2. This doctrine is inconsistent with the freedom of the will, in which and with which man was created by God. For it prevents the exercise of this liberty, by binding or determining the will absolutely to one object, that is, to do this thing precisely, or to do that. God, therefore, according to this statement, may be blamed for the one or the other of these two things, (with which let no man charge his Maker!,)— either for creating man with freedom of will,-or for hindering him in the use of his own liberty after he had formed him a free agent. In the former of these two cases, God is chargeable with a want of consideration, in the latter with mutability, —and, in both, with being injurious to man as well as to himself.

3. This predestination is prejudicial to man in regard to the inclination and capacity for the eternal fruition of salvation, with which he was endowed at the period of his creation. For, since by this predestination it has been pre-determined, that the greater part of mankind shall not be made partakers of salvation, but shall fall into everlasting condemnation,— and since this predetermination took place even before the decree had passed for creating man,—such persons are deprived of something, for the desire of which they have been endowed by God with a natural inclination. This great privation they suffer, not in consequence of any preceding sin or demerit of their own, but simply and solely through this sort of predestination.

IX. This Predestination is diametrically opposed to THE ACT OF CREATION.

1. For creation is a communication of good according to the intrinsic property of its nature. But a creation of this description, whose intent or design is, to make a way through itself by which the reprobation that had been previously determined may obtain its object,-is not a communication of good: For we ought to form our estimate and judgment of every good, from the mind and intention of Him who is the Donor, and from the end to which or on account of which it is bestowed. In the present instance, the intention of the Donor would have been, to condemn,-which is an act that could not possibly affect any one except a creature; and the end or event of creation would have been the eternal perdition of the creature. In that case creation would not have been a communication of any good, but a preparation for the greatest evil both according to the very intention of the Creator and the actual

issue of the matter; and according to the words of Christ, It had been good for that man, if he had never been born! (Matt. xxvi, 24.)

2. Reprobation is an act of hatred, and from hatred derives its origin. But creation does not proceed from hatred; it is not therefore a way or means, which belongs to the execution of the decree of reprobation.

3. Creation is a perfect act of God, by which he has manifested his wisdom, goodness, and omnipotence: It is not therefore subordinate to the end of any other preceding work or action of God. But it is rather to be viewed as that act of God, which necessarily precedes and is antecedent to all other acts that he can possibly either decree or undertake. Unless God had formed a previous conception of the work of creation, he could not have decreed actually to undertake any other act; and until he had executed the work of creation, he could by no means have completed any other operation.

4. All the actions of God which tend to the condemnation of his creatures, are strange work or foreign to him; because God consents to them, for some other cause that is quite extraneous. But creation is not an action that is foreign to God, but it is proper to Him: It is eminently an action most appropriate to Him, and to which he could be moved by no other external cause, because it is the very first of the Divine acts, and, till it was done, nothing could have any actual existence, except God himself; for every thing else that has a being, came into existence through this action.

5. If creation be the way and means through which God willed the execution of the decree of his reprobation, he was more inclined to will the act of reprobation than that of creation; and he consequently derived greater satisfaction from the act of condemning certain of his innocent creatures, than in the act of their creation.

6. Lastly. Creation cannot be a way or means of reprobation according to the absolute purpose of God: because, after the creation was completed, it was in the power of man still to have remained obedient to the Divine commands, and not to commit sin; to render this possible, while God had on one part bestowed on him sufficient strength and power, He had also on the other placed sufficient impediments;—a circumstance most diametrically opposed to a predestination of this description.

X. This doctrine is at open hostility with THE NATURE OF ETERNAL LIFE, and the titles by which it is signally distinguished in the Scriptures. For it is called "the inheritance of the sons of God;" (Tit. iii, 7.) but those alone are the sons of God, according to the doctrine of the Gospel, "who believe in the name of Jesus Christ." (John i, 12.) It is also called, "the reward of obedience," (Matt. v, 12.) and of "the labour of love;" (Heb. vi, 10.) "the recompence of those who fight the good fight and who run well,-a crown of righteousness;" &c. (Rev. ii, 10.-2 Tim. iv, 7, 8.) God therefore has not, from his own absolute decree, without any consideration or regard whatever to faith and obedience, appointed to any man, or determined to appoint to him, life eternal.

XI. This Predestination is also opposed to THE NATURE OF ETERNAL DEATH, and to those appellations by which it is described in Scripture. For it is called "the wages of sin; (Rom. vi, 23.) the punishment of everlasting destruction, which shall be recompenced to them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; (2 Thess. i, 8, 9.) the everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels, (Matt. xxv, 41.) a fire which shall devour the enemies and adversaries of God." (Heb. x, 27.) God, therefore, has not, by any absolute decree without respect to sin and disobedience, prepared eternal death for any person.

XII. This Predestination is inconsistent with THE NATURE AND PROPERTIES OF SIN, in two ways:-(1.) Because sin is called "disobedience" and "rebellion," neither of which terms can possibly apply to any person who by a preceding Divine decree is placed under an unavoidable necessity of sinning. (2.) Because sin is the meritorious cause of damnation. But the meritorious cause which moves the Divine will to reprobate, is according to justice; and it induces God, who holds sin in abhorrence, to will reprobation. Sin, therefore, which is a cause, cannot be placed among the means, by which God executes the decree or will of reprobation.

XIII. This Doctrine is likewise repugnant to THE NATURE OF DIVINE GRACE, and, as far as its powers permit, it effects its destruction. Under whatever specious pretences it may be asserted, that" this kind of predestination is most admirably adapted and quite necessary for the establishment of grace," yet it destroys it in three ways:

1. Because grace is so attempered and commingled with the nature of man, as not to destroy within him the liberty of his

will, but to give it a right direction, to correct its depravity, and to allow man to possess his own proper motions: While, on the contrary, this Predestination introduces such a species of grace, as takes away free-will and hinders its exercise.

2. Because the representations of grace which the Scriptures contain, are such as describe it capable of "being resisted, (Acts, vii, 51.) and received in vain ;" (2 Cor. vi, 1.) and that it is possible for man to avoid yielding his assent to it; and to refuse all co-operation with it: (Heb. xii, 15.-Matt. xxiii, 37. -Luke vii, 30.) While, on the contrary, this predestination affirms, that grace is a certain irresistible force and operation.

3. Because, according to the primary intention and chief design of God, grace conduces to the good of those persons to whom it is offered and by whom it is received: While, on the contrary, this doctrine drags along with it the assertion, that grace is offered even to certain reprobates, and is so far communicated to them as to illuminate their understandings and to excite within them a taste for the heavenly gifts,-only for this end and purpose, that, in proportion to the height to which they are elevated, the abyss into which they are precipitated may be the deeper, and their fall the heavier; and that they may both merit and receive the greater perdition.

XIV. The Doctrine of this Predestination is INJURIOUS TO THE GLORY OF GOD, which does not consist of a declaration of liberty or authority, nor of a demonstration of anger and power, except to such an extent as that declaration and demonstration may be consistent with justice, and with a perpetual reservation in behalf of the honour of God's goodness. But according to this doctrine it follows, that GOD IS THE AUTHOR OF SIN, which may be proved by four arguments:

1. One of its positions is, that God has absolutely decreed to demonstrate his glory by punitive justice and mercy, in the salvation of some men and in the damnation of others: which neither was done, nor could have possibly been done, unless sin had entered into the world.

2. This doctrine affirms, that, in order to obtain his object, God ordained that man should commit sin, and be rendered vitiated; and, from this Divine ordination or appointment, the fall of man necessarily followed.

3. It asserts that God has denied to man, or has withdrawn from him, such a portion of grace as is sufficient and necessary to enable him to avoid sin; and that this was done before man had sinned: Which is an act that amounts to the same as if

God had prescribed a law to man, which it would be utterly impossible for him to fulfil, when the nature in which he had been created was taken into consideration.

4. It ascribes to God certain operations with regard to man, both external and internal, both mediate (by means of the intervention of other creatures) and immediate,-which divine operations being once admitted, man ought necessarily to commit sin, by that necessity which the scl.oolmen call “a consequential necessity antecedent to the thing itself," and which totally destroys the freedom of the will. Such an act does this doctrine attribute to God, and represents it to proceed from his primary and chief intention, without any foreknowledge of an inclination, will, or action on the part of man.

From these premises we deduce, as a further conclusion, that God really sins. Because, (according to this doctrine,) he moves to sin by an act that is unavoidable, and according to his own purpose and primary intention, without having received any previous inducement to such an act from any preceding sin or demerit in man.

From the same position we might also infer, that God is the only sinner. For man, who is impelled by an irresistible force to commit sin, (that is, to perpetrate some deed that has been prohibited,) cannot be said to sin himself.

As a legitimate consequence it also follows, that sin is not sin, since whatever that be which God does, it neither can be sin, nor ought any of his acts to receive that appellation.

Beside the instances which I have already recounted, there is another method by which this doctrine inflicts a deep wound on the honour of God, but these, it is probable, will be considered at present to be amply sufficient.

XV. This doctrine is highly DISHONOURABLE TO JESUS CHRIST Our Saviour. For, (1.) it entirely excludes him from that decree of predestination which predestinates the end: and it affirms, that men were predestinated to be saved, before Christ was predestinated to save them; and thus it argues, that he is not the foundation of election.† (2.) It denies, that Christ is the meritorious cause, that again obtained for us the salvation which we had lost, by placing him as only a subordinate cause of that salvation which had been already foreordained, and thus only a minister and instrument to apply that salvation unto us. This indeed is in evident congruity

See page 449.