in a court of justice, and utter deliberate falsehood, under the sanctions and solemnities of an oath. We may well believe, that many a man may be frequently guilty of lying, who will shrink from committing perjury. The thought home to the time, by the We may be further satisfied of the security of oaths, by adverting to the difference between perjury and ordinary lying. Perjury is a sin of greater deliberation than lying. of God and of the sanctions of religion is brought understanding and conscience of the juror at the administration of the oath. If he offends, therefore, it is with a high hand, his offence is a more daring defiance of the sanctions of religion, and a more daring contempt of the knowledge, power, and justice of God, than ordinary lying, in which there may be nothing to lead the mind to any special reflection upon the Deity. Again, perjury violates confidence more flagrantly than lying. Mankind must trust to one another; and if they cannot trust to an oath, they have nothing to which they can trust. Hence, legal adjudications, which govern and affect every right and interest on this side of the grave, of necessity proceed and depend upon oaths. Perjury, therefore, in its general consequences, strikes at the security of reputation, property, and even of life. itself. The same credit is not given to statements made in the ordinary way; and, therefore, lying cannot do the same mischief with perjury. * Moreover, God directed the Hebrews to swear by his name; and was pleased, "in order to show the immutability of his own counsel," to confirm his covenant with that people by an oath ; neither of which things, it is probable, he would have done, had he not intended to represent oaths as having some meaning and effect beyond the obligation of a mere promise; which effect must be owing to the more severe punishment with which he will vindicate the violation of oaths. Finally, the declarations of judges, lawyers, and other official persons, are nearly if not quite uniform in favor of oaths, as securities for the attainment of truth in * Deut. vi. 13; x. 20. Heb. vi. 17. Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, pp. 114, 115. the administration of justice. History, argument, and experience, therefore, combine to satisfy us of the efficacy of oaths, as securities for truth and integrity. 5. The abuse of oaths. During many years past, complaints in regard to the administration of oaths, have been frequent and general in England and in the United States. It has been complained, that oaths have been unnecessarily multiplied; that they are required on trifling occasions; in cases in which the juror does not and cannot know the truth of the matter on which he is sworn; that it is degrading for men of dignity and elevation of character to confirm their assertion by an oath; and that the prevalence of oaths has produced upon the community a very material and very general effect, in reducing their estimate of the obligation of plain truth, in its natural and simple forms. All this has been said, and much more. Dr. Paley says, "It merits public consideration, whether the requiring of oaths on so many frivolous occasions, especially in the customs and in the qualification for petty offices, has any other effect than to make them cheap in the minds of the people. A pound of tea," he continues, "cannot travel regularly from the ship to the consumer without costing half a dozen oaths at the least; and the same security for the due discharge of their office, namely, that of an oath, is required from a church-warden and an archbishop, from a petty constable and the chief justice of England." * And Mr. Dymond says, "Oaths, at least the system of oaths which obtains in this country (England), tend powerfully to deprave the moral character. We have seen," continues he, "that they are continually violated, that men are continually referring to the most tremendous sanctions of religion, with the habitual belief that these sanctions impose no practical obligation. Can this," he asks, "have any other tendency than to diminish the influence of religious sanctions upon other things? If a man sets light by the divine vengeance in the jury-box to-day, is he likely to give full weight to that vengeance before a magistrate to-morrow? We cannot prevent the effects of habit. Such things will infallibly deteriorate the moral character, because they * Moral and Political Philosophy, pp. 111, 112. infallibly diminish the power of those principles upon which the moral character is founded."* We may well believe, that the quotation from the last author partakes very much of overstatement, and that many of the complaints respecting oaths are made without good reason. Still the conviction, that oaths are very greatly abused, is so strong and general, as not to permit us to conclude, that all or the greater part of these complaints are without just foundation. In many things where form is concerned, quite as much depends on the manner in which the form is administered as on the matter which the form contains. And in no case, perhaps, does this remark more forcibly apply, than to an oath. If all oaths were administered under suitable circumstances of solemnity, with distinctness of utterance and a gravity of tone and manner befitting the occasion, it is probable, that objections against them would be very much diminished. Very just objections however, in truth, seem to me to lie against our system of oaths, for their number and their use on trifling occasions; but a still stronger objection lies against the levity of manner and almost total want of reverence with which they are too often administered. The subject of voluntary and extra-judicial oaths has been much discussed in some parts of this country within a few years; and, in some of the States, Masonic oaths have been prohibited, on the ground, that they have sometimes interfered, and may again interfere with the duty of the citizen to his country. illustrate this, where, instead amidst the haste, agitation, and "that he has the qualifications My sentiments on this subject may be summed up and classified thus; (1.) Oaths ought not to be used, where other means exist of attaining the end for which they have been accustomed to be administered. The case of the election laws in this State (South Carolina) may be used to of putting the elector to his oath, sometimes turmoil of the polls, required by law, and that he has not voted elsewhere," the qualifications of all the electors, within particular districts, might be previously ascertained, and their names entered in registers kept for the purpose, and used at the time of the election, by which # Essays on Morality, p. 157. to admit the citizens of each particular district to the exercise of the elective franchise. (2.) Oaths, legal affirmations, which do not differ essentially from oaths, and affidavits, ought to be abolished in all cases where a declaration can be safely substituted. There is room for difference of opinion, how far declarations may take the place of our system of oaths in the present state of public sentiment, knowledge, and morals; but, in my judgment, the time has come, when they might be safely and beneficially substituted in all cases except the administration of civil and penal justice. (3.) Oaths fail of making their due impression, unless they are administered under circumstances of suitable solemnity, and in a manner becoming their sacred nature. The remark has before been made, that the form, substance, and accompanying ceremonies of oaths have necessarily been suited to the character of the times in which they were devised and used; and that, looking at them by the light of history, they have been simplified as knowledge, good faith, and general enlightenment have advanced. The present is an age of knowledge and of enlarged intercourse; and it may be said, with great confidence, that at no previous period has good faith been so much respected, or the public mind so much enlightened, both in England and in the United States. Who can doubt that a further simplification of the system has become safe, and would be beneficial? A conviction to this effect has become as general, as can ever be expected in favor of any considerable change to be made under any circumstances. Acting upon this general conviction and upon this state of public sentiment, the British Parliament has passed a new act (9th September, 1835), very important in regard to the changes and general provisions which it introduces, and in preparing which the entire subject of administering oaths seems to have been most carefully reviewed and considered. The act took effect on the 1st of October, 1835, and provides for the general substitution of declarations, instead of the former system of oaths, solemn affirmations, and affidavits, in the collection of the revenue, and in all the offices and departments of business under * Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 115, note. the superintendence of the Lords of the Treasury, in the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and all other bodies corporate and politic, in the cases of church-wardens, persons acting under various trusts, persons obtaining patents for new inventions, and the transfer of the stock of the Bank of England, &c. &c. The declarations must be to the same effect with the oaths, &c. for which they are substituted, and must be subscribed by the party making them. The wilfully making a false declaration, in any material particular, is made punishable as a misdemeanor. The oath of allegiance is still to be required as heretofore; and no changes are made in the administration of oaths in any court of justice, or in any proceeding before any justice of the peace; but neither justices of the peace nor any other persons, are to administer or to receive oaths and affidavits touching any matters of which they have no jurisdiction by statute. Voluntary and extra-judicial oaths and affidavits are entirely suppressed; but voluntary declarations, by which written instruments, &c. may be confirmed, may be received by justices of the peace and other magistrates. It may be hoped, that this act of the British Parliament, dictated by an enlightened judgment and patriotism, may soon be imitated in the United States. 6. In what cases oaths are not binding. When oaths are administered in affirmance of a promise, they are not binding when the promise itself is not binding; and when to secure the performance of a contract, they do not bind when the contract is unlawful, or is for any other cause not binding. Having before adverted to Masonic oaths, which have lately caused much controversy in this country, and been the occasion of considerable violence, I will subjoin, that if any of the Masonic or other extra-judicial oaths shall, in any event, interfere with the duty of the citizen to his country, they are superseded by the higher duty which he owes his country, they are not binding. Still I may say, in regard to extra-judicial oaths in general, that, when they have been voluntarily taken, and the obligation which they impose is not in itself morally wrong, that is, does not interfere with any personal, moral, or political duty, it does not seem right to set them aside, and renounce their obligation, from slight reasons. Especially, when this renunciation is a betrayal of |