ministers, how it had happened that so heavy and lamentable a loss as that of Sir John Moore, and so great a proportion of his army, had been sustained, without any one object having been obtained except the embarkation of the army? British blood and treasure, and the invaluable lives of British officers and soldiers had been sacrificed to no purpose. To what but the ignorance and incapacity of ministers were all these calamities to be attributed? Lord Erskine too, who felt as much for the fame of the immortal officer deceased as any of their lordships could possibly feel (from peculiar or personal circumstances which he detailed) could not refrain from expressing his indignation at such men, and that such resources as ours should have been utterly thrown away and lost by the total incapacity of those who had mis-directed their efforts.-Lord Grenville observed, that they were called upon to vote thanks for a success, followed by a retreat. The

success belonged to the army and its commander; the retreat to those who sent them, and placed them in such a situation that a safe retreat was the only thing that could be looked for. Ministers for the folly of such conduct must answer to their country.-The Earl of Westmoreland recollecting the expeditions to Alexandria, to Constantinople, and to South America, was surprised that noble lords opposite did not at those periods state that all the blame of unfavourable military events was to be attributed to ministers.

The motion was agreed to nem. diss. so also was a motion acknowledging and approving the services of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers; a motion of thanks to Rear Admiral de Courcy, and Sir Samuel Hood, and the other officers, for their assistance; and another, acknowledging and approving the services of the seamen and marines upon that occasion. Thanks to the same parties were also voted in the House of Commons.

CHAP.

of that court had been, that no further proceedings were necessary. But still this opinion left it open to that house to consider what had been the origin of the transactions, by which, in the eyes of the public, the principal object of the expedition to the peninsula, notwithstanding the success of the British arms, had been completely lost in disappointment and disgrace:-By the course of unexpected events, his Majesty's government, at the moment when called upon by circumstances for co-operation with Spain, had in actual readiness three distinct masses of disposable force. An intention was conceived of affording to that country the aid of a large military force under the command of that gallant military officer, Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the ultimate destination of the expedition was Portugal. There was nothing in the possession of Portugal itself: nothing in the possession of the port of Lisbon, that could be a source of immediate succour to the Spaniards; nothing connected with the real interests of even our faithful ally, the Queen of Portugal, or of her subjects in Portugal that could point out and justify that destination; for of all the calamities that could be inflicted on a country, the conquest of it by a power that is not able to retain it is the greatest; the country being thereby exposed to the calamities of two revolutions. There was, however, in that country a French army, and in its great port a Russian fleet. The capture of that army, and the possession of that fleet were of the highest importance to this country. We

saw a French army in a position in which it was cut off from all means of assistance. Every man who looked to the French army in Portugal might say, that whatever should be the fate of the other armies of Buonaparté, here, at least, was an army cut off from all possibility of relief.

Lord Petty pointed out the considerations that were required to be most particularly attended to in this expedition. It required the most positive and clear instructions, with regard to the nature of it, to be given to the officer who was to have the command of it; the expedition being intended to act in different situations, according to the different circumstances in which it should find the country that was to be the scene of its operations, it was above all things necessary that it should be properly equipped for the service: that the commander of the expedition should at least have had the opportunity afforded him of choosing his own ground; and that after such discretion was confided to him, he should at least have been continued in his command. In all these respects, Lord H. P. on a review of the campaign, considered the conduct of ministers as deficient :-The shores of Portugal were not the first objects of the expedition. It fluctuated between the northern and Southern coasts of Spain: ministers had been in important instances mis-informed: their instructions to the officers commanding our forces ill-concerted, wavering and discordant. suggestion of carrying the expedition to Portugal, far from having been founded upon any original determination,

The

determination, was taken up in 48 hours, upon the suggestion of the Spanish Deputies. And he could not but think it a most extraordinary thing, that the provincial Juntas, who could not concert measures for the defence of their own country should know how to advise the means by which a British army was to co-operate with them. The deputies of one of these provincial juntas were employed in advising his Majesty as to the best means of employing his troops elsewhere. And he believed that they were more actuated by the desire of not seeing the expedition come among themselves, than by any thing else. On the 30th of June, in opposition to all the previous designs, the only direction sent to the army was, in the words of the juntas, "To expel the French from Portugal;" words, with respect to which General Dalrymple had said, that if they had been selected for being equivocal, they could not have been more so. On the morning of the 30th of June, these instructions were sent; on the night of the 30th of June, new instructions, in consequence of fresh dispatches from Sir C. Cotton, &c.

Sir A. Wellesley had told them, that although he sailed under these instructions of the 30th of June, he yet conceived himself to sail with general powers, and liberty to apply his force in any quarter in which it might be serviceable in Spain. One would have thought that, with this latitude to Sir Arthur, there being hardly a point on the coast where cavalry would not have been most useful, cavalry would have formed a considerable part of the force under his

command, yet there were but 300 cavalry, of which 200 only were fit for service. Sir Arthur says, (on his examination before the Board of Inquiry) that when the expedition sailed, it being uncertain whether it might not remain long at sea, and it being doubtful in what part of the peninsula it might be serviceable, it was thought adviseable not to take good horses to draw the guns. I have heard (said Lord Petty) of cases where it has been necessary to have particularly good artillery horses; I have heard of cases where it has not been necessary to have any artillery horses at all; but this is the first time in my life that I have ever heard of an expedition in which it was thought expedient to have bad artillery horses; or that, because the expedition itself was uncertain, and the plan not fixed, therefore, if by chance it should become otherwise, the instruments were to be imperfect and insufficient, as it would be found these were. The account of Col. Robb describes the horses as sick, lame, blind, cast-off, and unfit for service. Now this was not by accident, but by concert, botween Lord Hawkesbury and the lord lieutenant.

The gallant general sailed on the 12th of July, conceiving himself to be the commander of the expedition which was to effect_the destruction of the enemy in Portugal.

And yet, three days after, on the 15th of July, a new commander in chief was appointed; and, in fact, not only one, but six general officers superior to him in ranks, were, in that short space of time, sent out to Portugal. This variety of commanders having been appointed, Sir A. Wel

lesley

lesley being sent to undertake a system of operations on the coast of Portugal, General Burrard sent to supersede him, and General Dalrymple to supersede General Burrard, with a design to send another general to supersede General Dalrymple, it was entertaining to see Lord C. recommending it to persons so superseding each other, to act together in harmony!

When it was resolved to deprive Sir A. Wellesley of the chief command, and to send to Portugal the force under Sir J. Moore, the unprofitable employment of which, in another quarter, was universally allowed, even by ministers themselves, not to have been chargeable upon him, it might have been supposed that this gallant and most able officer, was the most likely to be Sir A. Wellesley's successor. But no; such a successor was not thought of by the noble lord. On the contrary, it seemed to have been studiously provided, that in all the various changes, Sir J. Moore should not have even a temporary command. He who throughout his life had displayed so much skill and valour-so much zeal and patriotism; who had conducted his army with such distinguished judgment as well as intrepidity, through a long, a fatiguing, and perilous march; who would have saved that army from all disaster, had his views been duly seconded, was not considered by lord C. as deserving of any attention: for on the very day that Sir H. Dalrymple was appointed to the command in chief, orders were sent out that Sir J. Moore should be superseded by Sir H. Burrard: to whom, he

was convinced, a more unwelcome appointment could not have been given.-To Sir Harry Burrard, all the defects in the state of the army, which Lord Petty had mentioned, were immediately obvious. He saw the want of cavalry and artillery, and also the insufficiency of the country to afford provisions; and these were the grounds on which that officer rested the justification of his subsequent conduct.

Sir H. Burrard's reign, how ever, was but short; for, on the 22nd of August, another commander in chief appeared. The north wind brought Sir H. Burrard: the south Sir H. Dalrymple; and scarcely had Sir Harry's sun risen, when Sir Harry's sun was set for ever. Here Lord Petty thought it but justice to call the attention of the house to the very peculiar situation in which Sir H. Dalrymple was placed. He had just taken the command of an army which he had never before seen, and landed in a country with which he was not acquainted: and was committed on a system of operations on which he had never been consulted. The delicacy of Sir Hew's situation was described by himself in terms peculiarly appropriate, when he stated, "that all the responsibility was vested in him, and all the direction others." One general directed the expedition-another general concluded it-and a third directed the consequences that were to flow from it.

in

There was one reason, however, which induced all the generals to act as they did; which was, that no other object had been communicated to them than that

of