ftipulations having been ratified both by the Turkish government and by the French commanding officer; and his majesty having alfo inftruct ed his admiral commanding in thofe feas to accede to them as soon as - they were known here. This demand would be made with the more reafon, because even fubfequent to the recommencement of hoftilities in Egypt, (under circumftances to which his majefty forbears to advert) an official engagement was entered into by general Kleber in his letter to the kaimakan, dated the 10th of April, 1800, by which that general, then commanding in chief the French army in Egypt, and confequently poffeffing full powers to bind his government in this refpect, formally undertook that the convention of El-Arifh fhould be executed fo foon as the king's acquiefcence in it fhould be notified to him.

But when, instead of performing this engagement, the French government, under a pretence of affimilating Egypt to the blockaded places of Germany, requires that fix frigates fhall carry thither, without molestation or search, and even under the open protection of a Britifh officer, whatever articles the French garrifons there may be most in need of, it is natural to ask by what article in the German armi. ftice Ulm or Ingolstadt are to receive in covered waggons as many troops, as much provifions, and as great a quantity of every fpecies of arms, ammunition, and ftores, as might be conveyed to Egypt in fix French frigates? And this comparifon is ftill more ftriking, when it is confidered, that by the German armistice the blockaded places are exprefsly reftrained from receiving, during the armiftice, any thing which can fupply additional means

of defence: and on the other hand, that the proposals for the evacuation of Egypt originated on the part of the French themfelves, who now defire to avail themfelves of the benefit of an armistice to ftrengthen that very position which, by an agreement made in confequence of their own request, they have actually engaged to abandon.

This part of the French article is therefore wholly inadmiffible. It contains a pretenfion unjust in itfelf, injurious to his majesty's intereft, and repugnant both to the general principle of the negotiation, and to that which is specified in the very beginning of the article itself: and it implies a breach of faith on his majesty's part towards an ally to whom he is bound by a folemn treaty.

Befides all these confiderations, his majefty has no power to restrain, by fuch an engagement as is here propofed, the fhips of the Ottoman Porte from refifting the admiffion of this fupply into Egypt, unless his ally had acceded to the armistice, which, if it be concluded on fuch terms as thefe, there can be no reafon to expect.

The manner in which this par ticular fubject of Egypt is fpoken of, both in the projet and in M. Ot to's note of the 16th inftant, makes it neceffary that you should distinctly declare that the offer which was contained in the counter-projet goes in this refpect to the very utinoft extent that his majesty's regard for the intereft of his fubjects can ad.

it of. And his majefty is confident that no want of conciliation can juftly be imputed to him on account of his having at once brought forward explicitly and without referve the whole of thofe conceffions which it appeared poffible for him to make.

This obfervation applies equally to the remaining articies of the projet.

In the fifth article his majefty finds himself obliged to infit that the freedom of navigation there ftipulated for on the part of his enemies fhall not be extended to the tranfport of troops or of naval and military flores. The juftice of this exception and its neceffity are too obvious to require any farther explanations in addition to thofe contained in the official notes: and it follows as a confequence of this principle, as well as from the nature of the fuj& itfel, that the reftriction, as to the failing of flips of war, would be wholly illufory, were it, as now propofed, confined to hips of the line only.

It would, indeed, neither be indifferent in practice nor just in principle, that France facula be enabled, during the armistice, to change the stations of all her irigates; but when it is confidered how much it is the ufage of the French marine to employ thofe veffels for the tranfport of troops and military ftores, the two parts of this article become fo blended, with each other that they cannot be feparated; and his majefty cannot depart from the latter without equally abandoning the former.

The naval fupply of the articles which are here in queftion is indeed stated in one of M. Otto's notes to be a point of fmail moment to France. If it be fo, fhe can with lefs reafon infift on a point which can in this cafe only be infifted on with a view to affe&t thofe general principles which are connected with all the most important maritime interefts of Great Britain

The fixth article contains a new deman on the part of France, fuperadded to all the pretensions ad

vanced in her first projet. It refts on no juft or equitable principle; .for, while France would restrain his majefty from ftrengthening by the addition of more troops the forces of his allies in Italy, the referves the power of augmenting her own armies there, or of affifting her allies elsewhere, precifely as it may fuit her future plans of operations.

The French government now poffeffes, de facto, no means to prevent the tranfport of his majesty's troops by fea; and it is not reasonable that it fhould acquire the right of doing fo by the terms of an armiítice which conveys to his majesty no fresh means of impeding the future operations of his enemies beyond thofe which are already in his power, but which even concedes to them confiderable advantages of which they are not now in poffeffion.

It remains only to speak of the alterations made in that article which regards the allies on both sides.

His majefty's objections to the form propofed on the part of France for this article were detailed in my answer to the first projet.

If France confiders her allies in the light of independent powers, and is in the future negotiations to treat on that footing respecting her own interefts and theirs, it is neceffary that this principle fhould equally be adhered to in the preliminary arrangements which precede the negotiation. It has not appeared to his majefty by the communication of any regular or official act, that the French government has any authority to treat in this refpect for Spain or Holland. His majefty, on his fide, has received no fuch authority from his allies; and it would be inconfiftent with good faith were he, without fuch authority, to engage in their name for an armiftice with France in any

other

other form than that which is ufual in such cases, namely, that they fhall be at liberty to accede to the convention if they think fit. In that form his majesty is ready to admit the article as with refpect to the allies of France, and in that form only can he agree to include his own allies in this engagement.

If the article were concluded in the terms now proposed by France, his majesty would be bound by the obligations of good faith to obferve the armistice towards Spain and Holland; while, on the other hand, he could have no reciprocal claim on those powers, grounded either in juftice or in the law or practice of nations. Nor could he require the reftitution even of a fingle merchant vessel captured by a Spanish or Danifh fhip of war.

Thofe powers, if regarded by France as independent, cannot be bound by her act; and must be admitted as contracting parties acced-, ing by a regular diplomatic tranfaction to the terms of the armistice, before they can be confidered as under any obligation to fulfil those

terms.

Thefe confiderations are indeed fo obvious, that it is not eafy to imagine in what view the French government has propofed to alter the article from the form in which his majesty had offered to confent to it.

I have now only to add, that fhould the armiftice be concluded, his majesty would think it neceffary, for the purpofe of accelerating the negotiation (an object of which the French government, has declared itself to be allo very defirous), to limit a period for its continuance beyond which it would not be his majefty's intention, nor would it be confiftent with the effential interefts of his dominions, to extend it.

The power of doing this will be referved to either party by the terms of the convention. Nor does this power refult only from the a ticles as here propofed: it is equally referved to both parties by the effect of the prefent French projet; and there is, therefore, no neceflity for fpecifying in the convention itfeif either his majesty's intention in this refpect, or (itiil lefs) the precife period of fuch limitation.

But it may appear on his majefty's part more confiftent with that opennefs which his majesty is defirous to obferve in this whole transaction, that you should exprefs this intention to M. Otto in this ftage. of the bufinefs, referving to a fubfequent period the formal notification to be duly made in his majef ty's name, agreeably to the terms of the convention.

You are at liberty to communicate to M. Otto, in the course of your difcuffions, the whole or any part of this letter, and to allow him to take either a copy or fuch extracts from it as he may wish. Signed) GRENVILLE.

Mr. Hammond.

No. 39.

Downing-Street, Sept. 25, 1800.
MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your: lordship that, in obedience to his majefty's commands fignified to me in your lordship's letter of yefterday, I have this morning had a conference with M. Otto, on the subject of the propofed armiftice be- : tween Great Britain and France.

Having fuggefted to M. Otto whether it might not tend to facilitate. the difcuffion, that we should read over the counter-projet tranfinitted by your lordship to him on the 7th of this month, and the projet delivered by him on the 21ft in anfwer

to

to it; and that I fhould ftate to him, from the instructions which I had received from your lordship, the objections on the part of his majefty's government to the feveral articles of that projet; and M. Otto having acquiefced in this fuggeftion, we pursued regularly this courfe of proceeding.

As it does not appear neceffary that I should enter into any detail of the converfation which took place between us on those parts of the projet which M. Otto conceived the French government would relinquish, it will be fufficient for me to obferve on this part of the fubject,

ift, That M. Otto conceived that the French government would, in forming a regular convention for an armistice, have no objection to adopting the preamble in the counter-projet inftead of that which was propofed in the French projet.

2dly, That concurring in the opinion that the phrafe in the 4th article, appellée à jouir du benefice de l'armiftice continental, might be (for the fame reasons which applied to particular paffages of the preamble) liable to a conftruction offenfive to his majesty's allies, he doubted not that the French government would confent to omit that phrafe in the 4th article.

3dly, That he doubted not that the French government would have no difficulty in agreeing to omit the concluding claufe of the 3d article, from the words 'd'où il refulte,' to the end.

With respect to the claufe in the firft article of the counter-projet, by which the duration of the naval armiftice is made to depend on the continuance of the continental armiftice, M. Otto conceived that, by allowing the officers commanding the British forces to recommence

hoftilities as foon as the ceffation of the continental armistice should be fignified to them, too great a latitude was left to their difcretion; and that it therefore feemed moft adviseable that, in that event, the ceffation of the naval armiftice fhould be fignified from government to government, as would be the cafe whenever, for any reason, either Great Britain or France might think it for their intereft that the naval armistice fhould cease. But upon my representation of the advantages which France, on the one hand, would derive from her local pofition and the facility of collecting its forces on any point which it might determine to attack, and the delay, on the other, which would neceffarily occur in the receipt of the intelligence in England of the rupture of the armistice in any diftant part of the territory of the allies, M. Otto agreed to refer this fubject to future confideration.

We then proceeded to the 4th and 5th articles; on which M. Otto remarked, that they contained the only points to which his government attached much importance; and, fuch were its fentiments refpecting them, that he conceived that it would not confent to any armiftice of which they did not form a part. With respect to the calculation of the provisions for Malta at the rate of 10,000 rations per diem, M. Otto did not fpecify any data on which that calculation was founded, but remarked briefly, that the quantity of rations was not to be exactly apportioned to the precife return of the garrifon, but that a certain number of rations, in proportion to their respective ranks, was to be allowed to the general and ftaff officers; and that although a confiderable number of the inhabitants had been fent from the forts

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occupied by the French troops, there ftill remained many for whofe wants provifion was to be made. He was, however, of opinion that there might not be much difficulty in arranging this point in the manner propofed in the counter-projet, founded on the ftipulations in the German armistice relative to Ulm and Ingolstadt.

On the fubject of that part of the fourth article of the French projet, which requires that fix frigates should be allowed to fail from Toulon for Egypt, and be exempted from fearch, M. Otto read to me part of a dispatch from M. Talleyrand, expreffive of the intereft which the whole French nation takes in that part of the army now in Egypt, and affigning the defire of contributing to the comfort and fecurity of that army as the principal inducement to the conclufion of the armistice on the part of the French government. M. Otto added, that he would not conceal from me that the reinforcement which France intended to fend to Egypt amounted to 1200 men, and that the fupply of military ftores confifted chiefly of 10,000 mufkets. The language of M. Otto in this part of our converfation, and of M. Talleyrand's letter, appeared to be fo decifive and peremptory, that I was induced to inquire of him diftinctly, whether I was to underftand that this ftipulation was a point from which the French government would not recede? M. Orto replied, that, in his opinion, the French government would not recede from it.

On my adverting to the variation in the 5th article between the counter-projet and the French projet, by which the latter ftipulates, that the French frigates and finaller fhips of war should be allowed freely to fail

from and return to the ports of France, which have hitherto been in a state of blockade, M. Otto remarked, that the motive which induced the French government to infift on this claufe was the defire of opening a fecure mode of communication between France and her diftant poffeffions. To this infinuation I replied, that if fuch was the fole object which France had in view, it might be as effectually attained by the employment of unarmed veffels as of fhips of war.M. Otto did not appear defirous of urging this point much farther, but concluded this part of the converfation by expreffing his conviction, that the French government would infift upon this point, and confidered itself as having gone to the utmost extent of facrifice which could with juftice be required from it, in confenting that the fhips of the line fhould not alter their pofition. With refpect to that part of the counter-projet which reftrains the conveyance by fea of naval or military ftores, M. Otto is of opinion that the French government would agree to that restriction.

The fixth article in the French projet, although entirely new, was not confidered by M. Otto as likely to be infifted upon by his government; but he declined giving any pofitive opinion to that effect, until he had had farther time for the confideration of its tendency.

M. Otto's principal objection to the form in which the article marked 6 in the counter-projet is worded, was founded on an opinion, that unless Great Britain and France affumed the right of including their respective allies in the naval armi ftice, without waiting for their exprefs concurrence in it, much de lay would neceffarily arife, and the two powers (Great Britain and

France)