Here there 1854. THEOBALD v. RAILWAY ASSURANCE CO. way travelling. Suppose it had been necessary for the plaintiff to cross the line at the Wolverhampton station in order to get to the train for Shrewsbury, and in doing so he slipped and was injured, would that be a "railway PASSENGERS accident?" The term implies some defect, irregularity, or misadventure in the railway conveyance. was nothing whatever amiss about the railway. Then with respect to the damage, loss of profit and loss of time cannot be taken into consideration. The contract limits the compensation to personal injury. The 12th and 13th sections of the 15 Vict. c. c., require the assured, within a certain time, to give notice to the company of any personal injury, and submit to a medical examination. The object of that is to enable the company to offer compensation under the 15th section; and the only injury to which the attention of the company is to be called for that purpose is personal, that is, bodily injury. If a house is burnt the assured never receives compensation for his loss of profit whilst the house is being rebuilt. The rule is thus laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale (a):-" Where two parties have made a contract, which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it. [Martin, B., referred to the Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales, "The Venedotian Code," Bk. 3, c. 22.] The Court intimated their intention to take time for consideration, suggesting, however, that the parties should come to terms. Cur. adv. vult. (a) 9 Exch. 354. 1854. THEOBALD v. RAILWAY PASSENGERS ASSURANCE CO. POLLOCK, C. B., now said.-In this case a motion was made to reduce the amount of damages, and also to enter a nonsuit. The objection to the verdict was, that the accident in respect of which the action was brought was not a railway accident, within the meaning of the policy of insurance entered into by the defendants. The objection to the amount of damages was, that the defendants were not liable to compensate the plaintiff for his loss of time or loss of profit, but only for the personal injury sustained in consequence of the accident, assuming it to be a railway accident. The Court took time to consider its judgment, hoping that in the meantime the parties might come to some arrangement. But it has been intimated to us that there is a desire on the part of the company to obtain the judgment of the Court on the points raised, and consequently they are unwilling to enter into any arrange ment. The facts of the case were these:-The plaintiff, who was about to take a journey by means of two distinct railways, had insured himself with the defendants against death or personal injury arising from railway accident whilst travelling, the contract fixing the damage in the former event at 1000l. In getting out from one of the carriages on a rainy morning, his foot slipped, whereby he was severely injured. It was conceded by the defendants' counsel, that there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff in reference to the accident. And the first question is, whether this is a railway accident within the meaning of the policy. We are of opinion that it is. However much the company may desire that we should lay down a general rule as to what is a railway accident, I do not know that we are called on, or should be doing our duty, were we to lay down any rule beyond what is necessary to decide the actual case before us. Considering the great number of particulars that may enter into the decision of questions of this nature, and the very compli cated character they may assume under circumstances that at present we may not anticipate, I think, (and I believe the rest of the Court concur with me in thinking), that in the single instance brought before us under certain circumstances, some of which are not of a general nature, it would be assuming too much to lay down a rule to govern all cases. On the present occasion, it is quite plain that the plaintiff was a traveller on the railway; it is quite plain, that though at the time of the accident his journey had in one sense terminated, by the carriage having stopped, he had not ceased to be connected with the carriage, for he was still on it. The accident also happened without negligence on his part, and while doing an act which as a passenger he must necessarily have done, for a passenger must get into the carriage, and get out of it when the journey is at an end, and cannot be considered as disconnected with the carriage and railway, and with the machinery of motion, until the time he has, as it were, safely landed from the carriage, and got upon the platform. The accident is attributable to his being a passenger on the railway, and it arises out of an act immediately connected with his being such passenger. Under these circumstances, we think this was a railway accident within the meaning of the policy; and consequently the action is in our judgment maintainable, and so much of this rule as prays for a nonsuit must be discharged. In order that the question raised at the trial respecting damages might be considered by the Court in banc, the verdict of the jury was taken separately. They found for medical attendance and expenses 341. 19s., for loss of time or loss of profit 100%. At the trial, the plaintiff made his claim for both. I thought it quite clear that he could not claim for loss of time and also for loss of profit, which are the same thing under two different forms;-if indemnified for time he had no right to claim for profit, and if indemnified for profit he had no right to claim for time. I also had considerable doubt whether he was entitled to claim 1854. THEOBALD v. RAILWAY PASSENGERS ASSURANCE CO. 1854. THEOBALD v. RAILWAY PASSENGERS ASSURANCE Co. either, and I therefore directed the jury to find for one only, with leave to the defendants to move to strike that out if the Court should think it right. On considering the arguments used on both sides, we think that the verdict should be reduced to 34l. 19s. We are of opinion that the insurance must be treated in the same way, whether considered with reference to the death of the party or to an accident which inflicts injury short of it: and we think that, in considering the damage done to the traveller, the consequential mischief of losing some profit is not to be taken into consideration; otherwise, a passenger whose time or business is more valuable than that of another would for precisely the same personal injury receive a greater remuneration than that other. What the insurance company calculate on indemnifying the party against is the expense and pain and loss immediately connected with the accident, and not remote consequences that may follow according to the business or profession of the passenger. The verdict must therefore be reduced to 31. 198., and so far the rule must be made absolute. ALDERSON, B.-It was contended that the estimate of damage depended on some proportion to be ascertained between the amount of injury caused by the accident and the amount of loss in the event of the death of the party, in which latter event the damage is limited to 1000%, the sum insured. I, at least, think no such proportion exists. The true measure of damage is the personal injury resulting from the accident, not exceeding however the sum which the company would have to pay in the case of death. As to railway accidents, my notion of a railway accident is an accident occurring in the course of travelling by a railway, and arising out of the fact of the journey. It does not necessarily depend on any accident to the railway or machinery connected with it. Rule to enter a nonsuit discharged, rule to reduce the damages to 34l. 198. absolute. 1854. MANNING V. PHELPS and Another, Executors of the Will of W. DODINGTON. COVENANT. The declaration stated, that W. Dod June 5. The limitation prescribed by the 3 & 4 Will. apply to an ac teral covenant for payment of arent charged the covenantee on land, and may recover damages for the breach of that covenant, ing his right to recover the rent-charge is barred by the notwithstand above statute. ington in his lifetime, on the 1st of September, 1820, by his deed covenanted with the plaintiff to pay him during 4,c.27,does not the joint natural lives of W. Dodington and the plaintiff, tion on a collaan annuity or clear yearly rent-charge of 150%, payable half-yearly, of which annuity or rent-charge forty halfyears immediately preceding the death of W. Dodington, on the 25th of February, 1852, are due and unpaid. Fourth plea. That the deed mentioned in the declaration was dated on the day and year therein mentioned; and that by the same deed W. Dodington, in consideration of his natural love and affection towards the plaintiff his brother, and of a nominal consideration of 10s. granted to the plaintiff, to hold for an estate in the deed mentioned, a rent of 150l. per annum, issuing out of and charged upon certain lands, whereof W. Dodington was then seised in fee simple, payable to the plaintiff halfyearly, on the 29th of September and 25th of March in every year; and the first payment to be made on the 29th of September, 1820. And W. Dodington thereby empowered the plaintiff to distrain for the arrears of the said rent-charge in and upon the said lands in manner therein mentioned; and the said lands were and still are of an annual value amply sufficient to cover the said rent; and the covenant in the declaration mentioned is accessory and subordinate to the said grant. And the defendants in fact say, that this action is an action to recover a rent, and is not brought within twenty years next after the time at which the right to bring such an action first accrued to the plaintiff, but long, to wit thirteen years and upwards, after the expiration of such period of twenty |