and Italy. But Prussia, afraid of Russia, had shrunk into silence, like a scared child; and thus discarded the policy which she herself had advocated. In September, our troops disembarked at Eupatoria; in December, Parliament voted her thanks to the officers and men of the army in the Crimea. The Russian redoubts above the Alma river had been magnificently stormed, the charge of Balaclava had been made, and the battle on the heights of Inkerman had been fought and won. But this winter session of Parliament was full of anxious debates, and the Bill for foreign enlistment was passed. 9 London gossip had murmured that it was a mere petty dislike to being second where he had been first which had made Lord Russell hesitate to take office under Lord Aberdeen in a coalition Cabinet, and which had induced him to oppose certain of Lord Aberdeen's measures. Needless to say, the gossip was false. His love of England was such that, to do her any good, he would gladly have been shoeblack to the whole 'Cabinet.' Lord Aberdeen stood deservedly high in the estimation of those |