Greek and Latin troops who served under him, they, who had long before departed from them in will and affection, effected a still more serious separation from them in religion; for, although they had previously been professors of Christianity, from that period they embraced the doctrines of the Alcoran and became followers of Mahomet.

But the professors of the true doctrine incur this species of hatred, either through some fault of their own, or through the pure malice of men.-(i) They incur this hatred by their own fault, if they do not administer the doctrine of the truth, with that prudence and gentleness which are appropriate to it; if they appear to have a greater regard for their own advantage, than for the advancement of religion, and, lastly, if their manner of life is in opposition to the doctrine. From all these circumstances a bad opinion is entertained of them, as though they scarcely believed the principles which they inculcate.—(ii) This hatred is also incurred by the fault of another, because the delicate and lascivious hearts of men cannot bear to have their ulcers sprinkled and purified by the sharp salt of truth, and because they with difficulty admit any censors on their life and manners. With a knowledge of this trait of the human heart, the Apostle enquires, "Am I therefore become your enemy, because I tell you the truth?" (Galat. iv, 16.) For truth is almost invariably productive of hatred, while an obsequious complaisance obtains friends as its reward.

3. The preceding appear to be the procuring causes of dissensions in religion; and, as long as their efficacy endures, they tend to perpetuate those dissensions. There are other causes that we may justly class among those which perpetuate discord when once it has arisen, and which prevent the restoration of peace and unity.

(1) Among these perpetuating and preventing causes, the first place is claimed for the various prejudices by which the minds of the Dissidents are occupied, concerning our adversaries and their opinions, concerning our parents and ancestors, and the Church to which we belong, and, lastly, concerning ourselves and our teachers.

(i) The prejudice against our adversaries is, not that we think them under the influence of ERROR, but under that of pure malice, and because their minds have indulged their humour in thus dissenting. This cuts off all hope of leading them to adopt correct sentiments, and despair refuses to make the attempt.-(ii) The prejudice against the opinions of our

adversary is, that we condemn them ourselves not only for being false, but for having been already condemned by the public judgment of the church; we therefore consider them unworthy of being again brought into controversy, and subjected anew to examination.-(iii) But the preconceived opinion which we have formed concerning our parents and ancestors, is also a preventive of reconciliation,-both because we account them to have been possessed of such a great share of wisdom and piety, as rendered it improbable that they could ever have been guilty of error;-and because we conceive favourable hopes of their salvation, which is very properly an object of our most earnest wishes in their behalf: But these hopes we seem to call in question, if, in an opinion opposed to theirs, we acknowledge any portion of the truth appertaining to salvation, of which they have either been ignorant or have disapproved. It is on this principle that parents leave their posterity heirs both of their property and of their opinions and dissensions.-(iv) Besides, the splendour of the Church, to which we have bound ourselves by an oath, dazzles our eyes in such a manner that we cannot suffer any persuasion whatever to induce us to believe the possibility, in former times or at present, of that church having deviated in any point from the right way.-(v) Lastly. Our thoughts and sentiments concerning ourselves and our teachers are so exalted, that our minds can scarcely conceive it possible either for them to have been ignorant, or not to have had a sufficiently clear perception of things, or for us to err in judgment when we approve of their opinions. So prone is the human understanding to exempt from all suspicion of error itself and those whom it loves and esteems!

(2) It is no wonder if these prejudices produce a pertinacity in eagerly defending a proposition once laid down,-which is a most powerful impediment to reconciliation. Two kinds of fear render this pertinacity the more obstinate: (i) One is a fear of that disgrace which, we foolishly think, will be incurred if we acknowledge ourselves to have been at all in error. The other is a fear which causes us to think, that the whole doctrine is exposed to the utmost peril, if we discover it even in one point to be erroneous.

(ii)

(3) In addition to these, the mode of action commonly adopted both towards an adversary and his opinion, is no small obstacle to reconciliation, although that mode may seem to have been chosen for conciliatory purposes.

(i) An adversary is treated in a perverse manner, when he is overwhelmed by curses and reproaches, assailed with detrac tions and calumnies, and when he is menaced with threats of violence. If he despises all these things, which is not an uncommon occurrence when "the testimony of his conscience" is in opposition to them, (2 Cor. i, 12.) they produce no effect whatever. But if his spirit broods over them, his mind becomes disturbed, and, like one stricken by the Furies, he is driven to madness, and is thus much worse qualified than before to acknowledge his error. In both these ways he is confirmed rather the more in his own opinion;—either because he perceives, that those who use arms of this kind openly betray the weakness as well as the injustice of their cause ;—or, because he draws this conclusion in his own mind, that it is not very probable that those persons are instructed by the Spirit of truth who adopt such a course of conduct.

(ii) But contention is rashly instituted against the opinion of an adversary, First, when it is not proposed according to the mind and intention of him who is the assertor; Secondly, when it is discussed beyond all due bounds, and its deformity is unseasonably exaggerated; and, Lastly, when its refutation is attempted by arguments ill-calculated to produce that effect. -The First occurs when we do not attend to the words of an adversary, with a becoming tranquillity of mind and suitable patience; but immediately and at the mention of the first word, we are accustomed to guess at his meaning.-The Second arises from the circumstance of no one wishing it to appear as if he had begun to contend about a thing of trifling importance.—The Last proceeds from ignorance or from too great impetuosity, which, on being precipitously impelled into fury, augments its mischievous capabilities: It then seizes upon any thing for a weapon, and hurls it against the adversary. -When the first mode is adopted, the person whose meaning is misrepresented, understands that an opinion very different from his own is invented through calumny.-The second course, according to his judgment, has been pursued for the purpose of affixing an envious mark upon his opinion, and upon the dignity which it has acquired.-When the last is put in prac tice, he considers his opinion to be incapable of refutation, because he observes that it remains uninjured amidst all the arguments which have been directed against it. All and each of these add fuel to the flame of dissensions, and render the blazing fire inextinguishable.

: III. We have now considered the NATURE, THE EFFECTS and THE CAUSES of religious dissension. It remains for us to inquire into the REMEDIES for such a great evil. While I attempt this in a brief manner, I beg that you will favour me with that degree of attention which you have already manifested. The professors of medicine describe the nature of all remedies thus,—" they are never employed without benefit:" For if they be true remedies, they must prove beneficial; and, if they do not profit, they prove hurtful. This latter circumstance reminds me, that I ought first to remove certain corrupt remedies which have been devised by some persons and occasionally employed.

1. The first of these false remedies which obtrudes itself, is the fable of the sufficiency of implicit faith, by which people are called upon, without any knowledge of the matter, to believe that which is an object of belief with the Church and the Prelates. But the Scripture places righteousness" in the faith of the heart," and salvation" in the confession of the mouth;" (Rom. x, 10.) and says, "The just shall live by his faith," (Heb. ii, 4.) and "I believed and therefore have spoken." (2 Cor. iv, 13.) This monstrous absurdity is therefore exploded by the scripture. Not only does this fable take away all cause of religious dissension, but it also destroys religion itself, which, when it is destitute of KNOWLEDGE and FAITH, can have no existence.

2. The next figment is nearly allied to this; it concludes, that every one may be saved in his own religion. But while this remedy professes to cure one evil, it produces another much more hurtful and of greater magnitude; and that is, the certain destruction of those who are held in bondage by this error: Because this opinion renders the error incurable; since no one will give himself any trouble to lay it aside or to correct it. This was Mahomet's devise, for the purpose of establishing his Alcoran free from all liability of its becoming an object of dispute. The same doctrine obtained in Paganism, where the worship of demons flourished, as is evident from the title on a certain altar among the Athenians, the high stewards of Pagan wisdom. That altar bore the following inscription, TO THE GODS OF ASIA, EUROPE, AND AFRICA; TO THE UNKNOWN AND FOREIGN GODS:' which was after the manner of the Romans, at that period "the masters of the world," who were accustomed to invoke the tutelary deities of an enemy's city before they commenced

hostilities against it. In this manner has satan exerted himself, lest his "kingdom, being divided against itself, should fall."

3. The third false remedy is a prohibition of all controversies respecting religion, which lays down the most stupid ignorance for a foundation, and raises upon it the superstructure of religious concord: In Russia, where such an ordinance is in operation, this is obvious to every one that contemplates its effects. Yet it is hurtful, whether it be true Religion that flourishes, or it be false: In the first case, on account of the inconstancy of the human mind; and in the second case, because it stamps perpetuity on error,-unless the preceding fiction concerning the equality of all religions meet with approval, for on that foundation Mahomet raised this prohibition against religious controversies.

4. Next to this in absurdity is the advice, not to explain the sacred scriptures but only to read them; which is not only pernicious, on account of the omission of their particular application, and repugnant to the usage both of the ancient Jewish Church and of the primitive Church of Christ; but it is also of no avail in the cure of the evil, since any one might by reading discover the meaning for himself, according to his own fancy; and that reading which is instituted at the will of the reader, would act the part of an explanation, on account of the parallelism of similar and dissimilar passages.

But the Popish Church exhibits to us THREE REMedies. FIRST, that, for the sake of certainty, we may have recourse to the CHURCH UNIVERSAL. However, since the whole of this church cannot meet together, the Court of Rome has appointed in its place a representative assembly consisting of the Pope, the Cardinals, the Bishops, and the rest of the prelates who are devoted to the Roman See and subject to the Pontiff. But, in addition to this, because it believes that it is possible for all the Cardinals, Bishops and Prelates to err, even when united together in one body, and because it considers the Pope alone to be placed beyond the possibility of error, it declares that we must apply to him for the sake of obtaining a decisive judgment concerning Religion. This remedy is not only vain and inefficient, but it is far more difficult to induce the rest of the Christian world to adopt it than any controverted article in the whole circle of religion: And since the Papists endeavour to prove this point from the scriptures, by that very circumstance they declare that the scriptures are the only sanctuary to which we can repair for religious information. DD

VOL. I.