upon men in possession of the living details of a situation. In the despatch beginning at p. 156, you will find that Lord Salisbury, no ways out of conceit with his plan, in spite of the protest of men experienced in Oriental diplomacy and acquainted with the situation in Afghanistan, gave the same instructions to Lord Lytton. Lord Lytton was told to send a Mission to the Ameer to notify his assumption of the Viceregal office, and the Queen's assumption of the title of Empress in relation to her Indian subjects. On the 5th of May, 1876, the Commissioner of Peshawur (p. 174) intimated to Shere Ali that the Mission was to be sent, and desired him to say where he would like to receive it. As Lord Northbrook foresaw, Sir Lewis Pelly, you 6 the Ameer's suspicions were at once roused. will observe, was the Envoy chosen, the same who had superintended the deposition of the Gaekwar of Baroda. The Ameer (p. 175) desired to know, before receiving the Mission, the things concealed in the generous heart of the English Government.' The intimation had been discussed for three or four days continuously in the Ameer's Council before this reply was sent. A. But why could he not accept the Mission at once? B. At p. 181 you will find the most potent reasons: His Ilighness feared that the Mission might merge into one of a permanent character, and that the Envoy, like our political Agents at the courts of the native Indian States, might become a referee for discontented Afghan subjects; that in any case, the permanent presence of a Mission would embarrass His Highness in his internal administration, causing annoyance to the patriotic party and raising the hopes of the disaffected. You will observe that Lord Lytton made no reply to this objection, his instructions being to insist on the reception of permanent Agents, without regard to consequences. A. Ah, but I see another objection made: His Highness was under the impression that after all that had occurred in 1873 and since that time, no practical result would follow the Mission, and that he entertained no hope of an improvement. I find the Ameer also saying that he had fully explained his wishes in 1873; and as the British Government would not then concede what he wanted, there was no use in reopening negotiations. So it was Gladstone's Government that was to blame after all. B. I will concede that they were to blame if we find that Beaconsfield's Government were at all more disposed to concede what the Ameer wanted. Were they willing to bind themselves to assist the Ameer against Russia without reserving the right to decide whether he had given grounds for attack? Were they willing to bind themselves to protect Shere Ali and his dynasty unconditionally on the throne of Cabul? We shall see. Lord Lytton's proposed concessions are to be found at p. 184. The second of these is worded thus,- In the event of unprovoked aggression upon Afghanistan from without, assistance shall be afforded in men, money, and arms.' The third is, "That Abdullah Jan shall be recognised as the Ameer's successor.' There is not a word about protecting his dynasty unconditionally, not a word about assisting him against Russia, leaving him judge of the occasion. This was what the Ameer wanted. No British Government in its senses could have made such a concession. Lord Beaconsfield's Government was as far as Mr. Gladstone's from giving the Ameer what he wanted. A. But that is only the Duke of Argyll's account of what Shere Ali wanted. B. Pardon me. If you turn to p. 165 you will find that this is also Lord Lytton's account of what he wanted. After a little experience, Lord Lytton discovered that what Lord Northbrook had said about the Ameer was true, though Lord Salisbury, in his study in London, thought he knew better. In Lord Lytton's despatch, of date 13th of May, 1877, p. 165, you see this sentence: All the recent conduct and language of this Prince had pointed to the conclusion that he cared little, or nothing, for such eventual protection of his country or as our political necessities might oblige us in any case to afford it against foreign aggression, and that what he really did care to obtain from us was some unconditional pledge of personal and dynastic support to himself and family. This was the protection which, as a year's experience convinced Lord Lytton, the Ameer desired. Mr. Gladstone's Government would not give it to him. Finding that, as you will see a hundred times repeated, he desired to be let alone. Mr. Gladstone's Government, advised by their Indian officials, let him alone, and secured the interests of India by obtaining an engagement from Russia upon which they could act when circumstances demanded. Lord Beaconsfield's Government also declined to give the Ameer what he wanted. But they would not let him alone. Further, when circumstances demanded their claiming from Russia the fulfilment of the engagement, they shrank from doing so. A. Not a bit of it. They made representations. B. And were content with representations in return, which they knew to be contrary to fact. Observe that they first received certain knowledge of Russian emissaries being at Cabul in 1876. Russian emissaries continued to be sent, to their knowledge, for two years afterwards. Why did they tamely acquiesce in this while it was going on, and in the end accept the excuse that it had been done as a precautionary measure when the maintenance of peace between England and Russia seemed uncertain? Not only did they accept this excuse, but the Blue-books show they made no attempt to have the limits of the engagement clearly defined, although they continued to receive reports that Russian agents were still at Cabul. Within the last two months, after being taunted with their dereliction from their plain duty, they have waxed bold and declared that they will permit no tampering with Cabul. Why were they not bolder before they were pushed on from behind? And now, if you can spare me a few minutes more, I will show you from the Blue-books what effect their apparent acquiescence in Kaufmann's breach of the Czar's engagement had upon the mind of the Ameer. A. Go on, go on. You are having it all your own way. で B. Pull me up whenever you please, if you find me departing from the authorised record of facts. The Ameer knew of our engagement with Russia. The Indian Government had informed him. of it. Presently Kaufmann also wrote him a friendly letter, alluding to the existence of the engagement as a subject for congratulation. The Ameer was perplexed at this (p. 65). Russia and England in cordial agreement about his territories! This is a new tone. God knows what State secrets may be concealed in it!' He gave the letter to our Cabul Agent to be transmitted to the Viceroy. More letters came from Kaufmann. The Ameer gave them also to the Agent, more perplexed than ever. The Indian Government said nothing to him about these messages. They did not at once declare that they were a breach of Russia's engagements, and inform him that they would not permit it. What conclusion could he come to? He found Russia breaking her engagements: he furnished the English Government with the proofs. They made no remonstrance that he was aware of, and little that anybody is aware of. What conclusion could he come to, except that Russia was the stronger Power, and that the English Government was afraid to hold her to her pledges? " C A. But stay. At p. 177, in a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur to the Ameer, replying to his plea that if he accepted an English Mission he could not decline a Russian one, because Russia was a great and fearless Power,' I find this The Ameer must be aware that the British Government, acting on behalf of His Highness's wishes and interests, has obtained from the Government of the Czar written pledges not to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of Afghanistan. The reception of a British Envoy cannot therefore necessitate the reception of a Russian one; for in refusing to receive a Russian Envoy, His Highness would only be acting in conformity with the policy thus solemnly agreed upon. B. That refers to the reception of a Russian Envoy, but at the time when it was written (8th of July, 1876) the Indian Government was permitting, without remark, the Ameer's reception of Kaufmann's informal messages. If they permitted this, how was he to know that they had the will or the power to protect him if he should decline to receive a Russian Envoy? I say that the Ameer, hedged in as he was, could draw only one of two conclusions: either that the English were afraid of the Russians; or that they had made a compact to manage his affairs between them, and that the Russian annexation of Kokand, of which Kaufmann had informed him, was the prelude to an English annexation of Afghanistan. A. Now you are going a little too deep into the feelings of the savage for me. After all, the main point is that, however it came about, he accepted a Russian Envoy and refused an English Envoy, and that this is a thing which we could not permit. B. Not even if we had forced him into the arms of Russia by our blundering diplomacy? A. Certainly not. B. Not even if there was another clear course open to us? I grant you that we could not permit a Russian Envoy to remain at Cabul. A. Well, that might alter the case. But what other course was there? You can't tell me that from the Blue-books. B. There is no record in the Blue-books of any compact with us broken by the Ameer in receiving a Russian Envoy. On the other hand, the passages I have shown you, and the one you have just quoted yourself, make it clear that there was a compact with Russia that she would not send Envoys to Cabul. Why not call Russia to account? The Ameer had broken no compact, Russia had; why hector the small man about the offence of the big? A. I must be going now. B. I hope I have convinced you, without the least reference to party, which should never be allowed to interfere with the foreign policy of this country, that a course of action, decided on after due consideration of all contingencies, to prevent unrest and uncertainty, has been broken in upon without a shadow of a reason. Further, that the safeguards to our interests in India, provided by an experienced statesman after repeated and careful consultatiou with all his high officers who were practically conversant with the state of affairs, have been ignominiously and pusillanimously neglected by an inexperienced statesman, intent upon his own doctrinaire ideas, the fruits of a few months' cram. You see for yourself in these Blue-books with what amount of propriety the men who have gratuitously disturbed the tenure of our power in India try now to prove that they could not help it, and to throw the responsibility and the blame on other shoulders. No one who looks at these colourless records can be in any difficulty about putting the saddle on the right horse. A. Well, well; I must be going. B. I hope you are convinced. A. Not in the least. B. Do you reject the evidence of facts? A. throws Blue-books in the fire; B. rescues them, and WILLIAM MINTO. RECENT SCIENCE. (PROFESSOR HUXLEY has kindly read, and aided the Compilers and the Editor with his advice upon, the following article.) 6 To those who have been familiar for many years with the electric light, and have watched its gradual application to special purposes of illumination, it is strange to find it suddenly starting into publicity and overshadowing all other scientific topics. The impetus which has lately been given to the subject of electric lighting may undoubtedly be traced to the invention of the famous electric candle' of M. Jablochkoff, and to the introduction of this candle on an extended scale into some of the great thoroughfares of Paris. Those who had admired the beautiful effect of the Jablochkoff light in the Avenue de l'Opéra, would naturally believe that we were approaching the dawn of a new era in the history of illumination. No sooner, however, does the light give promise of practical utility, than a host of inventors rush into the field, each enthusiastic on the peculiar merits of his own system, until the unscientific reader is utterly bewildered by the number and variety of devices which clamour for attention. The excitement on this question has culminated in the mysterious paragraphs which, after their appearance in the American newspapers, have been widely reproduced in this country, announcing that Mr. Edison, who has lately played so prominent a part in connection with other electrical discoveries, has devised a new system of electric illumination which is so simple and so practical as to threaten to supersede the use of coal-gas. The details of his process, it is true, have not yet been published; but still sufficient has leaked out to leave little room for doubt that the light is obtained by the incandescence of a resisting body interposed in a closed circuit. It may therefore be of interest to explain the principles on which such incandescence is produced; to trace the steps which have previously been taken to apply this incandescence to practical purposes; and to contrast this mode of illumination with that of the ordinary electric light. When an electric current such as that from a voltaic battery meets with a resistance to its passage, the electricity is directly converted into heat. It is, in fact, a case of the transformation of one species of energy into another. If a thin wire be placed in the circuit, the |