the plaintiff was not only hurt, &c., but was also thereby greatly exposed and injured in his credit, and incurred expenses in procuring necessary lodgings and refreshments, and was hindered from performing his necessary affairs. Damages 500l.

Plea-Not guilty.

The plaintiff was resident at Torquay, in Devonshire. Some time previous to the proceedings in question, he had resided at Bishop's Waltham, in Hampshire, with his friends. A young woman at Bishop's Waltham affiliated a child to him, which was chargeable to that parish. The Magistrates of Hampshire made an order of filiation and maintenance upon him. In July 1836, in consequence of his having suffered arrears of the weekly payments to accumulate, he was summoned and appeared. On his refusal to pay, the Magistrates gave him a month's time to consider, which having elapsed, a Magistrate made out a commitment against him. (See 1 Burn's Justice, D'Oyley and Williams's edit. 391.) In the meantime he had gone to Torquay. The commitment bore date the 21st of August 1836, and purported to be an information and complaint upon oath made in the usual form-"The said F. Atkins being present before me" (the Justice), "to answer unto the complaint." This commitment was delivered to the defendant Wyatt, a Hampshire constable, who was sent with it into Devonshire to apprehend the plaintiff. Wyatt got the warrant indorsed by a Devonshire Magistrate, in the following form:

"I hereby authorize the within-named constable of Bishop's Waltham to execute this warrant in the county of Devon, and also Charles Kilby, constable of Tormoham" (the other defendant), "to assist in executing the same." Wyatt left the warrant with Kilby. After some delay, produced by an attempt at a compromise, Kilby executed it, by apprehending the plaintiff, and bringing him from Torquay to Bishop's Waltham, where he delivered him to Wyatt. The plaintiff tendered the sum mentioned as due in the warrant (187. 5s.), to both defendants at Torquay, and again at Bishop's Waltham; but they declined receiving it, no expenses of conveyance being tendered, and as not being authorized by the warrant. From Bishop's Waltham, Wyatt conveyed the plaintiff back

as far as Winchester, when he conveyed him to the house of correction. The money was paid the same afternoon.

The plaintiff commenced his action in September 1837, having first demanded, in writing, a perusal and copy of the warrant, under 24 Geo. 2. c. 44. The defendants did not give him a perusal of the warrant, which it was not in their power to produce, as it was then held by the keeper of the house of correction for his protection; but they delivered a copy to the plaintiff's agent. It did not appear that the plaintiff objected at the time to the denial of perusal.

At the trial, before Parke, B., at the Devon Summer Assizes, 1838, the plaintiff endeavoured to prove unnecessary devia tions by the constables from the route, and other grievances, which were negatived by the jury, who found generally for the defendants. The learned Baron gave the plaintiff leave to move to set aside the verdict. on the points which appear in the following arguments.

A rule nisi having been obtained accordingly

Erle and Saunders shewed cause, in Hilary term of this year.The points on which it was contended that these proceedings were illegal were, first, that a perusal of the original warrant was not given to the plaintiff; secondly, that a due indorsement of the warrant was not proved; thirdly, that the warrant was not duly executed by the defendants; fourthly, that the plaintiff's tender of money ought to have been accepted by the defendants. As to so much of these points as regards the validity of the warrant, the constables were protected if they acted in obedience to it, whether valid or not, by the express language of 24 Geo. 2. c. 44. s. 6, "notwithstanding," in the words of that act, any defect of jurisdiction in such Justice or Justices." The statute was intended to cast the responsibility on those who issue the warrant. But, in point of fact, the Justices had jurisdiction in this case. It was objected at the trial, that it did not appear on the face of the warrant that the hand-writing of the Hampshire Magistrates was proved to the indorsing Magistrate of Devon; and also, that the recital that the plaintiff was "then present before" the Magistrates who

As

granted it, was not founded in fact. The first is immaterial, as the proper steps must be taken for granted from the indorsement; as to the second, the summons in July, to which the defendant appeared, and the granting of the warrant in August, may all be taken as one transaction. to the first point-wilful refusal or neglect to give perusal of an original, and a copy, are undoubtedly contrary to the statute; but its words cannot be pressed against parties who have substantially complied with its demands, by giving the copies when it was out of their power to give the perusal. The tender of money the constables were not authorized to accept; the warrant commanded them to take and convey the man; and it would be dangerous to allow them the power to release a prisoner on receiving what he tenders.

Crowder and Butt, contrà.-As to the tender, Abbott, C. J. said, in Robson v. Spearman (1), that the object of the statute 49 Geo. 3. c. 68, which gives the power of commitment in these cases, was to give the party the option of paying, or remaining three months in prison. Therefore his offer ought to have been received; at all events when he got to the gaol, even if the officer would not have been justified in taking it before. The three months must be reckoned not from the arrival at the gaol, but from the commencement of his imprisonment by arrest. As to the demand and refusal of perusal, there is no express decision that anything short of literal compliance with the words of the statute, that the officer shall "shew such warrant to, and permit a copy thereof to be taken by, the party demanding the same," will suffice; and this protection is a statutable benefit to the officers, conditional on their compliance with an obligation imposed by the same statute. But lastly, the Magistrates had no jurisdiction in this case; and, being a case in which the Magistrates could not be joined as defendants, the statute does not protect the officers from the consequences of such want of jurisdiction-Sturch v. Clarke (2), Bell v. Oakley (3), Cotton v. Kadwell (4).

The Magistrate of Hampshire had no authority to issue a warrant against a party residing out of his jurisdiction in Devonshire, falsely reciting his appearance. Nor is the indorsement on the warrant sufficient. Every step necessary to give jurisdiction must be recited in a commitment. Here, it ought therefore to have been recited that the hand-writing of the Magistrate of Hants was proved, on oath, to the Magistrate of Devon; nor can this be presumed-The King v. the Inhabitants of All Saints, Southampton (5).

Cur, adv. vult.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. now delivered judgment. This was an action for false imprisonment at Torquay, Salisbury, and other places, ending at the house of correction at Winchester, obliging the plaintiff to pay 181. 5s, and forcing him to incur expenses. The plea was, not guilty. At the trial, before my Brother Parke, at Exeter, a verdict passed for the defendant, and a motion was made to enter the verdict for the plaintiff, for 5l. on some points reserved, or for a new trial. The cause of action arose out of the apprehension of the plaintiff, on a warrant granted for nonpayment of money, alleged to be due under an order of affiliation; for refusing to accept the money claimed until the plaintiff had been lodged in the house of correction; and for carrying him thither by a circuitous road, Several objections were made on the part of the plaintiff, which went to the validity both of the original warrant and of the indorsement thereon. Upon this, however, it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion, as they all resolve themselves, if well founded, into a want of jurisdiction in the Magistrates granting and indorsing the warrant; which will not the less avail for the protection of these constables, if they acted in obedience to it, and complied with a demand for a perusal or for a copy of it, duly made before action brought. The statute of 24 Geo. 2. expressly extends to cases in which the Justices have acted without jurisdiction. In the judgment in Price v. Messenger (6), it is said, that the law has already provided that the remedy of the party ag

(5) 7 B. & C.785; s. c. 6 Law J. Rep. M.C. 55. (6) 2 Bos. & Pul. 158.

grieved shall be confined to the Magistrate, as well where he has granted a warrant without jurisdiction, as where the warrant granted is improper. Now, with respect to the demand of perusal, and with respect to the copy of the warrant, we entertain no doubt but that the copy was duly given; but on the demand of a perusal of the warrant itself being made, it was answered that the original could not be produced, for it had been taken by the keeper of the Bridewell of Winchester, and he, on being called, proved that he always kept the warrant when a prisoner was brought into his custody, and that he did so in the instance in question. Further, it was admitted that, on receiving this answer, the plaintiff made no objection to the nonproduction of the warrant, he being aware that the original was in the possession of the keeper of the Bridewell, as stated by the defendant. We think that, under the circumstances, a literal compliance must be taken to have been dispensed with. The demand for a perusal of the warrant was made by an agent for the plaintiff, and his conduct was such that the delivery of a copy, under the circumstances, was all that was required. But for this, steps might have been taken to procure the original. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot rely upon its non-production to oust the defendants of protection under the statute. The only remaining question is, whether the defendants acted in obedience to the warrant. Now, the warrant required them to convey the plaintiff to the Bridewell, and to deliver him to the keeper there. They had no authority to discharge him, or to receive the money at any intervening place; and the only doubt on this part of the case could properly be, whether they had conveyed him by a circuitous route, and thereby subjected him to unnecessary inconvenience. The jury have found that they carried him by the most convenient road; and we see no reason for disturbing the verdict. It follows, that the defendants are protected by the warrant, and that the verdict was properly directed to be entered for the defendants. The rule, therefore, must be discharged.

1840. June 3.

THE QUEEN V. THE INHABI-
TANTS OF MIDDLETON, IN
TEESDALE.

Appeal, Statement of Grounds of— Sufficiency.

On an appeal against an order of removal, it was stated as one of the grounds of appeal, that the order, the examination upon which the same was grounded, and the notice of chargeability, were bad upon the faces thereof, without saying in what respect:-Held, sufficient.

Statements, that A. B. gained a settlement in the township of N., by renting a tenement there, of the value of 10l. or more, in the years 1816, 1817, 1818, 1819, or some or one of them, and resided there during the time; and also, that the said A. B. gained a settlement in your said township of N., by again renting a tenement therein, in the years 1829, 1830, 1831, or some or one of them, and paid rents for the same, to the amount of 101. for the year :-Held, insufficient.

On an appeal against an order of two Justices, whereby Elizabeth Collinson, single woman, and her illegitimate male child, were removed from the township of Newbeggin, in the county of Durham, to the township of Middleton, in Teesdale, in the same county, the Court of Quarter Sessions confirmed the order of Justices, subject to the opinion of this Court upon the following

CASE.

The removal was made on the examination of the pauper alone, which was as follows:

Durham, to wit. The examination of Elizabeth Collinson, of the township of Newbeggin, in the said county, single woman, taken on oath, &c.; who saith, that she is nineteen years of age, and that her father gained a settlement in the township of Middleton, in Teesdale, in the said county, by renting and occupying a house and land, of one Jacob Farn, in the said township of Middleton, in Teesdale, of the yearly rent of 10%., and that she hath never to the best of her knowledge and belief, done any act whereby to gain a settlement in her own right, and that on the 24th of October 1837, she was delivered of an illegitimate male

child, now aged twelve months, or thereabouts, and that she and her said illegitimate child are now actually chargeable to the said township of Newbeggin; and further it appeared to us, that this examinant hath done no act whereby to gain a settlement elsewhere.

A copy of this examination, with a copy of the order of removal, and notice of chargeability, were duly served upon the appellant township. Notice of appeal, and the grounds of appeal, were duly served upon the respondent township. The grounds of appeal were stated as follows:-First, that the order, the examination upon which the same is grounded, as also the notice of chargeability accompanying the same, are bad upon the faces thereof;-secondly, that the lawful settlement of the said Elizabeth Collinson, and her said illegitimate male child, is not in our township of Middleton, in Teesdale, as represented in the said order; but on the contrary, is in your township of Newbeggin, (she not having gained a settlement in her own right,) her father, Matthias Collinson, having gained a settlement there, by renting a tenement of the value of 10l. or more, in the years 1816, 1817, 1818, 1819, or some one of them, and resided there during the time; that the said Matthias Collinson also gained a settlement in your township of Newbeggin, by again renting a tenement therein, in the years 1829, 1830, 1831, or some or one of them, and paid rent for the same, to the amount of 10l. for the year.

or

On hearing the appeal, the respondents insisted that the settlement of the pauper, as set forth in her examination, was admitted by the appellants, as their notice did not in the first ground specify any defect in the examination, and was therefore inoperative, and did not in the second or third ground deny the settlement alleged in the examination; and that the appellants ought not to be allowed to give evidence of the settlement alleged in either the second or third ground of appeal, as the allegation was defective, in not sufficiently describing the tenement, there not being any statement either of the nature of the tenement, or of whom it was held.

If this Court shall be of opinion, either that the respondents ought to have proved

their case by evidence, or that the appellants ought to have been admitted to contest the validity of the order, examination, and notice of chargeability, or to give evidence of the settlement, alleged on the second or third ground of their appeal, the appeal is to be re-heard. If this Court shall on both points be of the contrary opinion, the order of Sessions to be confirmed.

Ingham, in support of the order of Sessions.-The respondents were not called upon to prove their case, as no sufficient issue was raised upon the settlement set out in their examination, by the grounds of appeal; nor were the appellants in a condition to go into their case, as the settlement they wished to set up was not sufficiently specified in the grounds of appeal. Those grounds neither shew who the landlord was, nor give localities to the tenement, nor shew its nature, or the duration of the tenancy-The King v. the Justices of Sussex (1).

[Wilkinson, contrà, admitted that after that case, he could not contend that the second and third grounds, stated in the notice of appeal, were sufficiently explicit.]

Then the only question is, whether any proper objection is made to the examination, notice of chargeability, and order, sent by the respondents. They are all said to be bad upon the faces thereof; but it is not said, in what respect either of them is so. Such a general statement is too vague to give any information to the respondents.

[LORD DENMAN, C.J.-Is not the examination bad upon the face of it? The objection is, that no settlement is shewn to have been gained. It is a demurrer to the examination.]

The objection is equivalent to saying, this order cannot be supported in fact. Such a statement would be too general. Allowing a general objection of this kind is of great benefit to the party making it, as he thus puts his opponent upon proof of his whole case, without subjecting himself to be visited with costs, as he might be if his objection were less general, and that objection were apparently frivolous, and disproved at the trial. The King v. Withernwick (2) is an authority to shew, that (1) 9 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 22. (2) 6 Ad. & El. 273; s. c. 6 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 54.