thousands of miles distant from its own frontiers. The continent of America is not like Africa. It is not a no-man's land, inhabited by masterless savages. Except the white desolate wastes of the far North, where the continent breaks up among the Polar seas, and a comparatively insignificant tract in the extreme South, all America -North, Central, and South-is, nominally at least, subject to the rule of some organised Government recognised by the family of nations, and administered by men of European blood, professing the Christian religion. Whatever may be the actual facts, in theory, and in the view of International Law, the other Governments of the Americas have as much right to call themselves civilised, and to claim all the immunities and prerogatives of civilisation, as that of Washington itself; and some at least of their States have existed, under settled rule, as dependencies of European Powers, as long as the United States or longer. Nor are these groups of countries, which are henceforth to consider themselves under the tutelage of the Republic, insignificant in resources, or in the possibilities of future wealth and greatness. The Union, it is true, is a mighty Realm, with its seventy millions of people, its vast area of fertile and temperate land, its abounding prosperity, and its magnificent industrial development. Few Englishmen would be inclined to underrate the power and the splendour of the noblest of the daughter States which have sprung from the womb of the Mother of Nations. But the tall shadow of the Republic has perhaps unduly dwarfed the proportions of others who share with it the heritage of the Western world. We need not forget that alongside the United States there lies a country, still under the Imperial Crown of Britain, which may also be called great, in all the elements that make for greatness, except an abundant population; and even that may come before long. In thirty years' time the Dominion of Canada may have grown into a nation with ten or fifteen millions of people, mostly of British descent: a nation large enough to claim its right to be treated on terms of political equality with any neighbour, however populous and powerful. And if we leave Canada out of account, the Republics of South America and Central America are not so unimportant that their political control can be easy, even for a country so vigorous and powerful as the United States. Mismanaged as it has been by bad government, and retarded in its material development by war, bankruptcy, slavery, and revolution, there is the possibility of a great future before Spanish and Portuguese America. Great, in certain ways, it is already. Mexico has a population of 10,000,000, and an area equal to all the countries of Western Europe together; Brazil is larger than Europe, and larger than the United States, excluding Alaska; the Argentine Republic has fertile land enough to support the combined population of England, France, and Germany; and even the smaller Republics of the North are larger than most European monarchies. These States are not merely huge tracts of uninhabitable desert, like that immense blank area of 'light soil' which makes French Africa fill so much space on the map. Nearly the whole of South and Central America is well watered, and it is lavishly endowed by nature with vegetable and mineral wealth; a considerable portion has a climate which does not forbid settlement by men of the Caucasian race. Of this splendid slice of the earth's surface much is still almost virgin to the foot of man. The immense dominion which is called Brazil has only fourteen millions of inhabitants, including negroes and Indians. The Argentine is less populous than Belgium. Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, even Peru and Chili, are still only half-explored lands. Who can doubt that these vast expanses of fruitful soil cannot be left for ever to a handful of traders and political adventurers in a few ports and capitals, and to sparse agricultural settlements round the rim of the coast and along the lower course of the great rivers? And who can fail to believe that as South America fills up its haphazard political arrangements, its accidental and unnatural geographical distribution will be altered? The future history of the continent is likely to be more adventurous than its past. New states will be created; the old ones will fall to pieces; there must be convulsions and cataclysms, and probably a struggle for territory, which cannot well be otherwise than violent. There is another point worth considering, though strangely little attention has been bestowed on it in this country.3 When the reconstruction of South America begins, it will be difficult to exclude the European nations from a share in the scramble. Some of them may be drawn into it by the natural evolution of events and probably very much against their will. But then the countries of Europe are full, and over full; their surplus population is brimming over into the other quarters of the world; cupidity, industrial enterprise, the desire to gain the necessaries of life on easier terms than they can be got in comparatively poor countries not fitted to sustain a large population from their own resources, are driving them to the outermost parts of the world, in numbers larger than ever Rhene or the Danaw from their populous sands poured upon the fields of Italy. The problem is really less interesting for us than for some others. Within the limits of the Empire there is good land enough to hold the increase of the British Isles for a hundred years to come. But the German, the Belgian, the Austrian, the Italian, the Alsatian, the Sclavonian, the Scandinavian, pressed abroad by ambition or sheer hunger-where are they to go? At present they go mostly to the United States; but the United States is not anxious to have them, aud will not take them much longer. There is Africa; but Africa is already a failure, since it * See, however, an admirable article in the Spectator for November 14, in which some of the considerations here suggested are presented in a very striking manner. begins to be plain that the amount of land suited for settlement is strictly limited and a very large part of all that is worth having is in the possession of a Power which cannot be deprived of its dependencies till the strongest navy in the world has been mastered. What every European State wants is a colony capable of sustaining in comfort a few millions of its own people. It is not at all improbable that Germany, for instance, will find such a colony in Southern Brazil, and Italy on the Rio Plata. Let us suppose-not an extravagant supposition that some time in the early part of the next century a couple of millions of Germans find themselves living in Southern Brazil, and that they also find the government of a gang of half-caste attorneys and political adventurers at Rio Janeiro no longer tolerable. The Uitlanders revolt and are beaten; they appeal to their own Government for protection and annexation. What will the United States do? It might annex South Brazil, or all Brazil, itself; or it might merely signify that the Monroe Doctrine, with its authorised glosses, required it to warn off Germany, and leave the inhabitants of Brazil to fight out the question among themselves. In the former case it would have acquired a Territory or a new State, of enormous extent, inhabited by an alien race, separated from the rest of the Union by hundreds of miles of sea and land, and needing a military force, much larger than the whole of the present United States Army, to police and protect it. In the other case, the civilising mission of the United States, of which Mr. Olney speaks, might be fulfilled by consigning a nobly fertile region and an industrious population to some such welter of anarchy and murderously savage warfare as that which devastated Paraguay and almost exterminated its male inhabitants thirty years ago. There is another alternative. It is conceivable that even the prestige of the United States might not be sufficient to induce a powerful European monarchy to abandon a large population of its own subjects without a struggle; and if the United States declined to annex Brazil, Germany might take some forcible action which would effectually impede that American State from 'shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies.' But this would be 'antagonising the interests and inviting the opposition of the United States,' and according to the Olney Doctrine would have to be opposed by the forces of the Union. Whichever alternative is taken the result would involve an addition to the external responsibilities, and an increase of the warlike resources, of the United States. This last result seems to be inevitable. No nation can expect to take over the political control of an entire continent, to make itself answerable for permanently maintaining the existing geographical divisions of a group of States so large and (in some cases) so distant as those of the two Americas, and to secure the integrity against colonisation, annexation, or other forcible intrusion, of terri tories at once so tempting, so weak, and in such a condition of economic and industrial infancy, without being in a position to give effect to its wishes. If the scramble for South America once begins, neither the latent resources nor the moral influence of the United States will avail to protect its clients without the display of effective material strength. The Republic will be compelled to provide itself with some of those burdensome appendages to political predominance, under which the peoples of this continent have suffered. Amateur diplomatists may contrive to conduct the external affairs of a nation which is seldom called upon to concern itself with what happens beyond its own borders; they will require to be replaced by an elaborately (and expensively) trained staff of experts. Both the army and the navy must be brought a good deal closer to the European standard. A levy of militiamen and civilian volunteers can no more be relied upon to furnish a completely equipped army corps for service in South America than a fleet of cruisers can be safely left to face a squadron of battleships. President Cleveland has at last provided the United States with a definite and positive foreign policy. It will remain for President Cleveland's successors to supply the country with the means of adequately discharging the responsibilities which this policy necessarily involves. The old Monroe Doctrine was one of self-centred isolation. A country, which aimed as far as possible at having no political relations with foreign States, could almost dispense with the luxury of fleets and armies. But the New Monroe Doctrine (which in some respects is rather the antithesis than the legitimate development of its predecessor) cannot assuredly be maintained unless the citizens of the Republic are prepared to endure burdens and incur obligations from which hitherto they have been enviably free. SIDNEY LOW. ! 1896 MANNING THE NAVY IN TIME OF WAR THE reply given by Mr. Goschen' to the question asked by Mr. Webster in the House of Commons on the 23rd of July, seems to indicate that the Government intend to provide for the deficiencies, admitted on all hands to exist in the personnel of the navy, by a further increase in the permanent force. The moment seems specially opportune for the consideration of the grave question of the manning of the navy in war. Shall the permanent force be raised to the strength required in war, or shall we look to an adequate and welltrained reserve for meeting the war requirements of the navy? That the country and the Government should come to a right decision on this question is of supreme national importance. First let us inquire what number of men are required to man the navy in time of war. In the Naval Annual for 1895 and 1896 detailed estimates are given of the numbers required for every ship built or building. The figures are as follows: This total requirement of 114,000 men could not under ordinary circumstances be reached until the year 1900; but before the vessels of the 1895 and 1896 programmes are completed our requirements will probably be diminished by over 7,000 men, owing to the elimination of obsolete ships now on the navy list. It must also be borne in mind that every ship on the list would not be ready for sea at the outbreak of war. There will always be ships in the dockyard reserve requiring extensive and therefore lengthy repairs to make them ready 1 Mr. Goschen said: 'With regard to reserves of sailors and marines nothing has happened since I submitted the Navy Estimates to induce me to depart in either direction from that steady continuous proportionate increase in the number of men which is rendered necessary by the extension of the fleet. I asked the House for an increase of about 5,000 men when I submitted my last estimate. I must decline to anticipate a statement which I shall have to make next year as to the further increase which will be required.' |
