So little confidence did he place in these men, that he was decidedly of opinion, that unless they were removed, the country would be lost. The convention of Cintra could not be considered, with out feeling sentiments of alarm as well as indignation, rising in the mind: the more especially when he observed the cold-blooded treaty, that gave up a contest with the ships of an enemy, upon a compromise so unworthy the nation's character. There was a time, when such old-fashioned words as "sink, burn, and destroy," were understood and exercised; but now we are to negociate to be ships' husbands, and to take possession by bargain and barter, in stead of by battles, by bravery, and by balls; we are to hold ships in trust by contract, and not in right by conquest. We had Princes of the blood, all of whom are bred to arms. Why, he asked, were not some of these illustrious persons employed to lead our armies; they had made the science of war their study from their childhood! If they were not to be employed, he was at a loss to ascertain for what purpose they were bred to arms. There was a distinguished person near him (Earl Moira) who had the confidence of the people, who had the love of the soldiery, and who possessed the esteem of his majesty: why was not such a person as that nobleman employed? The reason was evident-it was because management prevented it. But was it to be supposed that because a Court of Inquiry had deemed no further investigation necessary, that therefore there ought to be no investigation? Whenever he looked at

the terms of the Convention, whenever he reflected on the decision of that court, he could not avoid exclaiming, that the decision so announced was a blot upon the country. Whenever he heard of councils of war being called, he always considered them as cloaks for cowardliness; so said the brave Boscawen, and from him he imbibed the sentiment which time and experience had completely confirmed. At Vimiera we gained a victory, and in the moment that our soldiers were flushed with conquest, recourse was had to a council of war: that, he presumed, could only have been necessary, or indeed apologised for, in the moment of defeat. Upon what principle, therefore, such an expedient was resorted to, he, for one, accustomed to other methods, could not account. They only who acted in it could explain it. Just the same opinion he entertained of the Court of Inquiry; it was a shield to ward off investigation from ministers themselves; but he trusted that their lordships would not be prevented from making a scrupulous investigation of it in their own way. He knew the character of the Portuguese exceedingly well. They, excepting the city of Lisbon, were as brave people as any upon the continent of Europe, and officered with British soldiers, would have presented an undaunted front to Frenchmen. Why was not that expedient made use of? Ministers ought to have known their value, and if they did not, their ignorance was inexcusable. If that house did its duty, they would immediately proceed to the foot of the throne, and there tell the sovereign the bold

truth

truth, that if he did not remove them, he would lose the country. These were the sentiments of his heart; he spoke them as a solemn duty, which he found himself bound to express. It was probably the last time he should trouble their lordships, and with that, said the noble admiral, I wish your lordships a good night. (At these words the noble earl instantly walked out of the house.)

The Earl of Grosvenor admitted that there was not much in the address to admit a diversity of opinion. He cordially approved of that part of the speech which expressed a determination to give all possible assistance to the Spani ards, so long as they should continue to be true to themselves. He did not despair of the Spanish cause, provided that the vast means of this country were employed in the manner best calculated to distress and embarrass the enemy. He also concurred in that part of the speech which expressed disapprobation of the Convention of Cintra. -His lordship severely censured that military arrangement, by which a British army was sent into the heart of Spain, when it should have been sent to the foot of the Pyrenees. It should have been sent to a situation, where it could not be exposed to the possibility of being obliged to retreat.

Lord Viscount Sidmouth approved of continuing to support Spain as long as any hopes remained. But he was not prepared to thank his Majesty for a treaty of the conditions and engagements of which he was wholly ignorant.

Lord Grenville observed, that it was the constant practice, until the present administration came into office, to refrain, both in the speech and in the address, from calling upon parliament to deliver any decided opinion approving of past measures, the documents relating to which were not in the possession of the House, or expressing a determination to support any future system, the details of which had not been communicated. With respect to the policy of sending a British army to Spain, he did not mean to say, that there might not be circumstances under which it might be expedient to send British troops into Spain, but during the last summer there was no pros pect that ought to have induced any reasonable man to send a British army into the interior of Spain. He did not mean, however, to apply his observation to naval co-operation, by sending fleets with troops to annoy particular parts of the coast, to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm, and to obtain partial advantages. With the Pyrenees unlocked, and the road between Paris and Madrid as open as that between Paris and Antwerp, there was nothing that could justify our sending into the interior of Spain 30 or 40,000 British men to meet an army of 200,000. " I can compare such a measure," said his lordship, "only to the farfamed march to Paris, to which it is fully equal in its wildness and absurdity. It is perfectly clear that it must rest with the Spanish people themselves to maintain their independence, and that with

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out that spirit amongst themselves no army that we could send would be of any avail. They adopted a system, which was published in the early part of the summer, under the title of "Precautions," and which contained a most excellent plan of defence adapted to the peculiarities of the country, and calculated to harass and annoy an invading army, and to wear them down by a continued system of partial attack, without incurring the risk which must necessarily attend a pitched battle with regular and veteran troops. This system was the best which could be adopted by that country, under its then circumstances, and might have produced a great effect upon the enemy, whose troops would have been continually harassed and fatigued, whilst the Spaniards, taking advantage of the peculiarities of their country, would have incurred little immediate risk, and would have gained a knowledge and attained a discipline which might have subsequently qualified them to contend in the field with the regular troops of France. This excellent system we forced them to abandon, by sending into the interior of the country a British army; it then became impossible for the Spaniards to leave our army to fight their battles by itself; our army would, of course, proceed in the manner and according to the usual routine of a regular army; and thus the Spaniards were forced on to engage in pitched battles, at a period when they were not competent, with regular troops, whilst the British army, too small to cope with the great superiority of troops brought into the field by France, can only retreat. In this way, my lords, I

contend that the sending a British army into the interior of Spain has been actually injurious to the cause of the patriots in that country.

In what manner have they afforded the aid of which they now so much boast? Setting aside for a moment the consideration of the general question of the policy or impolicy of sending British troops into the interior of Spain, it may be said, that there was a time when a British force of 30 or 40,000 men might have contributed to obtain a great temporary advantage, which, whatever effect it might have had upon the ultimate fate of the war, would at least have enabled the Spaniards to arrange their defence, and to mature their preparations. It may be said that there was a period of the contest when the French having been driven from Madrid, and forced to take refuge in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees, a British force sent there at that particular crisis, might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees, and placed in the hands of the Spaniards the keys of their country, which they might then have been enabled to defend under infinitely more advantageous circumstances than they had since been placed in. It might be said that this case did, from peculiar circumstances, actually occur. Allowing it to be so, how was it taken advantage of? One might have supposed, that, to make

the

proper use of such an advantageous conjuncture of affairs, our troops would have been sent to the port nearest the scene of action, and from whence they might be marched, in the shortest time, to the spot where their services were most wanted. Bnt, instead of the

nearest

nearest port, the farthest seemed to have been chosen, and the troops were sent to Lisbon. They are there employed in compelling the French to evacuate Portugal, who could not have held it if Buonaparté could not conquer Spain, and who must get possession of it if he does; and afterwards remain there for two months before they march to join the Spaniards. The moment was urgent, the occasion was pressing, every thing depended upon promptitude of action, and taking advantage of a small portion of time; and yet two months pass away before the army is even put in march to join the Spanish troops; and the general who commanded in chief, in giving an account of his conduct, says, that no arrangement was determined upon for putting the army in march. The transports which ought to have conveyed our troops are used to convey the troops of the enemy; and our army, compelled to make a long march over land, are too late for any effective purpose, and the enemy triumphs in the capital of Spain before even a British musket is fired. The Spanish people may truly reproach us, "You promised us protection and assistance; you induced us to engage in the dangerous warfare of pitched battles, quitting our more desultory mode of warfare, but more secure to ourselves and more harassing to the enemy; and now the oppressor lords it in our capital, plunders our property, and puts to death our nobles, whilst not a single British musket has yet been fired." Most unfortunate is it that our army should be placed in such a situation which must necessarily give rise to apprehension. The di

lemma stated by my noble friend (Lord Sidmouth), most aptly applies to ministers upon this subject: either they did or they did not know that a British army, sent into the interior of Spain, would have to encounter the whole disposable force of France. If they did know it, by what infatuation could they have been induced to place an army in a situation in which no rational men would ever have thought of placing it? If they did not know it, then they must confess that they were wholly ignorant of the resources of France

that they were wholly ignorant that the ruler of France had the resources of the greater part of Europe at his command-that they were wholly ignorant that France had a large army which could be brought to bear upon any given point. With this view of the subject, it is, of course, impossible that I can concur in applauding the past measures adopted by ministers with respect to Spain; nor can I concur in supporting the system proposed to be adopted for increasing the army, with the view of sending more troops to Spain, for this must be the object, or the expression means nothing; although I do not mean to deny, that with the evils with which we are now surrounded, the increase of our regular force is a necessary measure. From the approbation, however, which is implied of their conduct, and their wise and vigorous system, I must decidedly dissent, contending, as I do, that there has been neither wisdom nor vigour in their measures.

Lord Grenville said, that there was one most important topic which he thought it his duty to press on the attention of their lordships,

though

though no notice was taken of it either in the speech or in the address; he meant the present state of our relations with the United States of America-So also did many of the speakers, in opposition to ministry, in both Houses, on various occasions. But into their discussions on this subject, on such occasions, when the subject was not formally before the Houses, it would be both endless and idle to enter. It is remarkable that the debates were more than ordinarily keen, on the side of opposition, when the subject related either to America or to Ireland.

The Earl of Liverpool said, that with regard to the affairs of Spain, the address only proposed to give his Majesty a general assurance of support in maintaining the cause of the Spaniards as long as that nation proved true to themselves. In what way this support had been given, or how it was in future to be administered, would be a subject of distinct and detailed consideration: nor would the House, by now agreeing to the address, pledge themselves to approve of those particular engagements which had been contracted. All that they were now called upon to do, was, to record a public avowal of their determination not to desert that cause which the government and the country had espoused, and in which it was, in consequence of reverses, even become a more sacred duty to persevere. Those who inferred that the cause was desperate, from those disasters which had already happened, reasoned upon a most imperfect view of the relative situation of the parties engaged in the contest. And he entreated those who were in

clined to despond, to consult the records of history, and to review those instances of nations who had been compelled to struggle for their independence in circumstances similar to those in which the Spaniards were now placed. There it would be found that nations, after maintaining struggles for ten or twenty years, in the course of which they had been almost uniformly worsted in battle, had eventually succeeded, in spite of the triumphs of their adversaries, in securing the object for which they contended. It was difficult to conceive any situation which would better warrant hopes of ultimate success, than that of Spain at this day. It appeared a little extraordinary to Lord Liverpool, that Lord Grenville should have objected to the policy of the expedition to Portugal, which was almost the only point of the coast which was, at the time, in the possession of the enemy. A large force had been prepared with unexampled expedition, and in its application ministers had taken the advice, not only of military men of high reputation, but had consulted the Spaniards themselves, who, both in the north and south, had recommended the reduction of General Junot's army, as the most acceptable service, that it was in our power to perform. The consideration due to an ancient and faithful ally, he admitted to have had considerable influence with his Majesty's ministers, in undertaking the deliverance of Portugal. He requested also the noble lord to bear in mind, that at the time when our expedition sailed, and which he seemed to think might have acted with greater advantage in the

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