12971. 188. 7d. being then due to him, the plaintiff seized and took possession of some crops of grain then growing on the farm, and which had been sown by S. subsequently to the execution of the indenture. In Trinity Term, 1848, the defendant recovered a judgment against S., and on the 22nd of February, 1849, a writ of fi. fa. indorsed to levy 3107. 198. 3d., was issued on such judgment and delivered to the sheriff for execution, who on the same day seized the said crops. On the 8th of March, 1849, S. petitioned the Insolvent Court under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96. The official assignee in the first instance claimed the crops, and a bill was filed by him in the Court of Chancery to restrain the plaintiff from selling them, which bill was dismissed upon terms agreed on between the plaintiff and the assignee, and the latter then abandoned all claim to the crops. The sheriff afterwards sold the crops for 2947. which came to the hands of the defendant; and the plaintiff having sued the defendant for the same

Held-First, that, supposing the debtor had not petitioned the Insolvent Court, the plaintiff had a right to recover; for though the power to seize future crops, if unexecuted, would have been of no avail against the defendant's execution, since it gave no legal or equitable title to any specific crops, yet when the power was executed to the extent of the plaintiff's taking possession of the then growing crops, he was in the same situation as if the debtor himself had delivered them to him, and consequently his title would prevail against that of the defendant.

Secondly, that the circumstance of the defendant having petitioned the Insolvent Court subsequently to the seizure and before the sale of the crops did not affect the plaintiff's

INTERROGATORIES.

right, since the meaning of the 21st section of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, is that no creditor under a bill of sale not completely executed before the petition, shall avail himself of it to the prejudice of the general body of creditors; and therefore, although this bill of sale was inoperative as against the assignee, yet, as he abandoned his claim, it was valid as against the defendant.

Semble: that if the proceeds of the sale had been more than sufficient to satisfy the defendant's execution, as to the surplus, he would have been liable to the assignees, and therefore would have had a good defence against the plaintiff.

Held, also, that in the case of an execution founded on a warrant of attorney within the 108th sect. of the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, the effect of that enactment is not to render the writ void, and thereby let in an execution at the suit of a subsequent adverse judgment creditor, but only to vary the legal operation of the writ, so as to render a sheriff who executes it liable in tort. Congreve v. Evetts, 298

INSURANCE.

See PASSENGERS ASSURANCE COM

PANY.

INTEREST.

See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, (3).

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT.

See COPYRIGHT.

INTERROGATORIES.

(1). At what Time.

Under the 51st section of the Common Law Procedure Act, (1854), 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, which empowers the Court to allow a party to

deliver (before declaration by the plaintiff, and before plea by the defendant) written interrogatories to his adversary to be answered by him, the Court will not exercise that power by allowing a defendant to deliver interrogatories before plea, except under special circumstances, as, for instance, where the defendant makes out a case of urgent necessity.

Quære, whether the right to deliver interrogatories under that section, is confined to such cases as would have afforded ground for a bill of discovery in a Court of equity. Martin v. Hemming, 478

(2). Questions tending to criminate Witness.

On an application to the Court for leave to deliver interrogatories in writing to the opposite party in the cause, under the 51st section of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, the affidavit of the attorney of the party sought to be interrogated, that he believes that the questions proposed will criminate his client, is no answer to the application. Such objection ought to be made by the party himself when he has been

sworn.

Quare, whether a witness, to entitle himself to object to a question, on the ground that it has a tendency to criminate him, is bound to satisfy the Court that such will be its effect, or whether he is himself the sole judge of its effect. Osborn v. The London Dock Company, 698

(3). When allowable.

The plaintiff instructed the defendant, a broker, to purchase certain goods for him. The defendant accordingly, professing to have bought the goods as a broker, delivered a bought note to the plaintiff

"Bought by order and for account of T. & Co. (the plaintiff) from principal, 102 barrels of raisins, &c." The plaintiff paid to the defendant the purchase money, and received from him a delivery warrant for the goods; but, upon the plaintiff's presenting it to the wharfingers holding the goods, they refused to deliver them, on the ground that the warrant was fictitious. In an action for money had and received to recover back the money so paid, the Court allowed the plaintiff to deliver interrogatories to the defendant, under the 51st section of the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, requiring him to answer, whether he acted in the transaction as principal or agent, and, if as agent, to name his principal. Thöl v. Leask, 704

INTROMISSIONS. See GUARANTEE, (2).

ISSUABLE PLEA.

To a count on a bill of exchange, drawn by G. S. upon and accepted by the defendant, and indorsed by G. S. to the plaintiffs, the defendant, being under terms of pleading issuably, pleaded that he accepted the bill, and delivered it to G. S. as the plaintiffs' agent and on their account, in part payment of the purchase money on the sale by the plaintiffs to the defendant of a certain ship; that the defendant was induced to purchase the ship by the false and fraudulent representations of the plaintiffs and G. S. then made to him by them-that the ship was as strong as wood and iron could make her, and that she could be sent to sea without any expense. The plea then alleged, that the ship was not, at the time of the representation, as strong as wood and iron could make her, but, on the contrary, was weak

and rotten, and a large sum of money was and is required to make the ship fit for sea, which the plaintiffs and G. S. well knew; and further, that there never was any value or consideration for the indorsement of the bill by G. S. to the plaintiff's, or for the plaintiffs being the holders thereof:-Held, that the plea was not issuable, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to sign judgment. Sully v. Frean, 535

JOINT STOCK COMPANY.
See BANKRUPT, (5).
CONSIDERATION.

Right to sue a Member.

The 3 & 4 Vict. c. xcv., after reciting, that several persons had formed themselves into a company or partnership for effecting assurances on lives, and that difficulties might arise in recovering debts due to the company, since, by law, all members of the company must be named in every action or suit for such purpose, enacted that all actions and suits against any person indebted to the company, or upon any bonds, covenants, bills of exchange, promissory notes, contracts, or agreements, and, generally, all other proceedings whatsoever at law or in equity, by or on behalf of the company, against any person or persons, whether such person or persons be a proprietor or proprietors of the company or not, shall be commenced in the name of the chairman, or of a director, or the secretary of the company as the nominal plaintiff:— Held, that the company might sue, in the name of the nominal plaintiff, one of its own members for a debt due to the company. Pinnock,

JOINTURE. See DEVISE, (2).

Reddish v. 213

(2). To a declaration for a breach of contract in dismissing the plaintiff from his engagement as an actor, the defendant pleaded, in bar of the further maintenance of the action, that, after the plaintiff declared, the defendant pleaded payment into Court of 32., to which the plaintiff replied by taking the money out of Court in satisfaction of his claim that afterwards a Judge made an order, without the defendant's consent, that the replication and all subsequent proceedings should be set aside on payment of costs; and that the plaintiff should repay to the defendant the money taken out of Court, and be at liberty to amend his declaration and particulars of demand, the defendant being at liberty to plead de novo; that the defendant refused to receive the money and costs, and had not assented to the order; that the plaintiff amended his declaration and also his particulars by increasing his claim from 327. to 2167. Replication: that the plaintiff replied and took the money out of Court, and taxed his costs under an erroneous and mistaken belief, that, notwithstanding he accepted the said sum of 327. and costs, he would be entitled to proceed in a fresh action under the said agreement for the recovery of his salary when and as the same should from time to time become due, and that the order was made to enable him to rectify his mistake. On demurrer to the replication:-Held, in the Exchequer Chamber (affirming the judgment of the Court of Ex

land tax charged on his rectory out of his own estate, under the 38 Geo. 3, c. 60, and did not, in his contract with the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, declare his option to be considered a purchaser of the land tax (whereby, according to the provisions of the 37th section of that statute, the lands became exonerated from the land tax, and chargeable, for the benefit of the incumbent, his executors, administrators, and assigns, with the amount of the 37. per cent. Consols transferred, and with the payment of a yearly sum, by way of interest, equal to the amount of the land tax redeemed):-Held, first, that Dr. K., as an ecclesiastical incumbent, had such an estate as is contemplated by the 37th section of the 38th Geo. 3, c. 60, taken in connection with the 39 Geo. 3, c. 6, s.5; and that he was entitled to create the charge upon the living; and, secondly, that his personal representatives were entitled to maintain an action against the succeeding incumbent for the recovery of the interest accrued due on the amount of the 37. per cent. Consols so transferred, from the time when the latter succeeded to the rectory. Kilderbee v. Ambrose, 454

LEVEL. See MINE, (3).

LIBEL.

In an action for libel, it is no justification that the libellous matter was previously published by a third person, and that the defendant, at the time of his publication, disclosed the name of that person, and believed all the statements contained in the libel to be true. Tidman v. Ainslie, 63

LIEN.

See INNKEEPER.

962 LIVERPOOL PILOT ACT.

LIFE ESTATE. See DEVISE, (3).

LIMITATIONS.

See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

LIQUIDATED DEMAND. See WRIT OF SUMMONS.

LIVERPOOL PILOT ACT. The 35th section of the Liverpool Pilot Act, 5 Geo. 4, c. lxxiii., enacts, that "in case the master or commander of any ship outward bound, except &c., shall proceed to sea, and shall refuse to take on board and employ a licensed pilot, such master &c. shall pay to the pilot who first or who only shall offer his service, and shall be so refused, according to the different rates directed by the Act to be paid, in like manner as if the pilot had been received and employed in piloting the vessel into or out of the port, together with all expenses to be incurred in the recovery of the same.

A ship left the docks of Liverpool with a pilot on board on the 2nd of December. On the 3rd the plaintiff was engaged to raise an anchor of the ship which she had lost in the river; and in doing so, by some mismanagement and neglect of those on board the ship, the plaintiff's boat, which was alongside, was injured and sunk. At the time of the accident the ship was at anchor in the river Mersey, she was in the service of the Post-office, and was under contract to sail on the following day (the 4th), but the master was not on board, and the riggers were engaged in completing her rigging:-Held, (assuming that under the Act of Parliament an outward bound vessel

MAGISTRATE.

when proceeding to sea is bound to take a pilot on board), that, under the circumstances, this ship was not at the time proceeding to sea.

If, in the case of a vessel proceeding to sea under the care of a pilot, damage is done by the mismanagement of the vessel, the owners, in order to exonerate themselves, are bound to shew that the accident was occasioned exclusively by the pilot's default. Rodrigues v. Melhuish, 110

LOCAL AND PERSONAL ACT.

The Ramsgate Harbour Acts, 32 Geo. 3, c. 74, and 55 Geo. 3, c. lxxxiv., are local and personal Acts, within the meaning of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97; and therefore the period of limitation of actions for anything done in pursuance of those Acts is two years. Moore v. Shepherd, 424

LONG WEIGHT.

See WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

LOSS OF GOODS. See CARRIER.

LUGGAGE OF PASSENGER. See RAILWAY COMPANY, (1).

LUNATIC. See EVIDENCE, (2).

MAGISTRATE.

(1). Form of Commitment.

Warrants of commitment, convictions, and other instruments made by magistrates, are sufficient, if they correspond with the forms given in the schedule to the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43.

The 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, empowers two justices of the peace to punish,