'Very absurdly the cloud of fire which the bird has become in the poet's imagination is, by the removal of the semicolon from its proper place at the end of the second line to the end of the third, represented, not as soaring in the deep blue of the sky, but as springing from the earth-which is what nobody ever saw a cloud do; not a cloud of fire, or cloud glowing with coloured radiance at any rate; and would, besides, give us as forced and false an image of a lark commencing its ascent as could be well put into rhyme or into words-for the cloud of fire was only, according to this pointless pointing, the appearance which the bird presented (and which yet it never could have presented) when rising from the earth.'

The whole of this reasoning, and there is more to the same effect, rests on the assumption that in the second verse the lark is described as leaving the ground. This is, however, a complete mistake, the critic having failed to notice that in the opening verse of the poem the lark, when first addressed by the poet, is already far up the sky; and that in the second verse she still continues to ascend further and further from the earth, higher and higher into the air. The image, like a cloud of fire,' applies not to the appearance of the bird at all, as Professor Craik supposes, but to the continuous motion upward, for the obvious reason that fire ascending seeks the 'sun.' The assumption on which it rests being thus an error, the whole reasoning falls to the ground, and with it any show of plausibility for the change. Indeed, the altered punctuation of the verse, and its interpretation, simply blur the pure and delicate outlines of the poet's glowing picture, reducing his lucid thought and vivid imagery to a confused and inconsistent jumble. These examples well illustrate the danger attaching to the conjectural emendation of Shelley's poetry. Professor Craik was an accomplished English scholar, and his verbal criticisms are usually sound as well as ingenious and acute. But Shelley, more than any other modern English poet, requires to be carefully studied before his refinements of thought and niceties of language can be fully understood or perfectly explained. The thought, while exquisitely articulated, is often so complex and subtle, and the feeling, though deep and strong below, has so many swift and brilliant changes on the surface, catching at every turn the colours of the sun,' that his more important poems cannot be adequately realised or interpreted without profound and sympathetic study. While this holds true of his poetry in general, it applies with peculiar force to its more obscure and difficult passages. In these the poet's meaning must be grasped as perfectly as possible before the critic attempts to correct what he may regard as imperfect or faulty in expression. Mr. Rossetti is not always sufficiently

careful in this particular. In many cases he has not gone through the preliminary labour essential to success in the work of critical revision. The result is a want of due reverence for the author's text, and the introduction of needless and therefore injurious alterations. The criticisms we have offered are in the main vindications of Shelley's own text from the destructive inroads of confident but rash conjecture.

We have no space to illustrate further the imperfections still attaching to Mr. Rossetti's work. It is, however, in the main, as we have already said, well done. Many of his verbal emendations are happy, and some may probably take rank as permanent improvements of the text. It will be seen, however, from what we have said that there is still critical work for the editor to do, and it must be carefully done before his volumes can be accepted as the standard edition of Shelley's poetical works.

ART. VI.-1. Sessional Papers of the Reichstag or Diet of the North German Bund. First Legislative Term. Second Extraordinary Session of 1870. Nos. VI., IX., and XII. Berlin: November, 1870.

2. The Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia in 1866. By Sir ALEXANDER MALET, Bart., K.C.B., late Minister Plenipotentiary at Frankfort. 8vo. London: 1870.

3. Les Droits de l'Allemagne sur l'Alsace et la Lorraine, Par HENRY DE SYBEL. 8vo. Bruxelles: 1871.

4. Réunion de l'Alsace à la France. Par le Baron HALLEZCLAPARÈDE. 8vo. Paris: 1844.

'IN the sixteenth century,' says Sir William Stirling Maxwell, in a passage which we have quoted before, and are not unwilling to quote again, the office of Emperor was sur'rounded with august and venerable associations which 'can now but imperfectly recall. Heir of the universal sway ' of Rome, the holder of it claimed to be the suzerain of all earthly kings. First and oldest of European dignities, its very name had a sound of majesty, which it has lost since it has been vulgarised by Muscovite and Corsican, by black 'men and brown men in the New World, and worst of all degraded by the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine itself, in the ' meaningless title of Austria and the bloody infamy of Mexico.' The title of Emperor took its origin in the death-throes of

Roman freedom. It was first borne by rulers who were stained with the crimes of the Claudian and the Flavian Houses. It was then conferred on a series of military adventurers by the acclamations of a venal and profligate soldiery. It passed in due time to the stolid pomp and growing degeneracy of the Court of Byzantium. The imperial crown of the West was placed by Papal hands on the brows of the first victorious soldier, who combined the savage tribes of Northern Europe beneath his sway. It was worn under varying fortunes by his successors for nearly a thousand years, and no doubt at one time it was regarded as the highest symbol of temporal power. The title was not inappropriately revived by Napoleon, when he had succeeded in trampling on the States of continental Europe. For always and everywhere it has been the symbol of despotic government and military strength, rather than of national rights or of freedom. Its strength, when it has been strong, was attested by acts of violence and oppression-by aggression on the territories of independent States, and by persecution of those subordinate princes and communities which held their authority in subjection to it. Its weakness, when it has been weak, proved infinitely more favourable than its strength to the liberties of Europe, in so much that the history of Germany for many centuries consisted in a continuous struggle to defend the rights of the Empire, and of the States belonging to the Empire, against the Emperors. The politics of Germany and of Europe, from an early period down to the Treaty of Westphalia, might justly be described as a protracted, and at last successful, effort to prevent the erection of one huge military monarchy in central Europe, under the imperial dignity which was then vested in the House of Austria; to resist the predominance of a power alike hostile to freedom and independence; and to limit the prerogatives of a crown which claimed a paramount authority over all cognate and allied States, for the purpose of reducing them to subjection, and of assailing and invading at pleasure the dominions of weaker nations. Some vestiges of this ancient tradition of foreign conquest survived even to our own time, for it was by virtue of this Imperial sway, which had outlived the Empire itself, that Austria continued, till within a very recent period, to hold Italy in chains and thraldom. The Emperors of Germany had done so for six hundred years. If then we are to look to the past to shed any light upon the future policy of the German Empire, whether at home or abroad, it is indeed, to borrow another expression from a celebrated article of this Journal, an ominous and evil name '—a name synonymous with the worst elements of human history,"

originating in bloodshed, appropriated by crime, dedicated to oppression. Cæsarism or Imperialism have become in our own days the last expressions of contempt to describe the degradation to which a great nation may be reduced by a long series of revolutions; and we should see no reason to admire them on one side of the Rhine more than on the other.

It was therefore with some surprise that the world learned that, whatever else King William of Prussia might have taken in France, he should have thought it added anything to his own dignity to appropriate the crown and mantle of the Emperor he had just dethroned. Indeed the Prussians themselves were more astonished than pleased to find that they were henceforward to be the Kaiserlicks,' the nickname of their ancient enemies. The title of Emperor was not awarded to the King by the acclamations of a free people, by the vote of a national Diet, or even by the cry of a victorious army. It was obscurely tendered to him by a junto of small princes, who were trembling at the least sign of Prussian irritation, and whose armies were at that moment serving under his orders. In his eagerness to secure this singular prize, he did not even wait until he had returned with the spoils of an unparalleled campaign to his own northern capital; nay, it can hardly be said that the Empire of Germany had itself any legal character or existence when the Emperor was declared. With singular bad taste it was hastily inaugurated at Versailles. In his acceptance of the proffered crown, the King cautiously abstained from any reference to the past, present, or future rights and liberties of the German nation, and the same significant silence on this vital point prevails in the speech delivered to the Reichsrath from the throne on the 21st March at Berlin. He assumed the title as the reward of victory, conferred upon him by the assent of the princes serving in his armies; he described it as a pledge of the unity and military strength of Germany; and he intimated that it was his intention to restore or re-establish' (both words were used) the German Empire. When the doctors of the University of Bologna were ordered by the Emperor Frederic I. in the year 1158, at the Diet of Roncali, to define the rights of the Imperial Crown in Italy, they wound up a long enumeration of privileges and powers by these comprehensive words: Tua voluntas jus esto: sicuti dicitur quidquid Principi placuit legis habet vigorem.' The doctors of Berlin, assembled at Versailles, would probably not hold language so explicit; but we cannot discover in the report of their acts which is now before us, any effectual provisions to limit the

We shall,

power they are so anxious to create and to serve. however, revert to this part of the subject in the latter pages of this article.

There exists, we are well aware, in Germany a numerous, highly-instructed, and patriotic body of men who hail these changes with great satisfaction as the noblest and best result of their recent success in war; who accept the title and authority of the Empire, not so much in memory of its past glories as in the hope of the services it may render in future to the unity of the nation; and who certainly believe that neither unity nor military power will promote the true welfare of the country and the general peace, unless they are based on free institutions. We sympathise to a great extent with these persons. We desire nothing so much as that the freedom and independence of the German people should eventually triumph over the military caste and the absolutist traditions of Prussia; and we trust that it is not impossible that this result may ultimately be arrived at. But at present everything in Germany seems to be moving in the opposite direction. The eminent military services rendered in the war by the princes and nobles of the land; the habits of authority and obedience engendered by military command; the overwhelming forces and money at the disposal of the governments; the passionate desire of national unity, which has led the Germans of the present day to cast aside with disdain many of those rights of independence which their forefathers struggled for centuries to obtain and defend; and the prestige of recent victory, all tend to throw a great advantage at the present time on the side of absolutism and aristocracy. The ministers and generals of the King of Prussia who have raised that sovereign to so exalted a position in Germany and in Europe are not men to cast aside this advantage. They have availed themselves of the national enthusiasm for unity to create a great power in the world; but they are for the most part the known enemies of popular rights and popular control; and on their return to their native country, when the severe pressure and constraint which they have maintained during the war is removed, they find themselves at the very outset of a political struggle, in which military and irresponsible authority will either have to submit to the just demands of liberal opinion or to confront them.* At present,

*It deserves to be noted that the very first act of the constituency of Berlin, after the war, was to reject Generals Moltke, Werder, and Manteuffel as Parliamentary candidates: a striking proof of the determined hostility of the population of the capital to the military spirit of the government, and, as far as it goes, an encouraging symptom.