the fight of the town, where they lighted fires, as fignals to the malcontents, and had raifed the country around by founding the tocfin. From this pofition they were driven the following day, by the divifion under Miolis, who, feconded by the general in chief, followed up his advantage, and, joining the Auftrians at Campinardigo, made fifteen hundred prifoners, among which was the general, baron D'Afpres. The principal advantage refulting from this victory was the effect it operated on the minds of the Genoefe, by crushing the spirit of infurrection which was rifing in the city.

The Auftrian general having fucceeded in infulating the French army, followed up his advantage on the western fide of Genoa, and marched to attack the divifion under Soult, leaving a fufficient number of troops to keep in check other corps under Suchet, who was thrown on the fide of Nice. The engagement which took place (10th April) near Saffelo, was obftinate and bloody, and ended in the defeat of the French, who had been unable, from the extreme difficulty of the country, to receive intelligence and concentre their forces, according to the inftructions of Maffena, who, with only three of his ftaff, narrowly efcaped being taken prisoner, after lofing one general out of two, two adjutant-generals out of three, and three aidesde-camp out of five. The divifion under Soult took advantage of the diverfion made by Maffena in its favour, and attacked the Auftrians, who were forced back to their poft at Tagliarino, from which they were afterwards driven with confiderable lofs. The mountain, Hermetta, in poffefiion of the Auftrians, feparated the two divi

fions of the French army; this poft was carried by the French; and the junction of the French troops,' the object of the expedition, took place, which was not gained without fevere lofs on the part of the French, and obftinate refiftance on that of the Auftrians, who loft in those various combats, or rather in this lengthened battle, upwards of 4000 men. The divifion of the French army, on the coaft of Genoa, weakened by the draught made by Maffena, and unable to refift the impetuous attacks of the Auftrians, though greatly inferior in number, were completely routed, and driven from their poft at Cozoletto, which was afterwards retaken by Maffena, who punished the fugitives for their cowardice, by ordering them to remain in garrifon at Genoa.

Whatever advantages might be gained in thefe partial engagements by the French, it was evident that a series of fuch victories muft end in the final deftruction of their army, fince cut off, as they were, from all communication with France, and incapable, from the blockade by fea, of receiving any fuccours, either in men or provifions; while the Austrians were in a fituation of repairing their loffes immediately, and becoming ftronger as their enemies weakened, had only to wait the hafty operations of difeafe and famine to bring Genoa to a speedy furrender. Maffena had now continued his offenfive operations during fifteen days; but, finding the country no longer tenable, and feeing the Auftrians in poffeffion of the pofts on the coafts, within a fhort diftance from the rivers that wash Genoa on the eaft and the weft, he determined on his retreat into the city, which was accomplifhed, but not without confiderable lofs. The French army

was

was now (21ft April) reduced to 9500 men, which Maffena formed into two divifions, under the generals Miolis and Garnier, with a fmall body of reserve. With this force he had to oppose an army four times the number. Under fuch circumftances, to remain fecure within the walls of Genoa till fuccour arrived would have been deemed no great calamity, had the French army not found an enemy within its walls more difficult to ftruggle with than Auftrian troops. This enemy was famine; and, among the problems which this memorable fiege will leave to be refolved, is the fact, how, in a country where, before the blockade, - there were scarcely provifions for more than fix days, there was found afterwards, and during a moft fevere blockade, conftancy and patience, which lengthened out the confumption to fixty.

In the fituation to which the army was reduced, a queftion naturally fuggefts itself with refpect to the prifoners made by the French. During the firft days of the blockade, the prifoners were fent back; but the fufpicion that they were made to take arms again, and the refufal of the Auftrian general to exchange them, led the French afterwards to retain them. As the refidence of thefe prifoners in Genoa might have been attended with danger, confidering the ftate of defpair to which the people were driven, Maffena fent them on board veffels in the port, and included them in the lifts of the people to whom the Ligurian government was commiffioned to diftribute provifions. Of this diftribution, wretched as it was, it might readily be fuppofed that thefe unfortunate men were by no means the equal partakers. Scarcely can an idea

1800.

be formed of the devouring hunger to which they became a prey. Their fhoes and knapsacks, converted into food, ferved for a moment to prolong their miseries; and, fuch was the state of defperation to which they were driven, that the government durft fend no one on board, left the messenger fhould become the victim of their raging appetites. Their cries and lamentations refounded through the port, meeting the ears of wretches fcarcely more fortunate than themfelves. Propofitions had been made in vain, by Massena, to general Otto, to fend them daily by fea their fubfiftence. Policy forbade the acceptance of this offer. Human nature could no longer fuftain fuch outrages to humanity. The miferable victims, in great numbers, expired amidst the most dreadful fufferings, and many fhrunk from them, by feeking in the waves that washed their veffels a voluntary death.

Although reduced to the defenfive, Maffena neglected no opportu nity of harating, by fallies from his lines, the enemy by whom he was furrounded. In one of thefe engagements the Auftrians loft upwards of 4000 men. In that which fucceeded it, the French were defeated with a confiderable lofs of officers of the staff. At tempts to furprise the Auftrian-magazines were unfuccefsful; and a fally to the east of Genoa, which promifed much at the beginning, was turned into a fevere repulfe, by the accidental occurrence of a dreadful tempeft which overtook them in the mountains furrounding Genoa, and which proved a favour able auxiliary to the imperialists. An engagement in which Maffena loft three of his best commanders, among whom was general Soult,

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terminated all further operations on his part, and the Auftrians had now carried their arms to the walls of Genoa, without meeting any further effective refiftance. At this period (14th May) the Neapolitan gun-boats began the bombardment of the town, which ceafed with the day, but which was renewed fome days after. The prefence of the French was fo much the more neceffary, as defpair had driven a great part of the inhabitants to purposes of infurrection; the Genoefe beheld, neither in the Auftrians nor French, a foe as favage as that which they had to combat in the famine which preffed them; and as much courage was neceflary to reftrain the people with in the gates, as to prevent the Auftrians from entering them.

General Melas having nothing more to apprehend from the army in Genoa, turned his forces againft general Suchet, whom he had detached from the main body on his firt attack. Against Suchet's divifion he had hitherto directed only an army of obfervation. To fuch fuperior forces no effective refiftance could be made. Suchet was compelled to abandon his ftrong pofition of the Col de Tende, and retreat from the various pofts of which he ftrove in vain to keep poffeffion. The French territory was now invaded by the imperialifts; and as Suchet found Nice untenable, he ordered it to be evacuated, and retreated across the Var, leaving Melas in poffeffion of the whole department of the Maritime Alps..

From tracing the military operations of the belligerent powers in Italy, of which the Aufirians, fave the city of Genoa, had gained the entire poffeffion, we turn back to the opening of the campaign on

STARO7 the Rhine.

General Kray, wha

had fucceeded prince Charles in the command on the Rhine, had divided his army into four corps, commanded by the generals Kollowrath, Klinglin, Starray, and Klenau. Orders were given by the Aulic council of war at Vienna to form two armies of referve; one of which was deftined to recruit the army of Italy, and the other to be cantoned in Bohemia. The Bava rian troops fubfidised by England were affembled at Donaworth, under the command of the baron of Deux-ponts. About the middle of April orders for opening the campaign were received at the headquarters of the imperialifts; but it was not till the 25th of the fame month that hoftilities began, in the paffage of the Rhine, by the left wing of the French army, under the command of the generals St. Sufanne and St. Cyr, at fort Kehl and New Brifack. Various fkirmishes and engagements took place in the Brifgaw, which left no decifive advantage for either army, but which fucceeded on the part of the French general, whose intention it was, by this manoeuvre, to withdraw the attention of the Auftrians from the real point of attack. Inftructions had been fent from Paris to Moreau, containing a plan of the campaign which he was ordered to execute. Moreau, whofe fkill in military operations was no way inferior to thofe from whom he received his inftructions, and whofe experience of the country.he was about to enter was greater, on reading his orders difpatched a courier to Paris, to fignify that, if thofe orders were rigidly to be fallowed, he muft decline the place of commander in chief, and take a fecondary rank. He accompanied his difmifhon with a plan of his

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own formation; his difmiffion was refused, and the execution of the plan was left to the courage and fkill of the framer..

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The paffage of the Rhine into the Brifgaw, between Straßburg and Huninguen, was therefore a military stratagem, to engage the attention of the imperialifts to that point. St. Sufanne had forced the Auftrians to fall back on Offenburg, and St. Cyr had taken poffeffion of Friburg; another divifion was dispatched through Bafle, under the command of general Richepanfe, with orders to take poft near Schillenger. While St. Cyr appeared to threaten the defiles of the Valley of Kintzig, as if to form his junction with the divifion under St. Sufanne, and penetrate through the Black Foreft, this latter general, in obedience to his orders, left the Auftrians waiting his fur ther attacks, re-paffed the Rhine, and, afcending it on the French fide, took poft at Friburg, from whence St. Cyr had marched with his divifion rapidly upon St. Blaife; which movement was fupported by the divifion under Richepanfe, who had croffed the Rhine at Bafle. While thofe various movements were taking place on the left, and the Auftrians were engaged in making refiftance against the various divifions whofe plan of opera tions appeared to be the carrying the positions of the Black Foreft to wards the fources of the Danube, Moreau, having fent off large detachments, and strongly re-inforced the right of his army under Lecourbe, gave orders for the paffage of the Rhine between Schaffhaufen and Stein, and fell upon the rear of the imperial army. The Auftrians were fo little apprized or prepared for this manœuvre, that the paffage

From Hohentweil, Lecourbe, according to the orders he had received, directed his courfe on the rear of the Auftrian army at Stockach; while Moreau, collecting his. centre and left divifions, marched upon the village of Engen, where general Kray, now undeceived with refpect to the plan of attack, had affembled the main of his army. Lecourbe, in his march, met with a divifion of the Auftrians near, Stockach, which he attacked, routed, and pursued beyond the towns Moreau, in order to favour this movement, attacked the Auftrians. at Engen; and, after a desperate engagement, fucceeded in carrying all the pofts of the imperialifts, who, balf-furrounded, made their retreat during the night upon Mofkirch. The lofs of the Auftrians on this day (3d of May) amounted to upwards of 10,000 men, of which 4000 were prifoners. As this mode of attack had been unforefeen, and confequently was unprovided for, the lofs of magazines and baggage was immenfe.

The retreat of the Auftrians was fo rapid, that the French could not reach them the following day, notwithstanding the rapid movement of the victorious army, whofe object it was to push its advantages, and give the imperialists no time to rally their forces. But general Kray, though furprifed and difconcerted at this novel plan of operations, had too formidable an army to permit the further advance of the Q2

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French army without ftern refift ance. By the battles of Engen and Stockach he had loft the whole of a country where he had counted on an effective defence; and the whole of his pofitions, from the headquarters at Donaufchingen to the Rhine, were taken poffeffion of without toil or bloodshed. He had now to prevent the progrefs of the French into the heart of Gerimany; and, having fucceeded, by his retreat, in getting between Mo reau and the ultimate object of his march, waited his attack at Mofkirch, where he had taken a strong pofition. Moreau, having now his enemy to combat in front, arranged his army for the attack. Le courbe, with the right wing, ad vanced upon Molkirch; the two other divifions, the one under the immediate command of Morean, and the other under that of St. Cyr, occupied the country between Stockach and the Danube. The engagement began on the plain, before the woods of Grembach, of which the French gained poffeffion. The Auftrians meanwhile endeavoured to turn the left of the French, and, pufhed on by refentment at the fignal victory which had been obtained too cheaply the preceding days, fought with uncommen valour. Three times the French were repulfed with confider able lofs, and the victory would have remained with the imperial ifts, after an hard-fought day, had not the divifion under Richepanfe come up at the clofe, and decided its fate by compelling the Auftrians to a fecond retreat, which was effected after the lofs of eight or nine thousand men.

Notwithstanding the obftinate and vigorous refiftance made by the Auftrians, it was expected by

the French that general Kray, after two fuch fignal defeats, would have retreated beyond the Yeller, and to Ulm. Kray was not yet prepared to make this facrifice, but took the intermediary line of the Rifs, which he gained by forced marches, and where he was refolved to abide the event of another engagement. The French did not wait long to join him. In poffeffion of the heights, rifing from the Rifs, Kray believed himself fecure from attack. Two divifions of the corps under St. Cyr had already penetrated into Biberach, which was commanded by thefe heights, when Riche panfe, who had fupported for four hours the heavy fire of the Auftrian artillery, feeing himself fupported, croffed the river with his troops, and gained poffeffion of this ftrong pofition. At the fame moment the cavalry belonging to this divifron, which, on account of the marthy foil, had been unable to act, having croffed the bridge at the town under a heavy fire, threw themselves behind the Auftrian infantry. This daring manœuvre decided, in a great measure, the fortune of the day. The Auftrians retreated a third time, leaving about 3000 prifoners, and nearly 2000 on the field of battle.

Thefe fucceffive defeats com pelled general Kray to concentrate his forces around Ulm, while Mos reau established his head-quarters at Memmingen, occupying the country between the Yell and the Lech, extending his right to Landburg and Augsburg. In this pofition two divifions of the French army futained an attack from general Kray, who marched against them with his whole force. After an obftinate refiftance, the French refumed the offensive, and fucceeded in