its opinion that the seven years which have since elapsed have developed the national life of Australia in population, in wealth, in the discovery of resources, and in self-governing capacity to an extent which justifies the higher act, at all times contemplated, of the union of these colonies under one legislative and executive Government, on principles just to the several colonies.

2. That to the union of the Australian colonies contemplated by the foregoing resolution, the remoter Australasian colonies shall be entitled to admission at such times and on such conditions as may be hereafter agreed upon.

3. That the members of the conference should take such steps as may be necessary to induce the Legislatures of their respective colonies to appoint, during the present year, delegates to a national Australasian convention, empowered to consider and report upon an adequate scheme for a Federal Constitution.

4. That the convention should consist of not more than seven members from each of the self-governing colonies, and not more than four members from each of the Crown colonies.

It will be noted that New Zealand safeguarded herself as a 'remoter Australasian colony under resolution 2, which provided for the union of Australian colonies only, and entitled the remoter Australasian colonies to subsequent admission upon terms to be mutually agreed upon.

The representatives who attended the Federation conference were as follows:

New South Wales. The Hon. Sir Henry Parkes, M.L.A., G.C.M.G., Premier.

Captain

Wm. Russell Russell,
M.H.R., Colonial Secretary.
Sir John Hall, K.C.M.G., M.H.R.
Sir Samuel Walker Griffith,
K.C.M.G., M.L.A.

John M. Macrossan, M.L.A., Colo-
nial Secretary.

John Alex. Cockburn, M.D., M.H.A.,
Premier.

Thomas Playford, M.L.A.

A. I. Clark, M.H.A., Attorney-
General.

B. S. Bird, M.H.A., Treasurer.

Duncan Gillies, M.L.A., Treasurer.
Alfred Deakin, M.L.A., Chief Secre-
tary.

Sir James G. Lee Steere, Speaker,
L.C.

Of the above-named representatives only one (Sir Samuel Griffith) took part in the convention of 1883, and only five out of the thirteen are at this day in active political life.

The outcome of this conference and its natural sequel was the convention held in Sydney in March 1891, when each of the colonies of Australia and Tasmania were represented by seven delegates each, and New Zealand by three-i.e. forty-five in all, of whom some twenty have, in the short space of five years, been removed by death, retirement, or other causes from the political arena. These forty-five were as follows:

This convention sat from the 9th of March. to the 9th of April. The report of the day-to-day proceedings, including the adopted draft bill of the Commonwealth of Australia, fill 188 pages of a very voluminous Blue-book; and the reported debates occupy 455 other pages. The draft bill, even though it may not ultimately be adopted in every detail, will doubtless form more than a mere groundwork of the Constitution Bill that has to be framed by the next and, one may hope, final convention; and it stands as a monument to the drafting skill of Sir Samuel Griffith, C. C. Kingston, and A. I. Clark. The Hansard report of the speeches made should earn for him who wades through its 455 foolscap pages the recognition due to indefatigable patience.

It was, I believe, at this convention that Sir Henry Parkes made his most substantial contribution to the cause of Federation in the effective phrase, One nation, one destiny. The debates teem with effective phrases and fine rhetorical touches that are ornamental if not eminently useful. They are distinguished also, and in a better sense, by much practical knowledge of the matter in hand. And, with one exception, they are characterised throughout by an admirable spirit of loyalty to the British throne and flag. As for the one delegate who thought it seemly to air his republican sentiments on that occasion, it is gratifying to read that he spoke of them at the time as of a bombshell hurled into the assembly of notables present, and that he has since seen fit to sink his republicanism by accepting knighthood (the K.C.M.G.) at the hands of the Sovereign whom in 1891 he would have repudiated.

But the proceedings at this convention lacked in a considerable degree that reality which comes of a determination to master every obstacle, and the confidence that should come to him who, as the chosen of the people, knows that he speaks for the people who have elected him to act in their behalf. They who will deal with the next draft of the Australasian Constitution Bill will be representatives of the people duly elected under the Assembly franchise. They who appeared at the Convention of 1891 were delegates only, and held no mandate from the people.

Thus, in 1891, the delegates, making some show of dealing with the lions in the path,' dealt timorously with those animals, and in some instances preferred to walk round them rather than to meet and

conquer them. This was especially noticeable in regard to matters of finance, the consolidation of the provincial debts into one Australasian stock, the protection of the smaller States through an equal representation of the States in the Senate, and other points.

As to this, one of the ablest delegates at that convention writes as follows:

The subject which the convention of 1891 failed to grapple with in as satisfactory a manner as could be wished was that of finance, and the cause of that failure was, apparently, a reluctance to make any proposal which would have the appearance of giving any one or more colonies an advantage over the others. The powers of the Senate in regard to money bills were also left in an unsatisfactory state, and a majority of the members of the convention seemed incapable of seeing any difference between the Senate of a Federation and the Second Chamber in a unitary State. But if the experience of other Federations is to be any guide or criterion for the relations of the two Houses of the Legislature in a federated Australia, there is no reasonable ground for anticipating any conflict upon money bills. Both branches of the Federal Legislature will find their ultimate root in popular election, and the Senate will not be the representative of property or wealth, as the Legislative Council is in the majority of the separate colonies.

It cannot be said of both branches of the Legislature in New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, and Western Australia that they now have their root in popular election. The Legislative Councils of those colonies are nominee Houses, repugnant to the ideal of the democratic form of government; and it was on this account, and because the Commonwealth Bill of 1891 provided for the election of senators by the Legislative Councils, that some of the delegates hesitated to give to a Senate so appointed the powers that it should have.

For the Commonwealth Bill, as then adopted, while it gave to each State representation in the House of Representatives on a population basis (i.e. one member for every 30,000 of population or fraction thereof), made the representation in the Senate equal for all States (i.e. eight for each), regardless of the number of population; and it is clearly to the interest of the smaller colonies that at the outset, and until the federated provinces have become welded together as one homogeneous entity-one nation one destiny'-the Senate should have such co-ordinate power with the House of Representatives, such full power as to amending as well as rejecting money bills, and, it may be, such power of initiating money bills, as will prevent the interests of the smaller colonies being prejudiced by the overwhelming power of the larger colonies in the House of Representatives. Nor can I see why this is not practicable (as it is certainly equitable and expedient) if the members of the Senate are chosen as representatives of their several States by election, as in the case of members of the House of Representatives, so as to realise to the full the idea of two Houses rooted in the popular will.

For myself, I have no fear that, even at the outset of Federal government, there will be occasion for any safeguards against unfair

treatment of the smaller provinces by the larger. There would be, I believe, on the part of the members of the House of Representatives generally a chivalrous feeling that would preclude the employment of a combination of representatives of the stronger States for any purpose calculated to injure States with smaller numerical strength in the House; there would be in the hearts of the greater number an earnest desire to obliterate the artificial boundaries that on the continent of Australia have divided into separate States a people who are one in race, language, and interests, and one also with the peoples of Tasmania and New Zealand, though these latter are separated from the mainland of Australia by leagues of sea; and there would be, we may assume, from the beginning, and more particularly then, a feeling animating all that the first duty of the Federal Parliament was to legislate in such wise for Australasia as a whole as would tend most certainly to cement the union of the colonies-large and small alike—that had entered the Federation. But the people have to say 'Aye' or 'No' whether they will enter this union; and to the people of the colonies with the smaller populations one should be able to point out, as an argument in favour of their voting ‘Aye,' that their interests have been fully protected in the Senate.

It will have to be considered at the next convention whether a Senate of smaller proportions and generally a less costly scheme of Federal government may not well be adopted. In 1891 Australasia had not yet drunk to the dregs, as now she has, the bitter cup of adversity. In 1891 the foremost plank in the political programme was not, as now it is in most of the Australasian colonies, that of retrenchment; and in 1891 bloated establishments and high salaries were as generally approved as now they are things to be attacked by the pruning-knife of the unsparing economist. Autres temps, autres mœurs. In 1897, when the convention may be expected to meet, less grandiose ideas as to expenditure will prevail, and the proposed Federal establishments may be of less magnificent proportions and cost, but not necessarily on that account any less effective in any particular.

Eight members of the Senate were to represent each colony in the Federation according to the proposal of 1891. Supposing the four eastern colonies of Australia and Tasmania joined the union, there would be, at that rate, a Senate of forty members to a House of Representatives numbering, say, 120; Western Australia would be obliged to enter the Federation immediately, and there would then be 48 members of the Senate to 124 of the House of Representatives; a Senate of about half of that numerical strength, if armed with proper powers, should be sufficient for the work of that branch of the Legislature.

This question of the personnel of the Federal Parliament presents