Imatges de pàgina
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'measures,' the Consul adds, do not seem to be contemplated 'by the instructions, as now constituted, but merely the affording of such assistance as may be necessary, in the event of an actual attack, to the preservation of life or the protection of property from destruction.' Under such limitations as these, ships of war can afford no real protection for the saving of either life or property against any sudden onslaught -the exact day and hour of which foreigners can never know, even though forewarned, as at Tien-tsin, of the existence of danger from a Chinese mob. It is generally under the leadership of crafty and very treacherous enemies plotting their destruction. For all practical purposes, a British fleet might as well be in the Atlantic as in the China seas, if no action can be taken until an attack has actually commenced. Measures in anticipation of danger must be taken if any real protection is to be secured. A certain large discretionary power on the spot is no less essential, since weeks or months must elapse before instructions from home can be received, and weeks before a reference can even be made at Peking from the ports in winter. In this last instance there was not even this difficulty, for the Legations were within twenty-four hours' reach. But between this discretionary power and a license to proceed to measures of hostility in anticipation of danger, under the direction of a commander of a gunboat or a junior consular officer there is a wide distance. The best deterrent of crime and treachery in China is undoubtedly the known strength to resist, or power to punish. Where the first is wanting, swiftness and certainty in the punishing power is the only substitute. Through the Chinese rulers neither of these will ever be secured. We repeat, they have never been known to intervene in time either to save life or property. In the last melancholy example of such impotence - the butchery of Tien-tsin, no effective action had been taken fifty days after the event. Nor in the end have any of the responsible and active participators in the outrage suffered punishment. All that has been done by the Chinese Government has been illusive and utterly inadequate. The Executive has shown its weakness in a way to revolt the least exigent; and the anti-foreign party has given us a specimen of their strength of a very ominous kind. The Tsungli-Yamen did not arrest Chen-kwo-jui, who seems, by common report, to have been the chief plotter of all the mischief. They made no step in this direction, although the Representative of France openly charged him with complicity in the evil doings of the 21st of June. Tseng-kwo-fau, by his weak trimming and

indecision when sent to the spot to punish the chief offenders, has lost credit with every party. His tardy memorial absolving the unfortunate Sisters from blame deprived him of the leadership of the anti-foreign party in the State, of which he had long been regarded the head; and his want of decision and his fear of the people have led the smaller group of proforeign officials to fancy that he must have been greatly overrated hitherto. He was six weeks at Tien-tsin before he had the courage to make a single arrest. The last reports from Peking say that he is about to retire into private life, discredited and disgraced in the estimation of all his friends. Yangchow, where he came in collision with the British Minister and was compelled to afford redress for a popular attack on the missionaries in that place, and Tien-tsin, where he was confronted with the French Representative in a still more serious affair, have clipped the wings of his soaring ambition, and sent him back into private life from his Viceroyalty and the foremost place in the councils of the nation. He has suffered a downfall scarcely less great than Yêh of Canton memory. Certainly if foreigners often suffer from the hostility and ineptitude of Chinese officials, the latter have reason to look with fear on any serious conflict with those they so often seek to trample on. Malheur à qui s'y frotte,' might well be the motto over every foreigner's escutcheon in China. This fact itself should be, and no doubt is, some protection.

The next greatest man in Chinese estimation to the Viceroy Tseng-kwo-fau, who is now passing off the stage, is Li-hungchang, the generalissimo of the ever-victorious army,' which, with Colonel Gordon's aid, gave the coup de grâce to the Taepings shut up in Nanking. He has been appointed Viceroy and Governor-General of the province of Chili in succession to Tseng-kwo-fau, and by last accounts had gone to Tien-tsin, that port as well as the capital being within the limits of his province. It remains to be seen how he will act. He has the reputation of not being afraid of the people, as his predecessor unfortunately was; and has shown himself quick in taking a decision. Of late people say, however, that his palm itches, and the rich folk at Tien-tsin may have already greased it for him. We fear matters were not well managed on the foreign side in the beginning. M. de Rochechouart seems to have complicated matters by demanding the heads of three officials at the offset. He did not get them of course. To have given them without a trial would have been an act of pusillanimity; and to give them now, if a legal conviction could be secured, would be regarded by the people as evincing fear of the

foreigners, and the beheaded would be glorified, as have been the coolies executed, as martyrs in a patriotic cause. He also seems to have greatly erred in separating himself from his colleagues after having proposed a common action, and thus suggested to the Chinese the idea of isolation. As he brought up gunboats and threatened to use them, the Chinese at once began their preparations for which he furnished so valid an excuse, and the province is now filled with troops, and all along the coast they are reported as prepared to meet the French. The officials-some at least-think they are strong enough to meet any one Foreign Power in the field, and they have so reversed the position, that from playing the part of the wolf in troubling the stream, they now regard themselves as the injured party, and will fight if France does not accept their terms ! This, we presume, is the blustering talk of the braves and firebrigades of Tien-tsin. As the French are not contemplating any attack, it seems probable that there may be quiet during this winter; but how next year may go on it is impossible to say. One thing seems certain; although the official telegrams from Peking do not sanction such a conclusion, the demeanour of the people is everywhere changed. We have this from many witnesses of the most reliable kind, and from one among others who has lately been at all the principal ports, and is thoroughly conversant with the people and their language, and could not be mistaken on such a plain matter of observation. There is evidence of a general desire to turn the foreigner out; so that unless they speedily get the only sort of lesson which they seem capable of understanding or really profiting by-teaching them respect for the foreigner's life and his property, there is a prospect of increasing difficulty in the future, and nothing but difficulties. If the French were in a position to act alone, they would for a time beat all conceit out of the most obstinate of the Celestial race, and inflict a lesson that would leave little to be desired-as to effectiveness. -as to effectiveness. But if France were left to act alone, great mischief would inevitably follow, and it is probable that in the present state of that country she will be unable to act at all. Already much evil has been caused by the domineering spirit and intermeddling policy of the French agents, as well as by the Ultramontanism of the missionaries under their protection. But what could be anticipated if they were left to act alone in humbling the Chinese, and compelling them to accept such terms of peace as it might please France, in her own political or missionary interest, to dictate? That at least must not be. It would be too utterly destructive of all hope of maintaining any permanent relations of peace and amity

with either Chinese rulers or people; and would undoubtedly pave the way for the disintegration of the Empire, or its partition among the Foreign Powers-attempts to subjugate whole provinces and appropriate the morsels in perfectly indigestible quantities. So far as the interests of commerce or of civilisation are concerned, nothing could be more fatal.

It is not without interest, in a political and historical point of view, to note the strange coincidence by which two countries, at the extreme west and east of the great Asiatic continent, afford at the present time striking analogies in their political situation and prospects. Both are objects of solicitude to the great European Powers, and both are, to a great degree, under their tutelage. Russia hangs on the frontiers of both with a menacing and crushing power, and is hated and dreaded accordingly by each of them for somewhat similar reasons. Against disintegrating forces, applied by rival and contending Western States, in the form of advice-imperious demands for reforms-privileges and concessions of the most sweeping kind -China, no more than Turkey, can offer any defence, save such as weakness suggests in presence of superior force-to temporise and oppose a certain immoveable and dogged inertia -a passive resistance such as the Pope's non possumus typifies. It is thus that they are alone enabled to meet demands made upon them for concessions larger than were ever demanded except from a defeated enemy. After all, however much we may regret this chronic state of antagonism, it is impossible not to admit that the Chinese ruling classes may be not wholly wrong if they conceive that a nation of some three or four hundred millions was not made merely for foreign trade and that foreign nations and merchants might grow rich, or even that foreign statesmen and political philosophers might enjoy, free of cost, a new and vast field for experiments. They may be pardoned if they sometimes feel-and feel strongly-that every other object and interest in the Empire should not be wholly subordinated to their commercial relations, or the nation governed entirely and exclusively by the demands of foreign merchants or the will of foreign States.

ART. VIII.-1. The Military Forces of the Crown. Their Administration and Government. By C. M. CLODE. 2 vols. 8vo. London: 1869.

2. Letters on Military Organisation, reprinted from the Times,' with Additions. By Lord ELCHO, M.P. London: 1871. 3. On Army Organisation. By Sir ARCHIBALD ALISON, Bart. Edinburgh: 1869.

'LET it suffice,' says Lord Bacon, in one of those pregnant sentences which are the wisdom of ages- Let it suffice, ⚫ that no estate expect to be great, that is not awake upon any 'just occasion of arming.' The people of England, not unmindful of their former and their present greatness, are awake to the events passing around them, and to their own duties in the midst of them. Whether they look to the East or to the West, to Central Europe or to the Furthest Isles, it is apparent to the simplest capacity that if we hope to retain the blessings of peace for ourselves, it must be that we are prepared to defend them; and that the rights of nations and the obligations of public law are, at this present time, protected solely by the force which can be brought to their support. It would be infatuation to imagine that the naval and military power which sufficed in years of peace and lassitude can suffice for this Empire when Europe rings with the din of arms, and when our interests in Asia and America are alike assailable. On this point the expectations of the nation are unanimously and confidently fixed. The security of the country and the duration of the present Administration depend on the fulfilment of these expectations. Mr. Gladstone is called upon to meet Parliament with measures widely different from those bills of internal reform which he has heretofore introduced and carried with so much spirit and success. We trust that he and his colleagues will display equal vigour and resolution in framing and proposing comprehensive legislative and executive measures for a thorough reorganisation of the military forces of the Crown. That is manifestly the task which now awaits his hand and calls for all his power. Parliament and the country are prepared to accept from him measures which might some months ago have found them indifferent or reluctant. We know nothing of the intentions of the Government; we do not pretend to penetrate them; but Ministers have a signal opportunity before them, and we trust they will use it with signal success. The following pages are offered as a contribution to the discussion

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