Imatges de pÓgina

the rear of the Auftrian army may have been repaired; but the pofition of the French armies has alfo been ftrengthened, and even the blockaded towns may perhaps fuffer more from the increated length of the blockade, than they can profit by any internal measures for improving their defences.

Into other points of comparifon his majefty forbears to enter. No part of the varied fucceffes of the continental war appears to him to entitle his enemies to prefume on any afcendant over the fpirit of the Auftrian armies.

But were the affertions of the French government in thefe refpects better grounded than his majefty conceives them to be, the principle itself would still be inadmiffible.It is impoffible that his majefty can admit that compenfation is to be demanded from him for the extent of thofe advantages, whatever they might really be, which his ally might derive from the continuance of the armistice; yet even fuch compenfation is in a great degree offered by his majefty. In confent ing to a naval armiftice on fuch terms as have already been acceded to on his majefty's part, he has made confiderable facrifices, and placed within the reach of his ene mies great and obvious advantages which their reprefentation in vain endeavours to depreciate. He has thereby given to all Europe a ftrong pledge of his concern for the general welfare, and to his enemies a decided proof of pacific difpofi


But to yield to the prefent de-, mand would be to facrifice thofe means of prefent defence, and thofe pledges of future fecurity, which have been acquired by fuch great and memorable efforts, and which he can never be expected to forego 1800.

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It was not merely with a view to difcufs thofe principles, but in order to propofe to your excellency fresh means of reconciliation, that I felt it my duty to requeft, in my letter of the 16th, to have an interview with you; and I had every reafon to hope that the explanations into which I fhould have entered would effectually have obviated the difficulties which are still oppofed to the conclufion of the general ar mittice.

You defire, my lord, that I fhould give you thofe explanations in writing. They relate to two points, which in your first note are reprefented as being the most important: the power of altering the pofitions of the fquadrons of the republic during the armistice, and the fate of the allies of Great Britain.

I am authorised to confent that the French fhips of the line fhall not go out of the harbours where they are at prefent; and if his majelly


jefly infils upon his allies being included in the proposed armiftice, I am authorifed alfo to confent that they fhould enjoy the fame advantages as thofe of the republic.

The intentions of the first conful are anew detailed in the projet which I have herewith the honour to inclofe, and in order not to delay a communication of fuch importance, I defer until another opportunity my answer to your ex-, cellency's note.


I fhall only obferve, that even if the Auftrian armiftice fhould have been broken in this interval, it would be eafy to make the refpective armies resume their former pofitions in the event of his majefly's acceding to the laft propofals which have been made to him. I have the honour to be, with the most refpectful confideration, &c. (Signed) Отто.

No. 32.-PROJET. In confideration of its having been agreed that negotiations for a general peace fhall be immediately opened between the French republic and its allies on the one fide, and his imperial majefty, his Britannic majefty, and their allies, on the other fide; and that the armiftice which has already been conclude ed between the armies of the French republic and thofe of his imperial majefty may be prolonged, if an equivalent arm ftice fhould be concluded between the forces of the French republic and thofe of his Britannic majefty, the two governments have agreed to conclude the faid armistice upon the following


Art. I. Ali hoftilities both by fea and land between the two nations fhall be fufpended, and shell not be renewed until after a month's notification prior to the end of the ar

miftice. In all parts of the world the armistice fhall not be broken without the exprefs order of the contracting governments; and hoftilities fhall not be renewed until a month after the notification which may have been given by the general or commanding officer of one of the two nations to that of the other nation.

Art. II. Orders fhall be immediately tranfmitted by the two governments to the commanding officers in the feveral parts of the world, directing them to act in conformity with this convention. Paffports fhall be given to the perfons who fhall carry out these orders; and the officers of his Britannic majesty who fhall travel through France for this purpofe fhall receive fafeconducts and the neceffary facilities for accelerating their journey.

Art. III. All prizes made in any part of the world during the continuance of the armistice, by an officer having actually received the notification of this convention, fhall be reftored. And generally (whether this notification fhall have been made or not) all prizes made in the Channel, or in the North Seas, after twelve days, to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications of this convention, fhall be restored; and, in regard to this object, the terms fhall be fixed for the other parts of the world conformably to the ftipulations of the 22d article of the preliminaries of the laft peace; whence it refults, that, computing from the day of the faid exchange, all trading veffels of either nation fhall have the power of putting out to fea, and of navigating freely as before the war.

Art. IV. Malta and Egypt hall be affimilated to the places in Germany, which, although blockaded by the French army, have been per

mitted to enjoy the benefit of the continental armiftice. Malta fhall be furnished with provifions for fifteen days at a time, at the rate of ten thousand rations per diem. With regard to Egypt, fix French frigates fhall have the liberty of failing from Toulon, of unlading at Alexandria, and of returning without being fearched, and without fuffering any oppofition during their paffage, either from English fhips or from those of the allies of Great Britain. An English officer of rank fhall for this purpose embark on board one of the frigates, and fhall travel through France on his way to Toulon.

Art. V. The blockade of Breft, of Toulon, and of every other French port, fhall be raised; and all British captains fhall receive inftructions not to interrupt the trade of any veffel either entering therein or going out thereof. No fhip of the line, however, of two or three decks, actually at anchor in the faid ports,

all be at liberty to go out before the renewal of hoftilities, for the purposes of changing its ftation; but frigates, floops, and other fmail fhips of war may freely go out and navigate, and in the event of their meeting at fea with fhips belonging to his Britannic majefty, they hall obferve the customs eftablished before the war.

Art. VI. The land forces in the pay of his Britannic majefty fhall not have the power of difembarking in any port of Italy during the continuance of the prefent armiftice.

Art. VII. The allies of France, namely Spain, the Batavian republic, and Genoa, fhall participate in the benefit of the prefent armiftice. (If his Britannic majefty infift upon including his allies in the armistice, they fhall enjoy the fame advantages with thofe of France.)

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he has had the honour to apprife the British miniftry, That if that armiftice be not concluded before the 11th of September, hoftilities will have been renewed with Auftria, and that in that cafe the firft conful will no longer be able, with regard to this power, to confent to any except a feparate and complete piace.

That armiftice was not concluded at the date fixed upon; it was therefore natural eventually to expect a Separate peace with Auftria, and, according to the fame fuppofition, a peace in like manner, feparate with Great Britain, unless it is thought that the calamities with which a great part of Europe has been for eight years paft oppreffed fhould be continued without other hope of termination than that of the com plete'deftruction of one of the belligerent powers.

It is not therefore the French government which propofes to his majefty to separate his interefts from thofe of his allies; but having in vain attempted to unite them in a common centre, and finding them feparated in fact by the refufal of England to lay down on the altar of peace fpecial advantages of which France had already made a facrifice, the firft conful has given a fresh proof of his difpofitions, by pointing out another means of reconciliation which the courfe of events will bring about fooner or later.

In conformity with the advice which the undersigned had transmitted on the 4th of this month, notification was given of the ceffation of the continental armistice at the term which had been fixed upon; but the counter-projet of the British miniftry, difpatched by the underfigned on the 8th of this month, having reached Paris on the 10th, and his imperial majefty having ap

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It would be in vain to look for proofs of a contrary intention in fome expreffions contained in the official communications of the French government to the allies of his majefty-more especially if fech proofs were attempted to be drawn from one of the laft letters written to baron Thugut, which the underfigned might have communicated himself, if he had found an opportunity; that letter would prove that the French government, always a friend to peace, appeared to complain of the intentions of Great Britain only, because it had every reafon to believe them contrary to a folid fyftem of pacification.

The underfigned has entered into thefe details only becaufe, on the


eve of negotiations which may be entered upon, it is of importance to the councils of the two powers to be reciprocally convinced of the fincerity of their intentions, and becaufe the opinion which they may have of that fincerity is the only pledge for the fuccefs of the negotiations.

With refpect to the fecond point in the note which the underfigned has had the honour of receiving, he is to refer to his letter of the 16th, in which he informed his excellency lord Grenville that he was directed to give fatisfactory explanations relative to the principal objections of the British government to the propofed armiftice, and entreated him at the fame time to facilitate the means, of verbal communications with the miniftry. It was therefore difficult to believe that the French government would adhere, without any modifica tion, to its firft overtures; for in taat cafe it would have been quire ufelefs to folicit for an interview, in order to give fatisfactory explanations.

republic themfelves, who have employed every effort to prolong the truce, and who have not fcrupled to ufe the means of pretended negotiations in order to gain time. The preliminaries figned by the count de St. Julien, and difavowed by his court, are a memorable example of this; and the prolongation of the continental armiftice muft necessarily be confidered as a facrifice on the part of the republic, fince every effort has been employed to extort its confent to it,

In fpeaking of the compenfations requifite, in order to place the na val armistice upon a footing with the continental truce, his majefty's miniftry think that there is fome preponderance in the balance fettled by the French government; a formal difcuffion upon this point would undoubtedly be mifplaced. After the various fucceffes of a war which has produced fo many extraordinary events, it is difficult to doubt of the moral influence of thofe events upon armies, upon nations, upon governments themselves, and the deductions which may be drawn from it at prefent, appear to juftify the opinion which the underfined has felt it his duty to ftate. If there be any exaggeration in this opinion, it is fhared with the enemies of the

But even whilft his majefty's miniftry admit the existence of this facrifice, they formally declare that an analogous facrifice cannot be expected to be made on the part of his majefty. It certainly does not become France to judge how far his majefty's engagements with his aliies may counteract his inclination in this refpe&t; but France appears to have certainly an undoubted right to demand the price of the facrifice which he has made, and which he is ftill willing to make. The first conful has given to Europe repeated pledges of his pacific dif. pofitions; he has never ceafed manifefting them to the cabinets interefted in this conteft; and even although the hopes of the enemies of the French republic fhould be excited by his moderation, it shall always be the fole guide of his actions.

Notwithstanding this difference in the manner of viewing feveral queftions acceffory and preliminary to the propofed pacification, the underfigned cannot but congratulate hinfelf on finding, in all the communications which he has hitherto had the honour of receiving, the fame affurances of his ajetty s difpofition to employ his efforts towards the re-eftablishment of the tranquillity of Europe; and he will neglect no opportunity of placing (L. 3) this


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