such a Treaty. It is deemed advisable to be thus explicit in the interest of both Governments, that the pending negotiations for a general Treaty of Arbitration may proceed without any misapprehension.

We shall see more particularly what Mr. Olney means by the distinction between a genuine arbitration issuing in an award, and a merely tentative decision on territorial claims. Meanwhile, whatever form the general treaty may ultimately take, it is well to remember that the secondary but more dangerous question still confronts us, as it confronted us six months ago. The telegram of the correspondent of the Times (July 19) contains a comment on the above passage which ought not to be overlooked, to whatever determination we may incline ultimately to come :

That is equivalent to saying that, in the event of a report from the present Commission adverse to the British claims and a refusal of Great Britain to accept that report and retire from the territory declared to be Venezuelan, the menace of the President's Message would become operative.

There is reason to believe that this contingency is kept steadily in view in Washington, and that the President, with the memories of last December fresh in his mind, still thinks that, should the need arise, a reassertion of his former warning would be supported by the multitudes who supported him before. He is still President, and will remain President till next March. His personal influence has waned, but the authority of his great office is what it was. If he tried to use it to revive the animosities of last winter, he would probably fail. Still, few Americans wish to see such an experiment tried or would be perfectly confident of the result.

A series of despatches is seldom very easy reading, and in the present instance the arrangement tends to confuse two questions which, though not wholly unconnected, are practically distinct, and ought to be considered separately. It may be useful, therefore, to set out pretty briefly the contents of these most interesting and important papers. Three or four pages will suffice to present the Venezuelan question, and the question of a permanent tribunal of arbitration, as each of them now stands. The former is, for various reasons, much the more pressing, contains more elements of real and actual peril, and ought less than any other to be allowed to drift.

So far as the Venezuelan question goes, it is hardly possible that Lord Salisbury can have a shadow of doubt as to the trend of public opinion.' A quarrel with America on the question of arbitrating a boundary line that has been in active and lively dispute at intermittent periods for more than half a century, has been viewed from the first with the deepest incredulity and abhorrence. It is safe to say that this feeling will grow a thousand times stronger when the public have mastered, as half a dozen pages of these papers enable them to do, the point to which the controversy has now been contracted.

This is not the place for any inquiry into the merits of the respective claims of the British and Venezuelan Governments to the territory in dispute between them. Whether the Aberdeen line, the

Schomburgk line, the Granville line, the Rojas line, be the boundary best justified by the history of the matter; whether grants from Popes or ancient treaties with aboriginal tribes are of any valid force; to what extent the exploration of streams and tributaries, and the constitution of post-holders by the Dutch, or the recognition by the Spanish of this river or that as the frontier of Spanish possessions -all these and the thousand obscure and intricate questions of fact through which the industrious reader may, if he pleases, thread his way in the heavy jungles of the two bluebooks, are happily not to the purpose now. The more diligently one endeavours to master this entangled mass, the clearer does it become that the whole field of the controversy, settled lands and all, presents matters with two sides to them, and claims for all of which something is to be said, and that if ever there was in the world a set of circumstances proper for arbitration, and if ever arbitration is to be good for any case, this is such a case. The question discussed here is whether there should be an unrestricted arbitration, with a final settlement for its result; or a limited arbitration, with only an optional acceptance of any award that should go beyond these limits.

In his speech in the House of Lords, the Prime Minister seems to have used some language that rather understates the extent to which the correspondence shows him to have been willing to go in meeting the American Government.

The difficulty lies in the fact that the claim of Venezuela embraces a very large proportion-I think two-thirds-of the colony of British Guiana, including a considerable quantity of territory that is settled and that has been settled for a great number of years. We have never thought, and we do not now think, that the ownership of that territory is a matter which ought to be submitted to arbitration. At the same time, with respect to the unsettled territory, we have always been willing that that should be submitted to arbitration, but it is necessary, of course, to distinguish between the two. Our view has been that at this stage arbitration is not a suitable remedy; that the first thing which has to be ascertained is the real state of the facts in respect to the past history of Venezuela and of Spain and of Holland in those countries; and, when the facts are fully ascertained by a Commission in which both countries have confidence, I do not myself believe that the diplomatic question that will follow will be one that will be very difficult of adjustment. When once we know what the facts are, I do not think there will be much difficulty in coming to an agreement as to their result. But even if there is, that would then be the time for applying the principle of arbitration. In order that arbitration may be satisfactory, the issue presented to it should be clean, clear, and simple; and when we know enough of the facts to be able to say what are the precise points on which the two Governments differ on the question of boundaries, I think then the question of arbitration will probably be dealt with without difficulty and without involving—what we deprecate-exposing to the hazard of a tribunal which is comparatively untried the long-inherited and longpossessed rights of British colonies.

From the first, says Lord Salisbury, 'our objection has been to subject to the decision of an arbiter, who, in the last resort, must of necessity be a foreigner, the rights of British colonists who have

settled in territory which they had every ground for believing to be British, and whose careers would be broken, and their fortunes possibly ruined, by a decision that the territory on which they have settled was subject to the Venezuelan Republic.'

It is worth while to note in passing that the papers shed no light on the number, quality, situation, or other particulars of these colonists. Mr. Olney asks for information as to the precise meaning attached by the Government to the expression of 'settled districts,' and Lord Salisbury promises to communicate this desire to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. So far, the result has not been made public. Yet the point is of much practical importance. The exact magnitude of these colonising operations does not affect the right and wrong of the matters in issue; it does not touch the general duty and obligation of protecting British colonists in their lawful rights. But the magnitude of the colonising operations has much to do with the expediencies of the particular problem. As we shall see in a moment or two, Lord Salisbury does not shut out these colonists from possibility of treatment. And in any event, if public opinion is to be consulted, it is indispensable that we should know, in an exact and concrete way, what is the size of the obstacle to such an arbitration as would finally dispose of the possibilities of a dangerous quarrel. There is no objection to a little rhetoric. But besides rhetoric, we must have arithmetic and mensuration.

Lord Salisbury's proposed basis of settlement is as follows:

1. A commission of four, two British and two American, to investigate and report upon the facts of the Dutch and Spanish rights respectively at the date of the acquisition of the Dutch territory by Great Britain.

2. Upon the finding of this commission as to the historic facts, the two governments to try to agree to a boundary line.

3. If they cannot agree, a tribunal of three to be appointed-one nominated by England, another by the United States, and a third nominated by these two, and the three to fix the boundary line upon the basis of the report of the commission of four, and this line so fixed to be binding upon England and Venezuela. Here, however, we come on the fatal proviso: 'Provided always that, in fixing such line, the Tribunal shall not have power to include as the territory of Venezuela, any territory which was bona fide occupied by subjects of Great Britain on the 1st of January 1887.' This is the sharp stumbling-block which at the present moment threatens to break off negotiations.

Lord Salisbury, however, speedily takes a long stride towards its removal by adding a remarkable rider to his proviso. 'In respect ' he says, 'to any territory with which, by this provision, the Tribunal is precluded from dealing, the Tribunal may submit to the two Powers 2 No. 17, May 22, 1896.

any recommendations which seem to it calculated to satisfy the equitable rights of the parties, and the two Powers will take such recommendations into their consideration.' That is to say, it may inquire into the case of the settled lands, may arrive at a decision about them, and may make recommendations about them, but neither decision nor recommendations will be absolutely binding. This opens a very wide door.

The position of the British Government is concisely summed up by Lord Salisbury in the closing sentences of the despatch :

It will be evident from this proposal that we are prepared to accept the finding of a Commission voting as three to one upon all the facts which are involved in the question of Dutch and Spanish rights at the time of the cession of Guiana to Great Britain. We are also prepared to accept the decision of an arbitral Tribunal with regard to the ownership of all portions of the disputed territory which are not under settlement by British subjects or Venezuelan citizens. If the decision of the Commission shall affect any territory which is so settled, it will be in the power of either Government to decline to accept the decision so arrived at so far as it affects the territory alleged to be settled. But I need not point out to you that even upon that question, although the decision of the arbitral Tribunal will not have a final effect, it will, unless it be manifestly unfair, offer a presumption, against which the protesting Government will practically find it difficult to contend.

Obviously, if this is a very weak position in one respect, it is just, on that account, very encouraging in another. Surely the last sentence comes very near to that exposure to the hazards of an untried tribunal of the long-inherited and long-possessed rights of British colonies, against which Lord Salisbury in his speech protested. 'I will not accept an unrestricted arbitration about the settled districts,' says Lord Salisbury, but I shall not complain if the Tribunal should choose to make an unrestricted award even about the settled districts; and, between ourselves, I may tell you in confidence that unless the award about the settled districts were manifestly unfair, I should find it impossible to resist.' In other words, broken careers and ruined fortunes or not, Lord Salisbury admits that the decision of the Tribunal against the title of the British occupiers would raise so strong a presumption that it would not be much less difficult to resist than if it were a definite award. That is where Lord Salisbury stands. Now for the American Secretary of State.

Mr. Olney, in reply, says that his Government with regret find themselves unable to regard the English proposals as likely to bring the boundary dispute to a speedy conclusion, or as duly recognising the just rights of the parties concerned. Your Commission of Facts, Mr. Olney argues in effect,3 will probably stand two and two, and so no decision will be reached. The chances of a peaceful settlement will even be made worse rather than better, because each party will be hardened in the conviction of the soundness of its own contention.

• Enclosure in No. 25, June 12, 1896.

Therefore the Commission of Facts should be so formed, by adding one or more members, that it must reach a conclusion.

In the next place, Mr. Olney proceeds, this Commission of Facts is confined to the facts of the year 1796. But how are you going to ascertain the facts about the occupied lands which you withdraw from arbitration? Who is to find out for us what and where these settlements exactly are? You talk of bona fide occupation. How are we to get at the circumstances showing the bona fides of the occupation? Yet the Tribunal of Three are to make recommendations about the settled lands, if they should be so minded. How can they do that, unless they have supplied themselves with a report of all the facts and circumstances of the settlements? In any case the Tribunal of Three will be bound to receive, and will undoubtedly have laid before them, all matters pertaining to bona fide occupation by settlers. This you cannot prevent. Surely the sensible course would be to invest the Commission of Facts with the power of reporting upon all the facts necessary to the decision of the boundary question, including the facts of the occupation of the disputed territory by British subjects?

So much for two comparatively minor matters. There is no room for quarrel about either of them, and Lord Salisbury will undoubtedly make no difficulty either about adding a new member to the Commission of Facts, or about including all the facts within the scope of the inquiry.

Mr. Olney then proceeds to press more closely to the heart of the thing. You tell us, he says, that if the Tribunal of Three should fix as the true boundary a line cutting off from your territory lands bona fide occupied by a British subject, that line must be so deflected in every case of that sort as to make such lands British. By what conceivable course of argument can this exclusion of the occupied lands from arbitration be justified? Is the rule you lay down just in itself, so as to give England a right to impose her will upon Venezuela in the matter?

Suppose it to be true that there are British subjects who, to quote the despatch, 'have settled in territory which they had every ground for believing to be British,' the grounds for such belief were not derived from Venezuela. They emanated solely from the British Government, and if British subjects have been deceived by the assurances of their Government, it is matter wholly between them and their own Government, and in no way concerns Venezuela. Venezuela is not to be stripped of her rightful possessions because the British Government has erroneously encouraged its subjects to

Of course, Lord Salisbury proposed that the same rule should apply to a case of territory bona fide occupied by a Venezuelan. But, as matter of pretty obvious fact, the rule would undoubtedly serve the interest of England, and prejudice the interest of Venezuela.