Was the noble lord (Castlereagh) the melancholy consequences, were opposite, so stinted as to that species of force: or so stinted as to the means of its conveyance, that for a British army, destined to act in the field against the enemy, he could only obtain 200 cavalry? Who that reverts to the proceedings of this House, in the last session, but must remember that noble lord, almost with tears in his eyes, and in a tone of despondence that arrested commiseration, regretting the exhausted state in which he asserted that department of the public service was, through a feeling of false economy, left by a right honourable friend (Mr. T. Grenville) not now in the House. It was then, we were told by him, that by having transports when they were not wanted, we were sure to have them at hand in the moment of urgency. By what fatality I ask the noble lord is it, that all his characteristic energy seems to have sat upon the present state of things? Is this the territory, which under the administration of the noble lord, Great Britain exemplifies to the continent of Europe, of her military powers, and of the strength and comprehension of those who manage her resources? Indeed, if their effects had not proved most lamentable to the security of Europe, and the character of this empire, it would afford a most prolific source of ridicule to review the ministerial operations of the noble lord. An army sent without instructions, without plan, almost destitute of cavalry, and deficient in stores; the artillery not fit for the operations which should have been pursued, whilst the horses (the accounts given of the state of which, if it were not for truly ridiculous) were represented as blind and lame, and some even as dying of old age. These, at least, are the statements of the general officers whom the noble lord had selected; and if they are not satisfactory to himself, he alone is to blame for their inaccuracy, having appointed three commanders in chief with a rapidity greater than the relays of post horses, from whom, of course, no very intelligent accounts were to be expected. Now, let us examine the reasons stated by the generals for acquiescing in the Convention. Time, say they, was thus obtained to forward the British army to Spain. The Convention was signed definitively on the 30th of August; and yet the British army was not ready for action in Spain for two months, nay, some of the troops did not leave Portugal for ten weeks after. Is it only for the conveyance of the troops of France that the noble lord can find transports? These he can convey in British shipping, to be again, almost immediately on their debarkation, employed in Spain, whilst by that very measure he subjects, in a dreadful. season, the British army to a march of 500 miles. It is impossible to pronounce adequately upon that disgraceful measure; there is so much in every part of it of mystery, enigma, and riddle. We are now told, that his Majesty has expressed his formal disapprobation of some parts of the Convention; and yet his. ministers thought proper to fire the tower guns in approbation of it. His Majesty, it appears, had a different feeling of what affects the the honour of the country and the glory of the British army, and I most sincerely believe it, from that entertained by those ministers, who conceived it right to proclaim with all the demonstrations of public rejoicing, this stain upon both. His Majesty protests against being deemed a partner with his servants in this disgraceful transaction; and has this night announced to his Parliament that he has formally disapproved of it. Early in the progress of the hostile operations in Spain, I believe in the month of July, a document was published by the Supreme Junta of Seville, under the title of Precautions, which fixed upon a plan of warfare, and also conveyed in structions to the inhabitants of Spain, as to the manner in which they were to conduct their hostility against the enemy. Biscay Castille, and Navarre were the parts of the peninsula pointed out as the most proper theatre for hostile exertions. These were the points most important to engage the consideration of the patriotic leaders, and, of course, of the auxiliary force which was naturally to be expected from this country. Now, if his majesty's ministers had condescended to hold a little intercourse with the Supreme Junta, or have allowed the army to remain in England till they actually knew something of the state of Spain; or, if Sir Arthur had even corresponded with the Junta, they, and we too, would have learned, that the most important duty to be performed was the defence of the north of Spain, and the passage of the Pyrenees; and then, instead of being worsted, the army so sent might have been used for the most beneficial purposes, so as to make the French retire within the frontiers of France. I am certain that was the plan of warfare which would have been most essential to the safety of Spain. The Convention of Portugal having taken place, his Majesty's ministers thought proper to cause the tower guns to be discharged, in token of the satisfaction they felt, until they found that all the rest of his Majesty's subjects entertained a contrary feeling upon the transaction. The public displeasure was loud and general; every patriotic heart felt the stain cast upon his country's honour; every tongue uttered the complaint. It did so turn out, too, that the first city in the empire, the city of London, sympathising with the national feeling, approached the throne with their sentiments, and a most vigorous reception they did meet with indeed. The right hon. gentleman had certainly anticipated a complete triumph over the Lord Mayor and Common Council of London; but subsequent events proved that his Majesty's citizens could rally. The Corporation tell his Majesty, that they think the Convention disgraceful, dishonorable to the British arms, and injurious to his Majesty's interests: they call for investigation and the punishment of the guilty. In answer to this application, his Majesty's ministers advise his Majesty to tell the citizens of London that their interposition was unnecessary, and that it was inconsistent with British justice to pronounce judgment before investigation. Really, though the gentlemen opposite may think their responses not only wise but oracular, I am at a loss to know what the difference is between British justice, and that justice which in every variation of time or place, is immutable. Feeling the profoundest respect in every case, in which his Majesty appears to act, I still must say, that his advisers put into his mouth upon that occasion, an answer as little congenial to the spirit of the British constitution, as it was ill suited to the dignity of the throne. Ministers may talk with flippancy themselves, they may pun and epigrammatise, they may sneer, or they may snoutch, but when unfortunately the king of this country feels it his duty to hint his displeasure to his people, or convey to them a rebuke for their conduct, there ought to be a dignity and decorum observed in the language of reproof from the throne, which would make displeasure more severely be felt by those for whom it was intended. But, Sir, I can easily conceive that ministers might have been a little irascible on receiving that remonstrance, because, notwithstanding the usual complacency of the City of London to their measures, it had within the last year on two important occasions opposed them, first on the Reversion Bill, and latterly on this disgraceful Convention. The most material considerations, however, are the employment of the British force in Spain, the dilatoriness of those directing it, and their total want of capacity. If it were wise at all to send a British army into Spain, that opportunity has been lost, which appears to have been the only favourable one that presented itself. In giving assistance to the Spaniards, + there were, as I before stated, two modes of proceeding. What the opinions of the Spaniards themselves are I profess myself totally ignorant. The fact is, that this ignorance does not proceed from any want of diligence on my part in making inquiries; but for want of any authentic source from which information could be procured. Did the Spaniards make application for a regular force to be sent into their country, or for money, arms, ammunition, clothing, and all other necessaries to enable them to prosecute the war against such armies as France had the power of pouring into their country? I ask this question, because if Spain with such assistance could not carry the point of keeping out any fresh reinforcements, there was little probability of preventing that country from being over-run. In investigating this matter we should have considered what was the amount of the disposable force of France. To guide us in regard to this point, we have a recent document to refer to for information, In papers which were laid before Parliament in the beginning of the year 1806, just after the failure of the third coalition, there appears a memoir from the court of Vienna to that of St. Petersburgh, stating the amount of force which France could probably bring against the allied Powers. From this document it appears that the French force was then estimated at 500,000 men, exclusive of the imperial guards, which consisted of 15,000 men. This was the opinion of the court of Vienna before France had over-run Germany and Poland, and some other countries of Europe and previously to her con nection nection with Russia. The dis posable force of France must, therefore, have been since considerably increased; and it was consequently most material for this country, before it adopted any measure whatever, to consider well the propriety of employing her troops in Spain, where there was a likelihood of such immense numbers being brought against them. Never, I believe, was sympathy so strong, as that evinced in England in favour of the Spanish cause. Yet, though such had been the enthusiasm of the nation at large, and however ardent the people might be in lending assistance to support such a glorious struggle, it was the duty of those, who were intrusted with the management of the national force, to consider in every point of view the propriety or impropriety of complying with the popular feeling. That was perhaps the feeling of the moment, but ministers were bound to consult for the permanent interests of the public, and it was therefore their duty to investigate and ascertain by every possible mode, whether they ought to risk an English army at all in Spain, or confine their assistance to the supplies I have mentioned. I do not wish to impute blame to them for having sent a British force to Spain, if the Spaniards themselves applied for it, and if it was the opinion of competent judges, that there was a probability of enabling them thereby to keep the field against their powerful enemy. We have instances in our history of our having been before in a similar situation and under similar circumstances. The independence of the United Provinces was effect ed principally by the assistance of England. Queen Elizabeth for her own safety against the designs of Spain, assisted those who revolted against its tyranny and oppression; and I wish that ministers had adverted, in the present instance, to the conduct of that wise princess, and her wise administration. None of the present ministry can think themselves disgraced by a comparison with Lord Burleigh; and yet we find that Queen Elizabeth, pressed as she was by the power, the rancour, the persevering hostility of Spain, did not hazard the whole force of her dominions, nor proceed to send any number of troops abroad, without some assurance of safety in case of disaster. She, by the advice of her ministers, took care to possess what were called cautionary towns, and thereby assured herself of a retreat, and gained a safe point whither to send reinforcements, as well as a security that the United Provinces should not abandon her in the contest in which they were engaged. I know not what has taken place between the English and Spanish governments upon that subject; but, I perceive, that in his Majesty's late declaration it is stated, that certain obligations exist which are considered equally binding as the most solemn treaty. From what I yet know of the matter, I cannot agree in the propriety of any such sentiment: I should not, however, think of abandoning them in the hour of misfortune; but I cannot admit, that we should consider our present obligations in the light of a solemn treaty for what is the nature of such an engagement? It is entered into in a moment of hurry and precipita : tion; it has not been laid before us, and therefore is, as yet, unauthorized by Parliament; and, consequently, you may approve or disapprove, you may grant or re fuse the supplies for carrying it into effect. Upon the whole, therefore, I know not how an engagement of this sort is to be considered as equally binding as the most solemn treaty. But we now understand, that a formal treaty has been negociated, which it is intended to lay before the house, and until that be done I cannot decide upon its merits or propriety. I dare say the house would naturally be inclined to receive, with the fondest partiality, every thing apparently tending to the advantage of the Spanish cause: but, sir, the state of our warfare, under such circumstances as I have already stated, and as his Majesty's ministers have conducted it, is truly extraordinary. If the Spaniards preferred that mode of warfare, which was of a desultory nature, instead of a continued warfare, then the British army could not have been of the least use in Spain; for a British army there must necessarily have pursued a plan wholly different from that of the Spaniards. I know not which system of warfare was proper to be adopted; but I say the two systems are completely incompatible. The Spaniards, in their own country, and pursuing a desultory mode of attack, have the power of dispersing and rallying again, as occasion might require; but this is not the case with a regular army. If you combine the two modes, you must necessarily destroy the energies and efficacy of one of them. We have already seen this exemplified in the Spaniards. We have seen their regular army defeated, and almost destroyed by the enemy; while in another quarter we have found their irregular force very successful; which shows that the two modes of fighting are perfectly inconsistent. Now, sir, let us see what has been the vigour of ministers upon this occasion. By vigour, I presume, is meant a prompt energetic use and application of the public force. Will you tell us of one instance of such promptitude and energy? I say it was displayed in Portugal; presume you cannot nor in Spain by Sir John Moore's coming into the field after the Spanish army had been defeated? It was not then useful, because it was unable to keep the field by itself. It is an extraordinary circumstance, that the Convention of Portugal is made to rest in a great degree upon the speedy applicability of the British army in Spain, and yet the general of that army, Sir Hew Dalrymple, tells you there was no preparation made for its reception in that country for some considerable time after the Convention was concluded. Can it then be said, that the object of the convention was carried into effect, or that any time was gained by it? If such measures deserve the name of being energetic or useful, I am at a loss to know what sort of measures would be deemed the contrary. As to that part of the speech which relates to Sweden, I have only to observe, that this country is placed in such a situation that I do not see how we can refuse to |