gines of the old government. Yet it was in this manner that the French revolution had commenced its attack on other nations. It was not France in arms which was to be dreaded; but a government founded on bad principles and bad faith. Such a government must therefore be overthrown, or its powers reduced, before this country could fafely treat with France. As to the revolution in this country, it was against the perfon of a sovereign who had violated his engagements; but when the griev. ance was removed, there was no queftion about principles. How unlike was this to a revolution which had torn up all principles, broken the bonds of all order, and had its origin in blood! He admitted, that twice within these ten years this country had entered into negotiation with France; but the feelings of minifters were repugnant to the measure, and its fuccefs would have proved a cala. mity. There were many collateral circumstances too, which forced them to this measure; the country was deluded by falfe fears and fpeculations, and fancied that a continuance of the war would induce infupport able taxes, and exhaust our resources, and that it was prudent to try whether a peace might not be procured on reasonable terms; the attempt therefore was made, and proved in vain. But let us not again facrifice the honour of the country by adopting fuch a line of conduct; let us not deprefs its fpirit and degrade ourfelves. For what did the attempt evince? That there was no fincerity on the part of France. We yielded every thing which a power, not imimplacable, could with, and yet it was rejected. If now we terminated negotiations fuccefsfully, fhould we venture to difarm? Was there a man prefent who would advife his majesty to disband his forces, and dismantle his army? Pruffia had to fupport a large army in order to maintain her line of demarcation. We Gould have a garrifon in every foreign colony, fo that we all must be at the expence of keeping up a mighty force without the power of exercising it. Before we concluded peace, therefore, we ought well to confider, whether it would not engage us to pledge ourselves to refrain from all hoftility against France, leaving her at liberty to act against the different governments of Europe as the thought proper, whilft our hands were tied up, and we were held back from every think but the expence. No negative had been put upon the queftion; but we profeffed to be guided by experience and the evidence of facts, refpecting the fincerity and good faith of France: without thefe qualities all treaty with it must prove useless or inju rious. Mr. Whitbread remarked, that the honourable fecretary had begun his fpeech artfully, by calling the attention of the houfe to the enormities of the revolution, and afking if any perfon would justify it? For his own part, he had ever held but one opinion on the fubject, and that was, that had it not been for the interference, folly, and ambition of the other powers of Europe, the French revolution would have borne a very different complexion. Every inju dicious attempt to reprefs its evils had only diffeminated them wider. Added to this, a worse effect had followed; which was, the extiriction of liberty in almost every part of Europe, under the pretext of counteracting the licentious principles of France. It was afferted, that, from the commencement, the had evinced a fovereign contempt of of treaties, and, within thefe laft ten years, had been at war with almost every state. Mr. Dundas had thought it right to invite every power of Europe to unite in one common caufe against her, as the common enemy of mankind, and had fucceeded; but, whether from the want of good faith, ability, or power, the views of the allied powers had been fruftrated, and the revolution had always rifen fuperior to their adverse endeavours. The conduct of the French rulers towards neutral powers was justly reprobated; but what had been the conduct of Pruffia towards Hamburgh? Was it forgotten that lord Hervey, and lord Hood, had or dered the French minifters to be difmiffed from Florence? Were the threats which induced Genoa to difmifs her French inhabitants paft recollection? It certainly was an everfight to complain of crimes in the French which we ourselves had committed. The want of good faith had been alleged as a reafon for not negotiating with France; but had his majefty's minifters acted on principles of good faith in former negotiations? The jacobin government, exifting at the time of lord Maline bury's miffion, was no obftacle, nor confidered as fuch in our treaty. His lord hip was not commiffioned to infift on a renunciation upon their part of their bad principles, or on acknowledgments tending to their own crimination. Yet, without thefe effential requifites, these Iminaries, we then expected good faith, otherwife our attempt to make peace must have been infincere. pre His majefty had made pacific declarations to the French at the time when the country was elated by the victory of lord Duncan; nor was it then interdicted to treat with a jacobin government; but pretexts were now fought for variable conduct in administration. A revolution in France pla es one perfon in power, inttead of five. This perfon makes overtures to his majefty; and in no way incompatible with the refpe&t due from one crowned head to another. In using this term, Mr Whitbread difclaimed any intention of fottening any crime attributed to the first confil of France, in his late affumption of power. This power, however attained, if confolidated, ought to be refpected as well as the moft legitimate; but as it now precarioufly ffood, the houfe was called upon to confider the propriety of negotiating. Many arguments were drawn from the character of the first conful (who was reprefented as an infractor of treaties, and an unprincipled blafphemer) to difcountenance any treaty of pacification. Every ex reffion which could revile, every topic which could prejudice, every art which comid blacken, had been used, for the purposes of poli ical flander; and he was forry to fee that the intercepted correfpondence (embellished with notes) had made its appearance with a view to influence the country againft, Bonaparte, and thereby. to remove every hope of peace. It had been affirmed, that fince Bona-parte had been known to mankind, in no one inftance had he obferved a treaty, or kept an armiflice. Before attention fhould be paid to fuch vague affertions, or any conclufions. formed upon them, our eyes fhould be fixed on matter of fact. The preliminaries of Leoben were not broken, or the peace with Auftria infringed by Bonaparte; for he had quitted Europe before these events took place. Even by any influence in in the councils of France he could not be fuppofed to have had a hand in thefe infractions. His conduct at Venice, i deed, he would not attempt to defend, any more than that of Auftria; they were both al ke culpable, and both, as far as their transactions there extended, equally worthy of future confidence. France at all times had been noto. rious for her want of faith in keeping treaties; but it was also known, that other governments kept them no longer than they were found beneficial to their states. England was now fmarting under the treachery of Pruffia, who took a fubfidy from us, and then broke through all engagements. England, how ever, was faid to be actuated by nobier views, and firmly to adhere to treaties. He would beg leave to put it to his majesty's minifters whether they had not repeatedly endeavoured to provoke Auftria and Prutha to infractions? This general charge did not justify any violations of promife; but it proved that if our government would only treat with thofe who had integrity, they could never expect to have an ally or a friend in any foreign ftate. "But to come to the Egyptian expedition; to feize and colonife that country had always been a favourite scheme of the old-government of France; the only difference th refore was, that the republic had executed what the monarchy had planned. Treachery of that kind was by no means confined to France; for Pruffia had feized Silefia, and three of the first powers of Europe divided and appropriated to themselves the unfortunate kingdom of Poland, whilft England was a tame fpectator., Auftria and Ruffia (the chief agents in this treacherous tranfaction) were still our "good and true allies :" though ministers refused to treat with France on account of treachery. Mr. Whitbread affirmed Bonaparte to be as upright as thefe. If he had broken treaties, fo had they; if he had killed his ten thoufands, fo had Suwarrow. The letter of Bonaparte to his majefty was full of good fenfe, equally free from republican familiarity and courtly adulation. He had faid that his majefty ruled in the hearts of his fubjects, and changed his addrefs from the republican form; and this was a tacit renunciation of the priaciples of his predeceffors, and as much as could be expected from the governor of a great nation. No attempt to make a feparate peace was difcernible in the papers before the house, no expreffion which could lead one to fuppofe him lefs willing to treat with the allies of England than with England itfeif; and, probably, had the first difpatches been received with any reafonable confideration, the next courier might have brought over his propofals for treating with thofe allies. Pacification feemed now to be the wish of Bonaparte; this the whole tenor of the correfpondence amply teftified; and the expreffions proved indirectly that he meant to include our allies. All the argus ments, therefore, drawn from a contrary fuppofition to fet afide a negotiation for peace, must be suspected of being unfound and fallacious. But fuppofe, whilft we refufed to hear propofals, our allies fhould feize this moment, and make peace for themfelves with the chief conful? Our former treaty was dictated by the humiliating circumstance of being deferted by our allies: fuch an event might again happen, and we should be left to negotiate ou grounds : 1 grounds far lefs advantageous than the prefent. Minifters very modeftly required, that Bonaparte fhould acknowledge himself a ufurper, recant his principles, and defcend from the throne which he now filled, to accommod te a branch of the Bourbon family. But was it really their with to lavish the blood and treafure of England to restore to the throne of France the Bourbon race? The honourable gentleman had carried his veneration of them so far as to palliate their crimes; and if they were perfidious (a fact he could not well deny) to find out fomething noble in their kind of perfidy: if they were ambitious, yet their ambition was of a fublime nature. He feemed to have forgotten the conduct of Louis the Fourteenth in his feizure of Holland, and of the Bourbon family during the American war, by which a whole continent was feparated from its mother-ftate by a fpecies of perfidy not completely honourable; it was from the fame fource the very revolution might take its date. Louis the Fourteenth had acted the part of a moft cruel tyrant in his perfecuting for religion, and extirpating by the edit of Nantz fo many thousands of his best subjects. It was thus that their affections were alienated from the Bourbon family; and was it the duty of Englishmen to restore a banished king of this line, of this character, to the throne, or the pope to his tiara: we were now contending either for this, or to exterminate the people who held jacobinical principles: if for the former, we were fighting for an unattainable object; if for the latter, for an opinion which could not be eradicated by force; and in both cafes the conteft must last as long as time. Bona parte had done more to ruin jaco binifm than any other perfon, by taking the executive authority into his own hands, deftroying clubs, and reftraining the licentioufnefs of the prefs. In A complete negative, however, we are told, is not given to the overtures of Bonaparte; and, fo far as this is true, it is fortunate for the country. Before any decifion be made, it would be well if the house would confider the relation of Eng. land with the allies: one of the coalitions against France had already failed, and one fingle fortunate event on the fide of the republic might occafion a second diffolution of fuch heterogeneous materials. Auftria did not pretend to have any communication with us; he had even refused our fubfidies. The emperor of Germany had declared ipfo facto for the restoration of royalty in France. England did not say quite fo much, however it might be an object of her wishes. foreign papers one party blamed the other for its ill fuccefs in the last campaign; no treaty exifted which bound them all to any one point, or united them in one fyftem; but they were all moving in irregular orbits. Between Ruffia and England there could be no common caufe; between Ruffia and the Porte it was a rope of land: Could it be fuppofed poffible for the allies to act in any kind of concert? and without this, combined operations would never be fuccessful; it was the object which alone could infpire unanimity, and, without it, no efforts could be fuccefsful. Mr. Whitbread ended by adverting to America: it had been infulted by France, and every thing bore the appearance of hoftility; but the prefident, by purfuing a very dif ferent ferent conduct from ours, appointing a perfon to remonstrate and negotiate, had faved the country from the evils of war, and established refpect and tranquillity. The intereft of England, he faid, depended on a fpeedy peace, and we ought to liften to the overtures of Bonaparte to obtain it. Mr. Canning profeffed to differ from the honourable gentleman in every fentiment which he had uttered; but no part of the fpeech, he faid, had fo much difpleafed him, as ftating that we and our allies had been guilty of as great enormities as the French. He had affirmed that Great Britain had violated the rights of neutral nations when her interefts were concerned, and had adduced, as a proof of it, our conduct to the republic to Genoa, and to the grandduke of Tufcany. When the French, in their deftructive career, had penetrated Italy, and were, notwithstanding a brave refiftance, difcomfiting our allies in almost every encounter, they at last arrived at the borders of Genoa. It was the duty of that state to have refrained from all intercourfe with them, much lefs to have afforded them affiftance: instead of which the Genoefe fupplied them with clothes, provifions, military stores, and neceffaries of every defcription;-under these circumstances had we not a right to order the government to difmifs the French ambaffador un der risk of our displeasure? What was there in this demand unfanctioned by the law of nations, and the uniform practice of every flate in Europe? Ought we quietly to have fat down inactive, witneffing unlawful measures taken for the deftruction of our allies? Had the Genoefe adhered to the duties of neutral nations, their rights would never have been infringed. Refpe&ting Florence, if the fource of information had been authentic, he would not pretend to fay our conduct had been as juftifiable; but it was not authentic; the letter of lord Hervey to the duke of Tufcacany iffued from the fame jacobinical manufactory with the treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz; and, like them, never had exifted. Lord Hervey had taken measures for the prefervation of British property in Leghorn, and to prevent, as far as was in his power, the government of Tufcany from affifting the French;-but he had done nothing for these purposes which the general practice of different nations did not entitle him to do. The court of Florence had complained; but fmall ftates were always irritable, and, fenfible of their weaknefs, were apt to think themselves infulted. Great ftrefs had been laid upon the declaration of his majefty after the failure of the negotiation at Lifle; and occafions had never been omitted of cenfuring ministers for rejecting the offers lately made by the enemy. The statement of facts was the best refutation of cenfure and prejudice. Immediately after the departure of our ambassador from Lifle, his majesty's arms were bleffed by Providence with a fignal victory, which might naturally be fuppofed to elate him and raife his pretenfions: to do away these apprehenfions, he published his declaration, in which his majefty faid, that notwithstanding the important advantages he had obtained, he was ftill ready, if the French were pacifically inclined, to treat upon the fame equitable terms propofed before this victory. But because he was willing to negotiate then upon thofe terms, did it follow that he ought to do fo now? The object of that declaration was, to remove all bar |