Works of Thomas Hill Green: Philosophical works

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Longmans, Green and Company, 1894
 

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It assumes that simple ideas are consciously referred to things
45
This ascription means the clothing of sensation with invented
51
Ilence another view of real essence as unknown qualities of
75
Fatal to the notion that mathematical truths though general
80
How can primary qualities be outside consciousness and
81
Only about qualities of matter as distinct from matter itself that
87
Summary view of Lockes difficulties in regard to the real
93
Ambiguity as to real essence causes like ambiguity as io science
100
His equivocal use of antecedent
104
Two lines of thought in Locke between which a follower would
106
Two ways out of such difficulties
112
Can it be applied to him figuratively in virtue of the indefi
118
There must have been something from eternity to cause what
126
Yes according to the true notion of the relation between thought
130
This derived from Berkeley
133
What is meant by relation of mind and matter?
134
Berkeley goes wrong from confusion between thought and feeling
140
Are there general ideas? Berkeley said yes and
145
If so it is not space at all but Berkeley thinks it is only
146
His way of dealing with physical truths
152
Physiology wont answer the question that Locke asked
164
His account of these
171
Summary of contradictions in his account of extension
175
Substancescollections of ideas
177
Hume no simply
179
Not relations of resemblance only but those of quantity also
186
Lockes shuffle of body solidity and touch fairly exposed 90
192
To make sense of them we must take perception to mean per
198
The points must be themselves impressions and therefore
205
What becomes of the exactness of mathematics according
230
His explanation implies that we have an idea virtually the same
238
Account of the inference given by Locke and Clarke rejected
244
For physiological processes are not continued into consciousness
248
Examination of Humes language about them
250
Identity of objects an unavoidable crux for Hume
254
Are these several fictions really different from each other ?
260
Their true correlativity
266
ascribed to
270
What is meant by present and future pleasure?
314
Conformity to law not the moral good but a means to it
320
But this does not exclude the view that all desire is for pleasure
326
His account of direct passions
332
Another device is to suggest a physiological account of pride
339
What pleasure
345
All passions equally interested or disinterested
346
How Hume gives meaning to this otherwise unmeaning defini
352
Moral sense is thus sympathy with pleasure qualified by consider
358
Such restriction if maintained would render the testimony
360
Interest and sympathy account for all obligations civil and moral
364
Only respectability remains
370
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION
373
Confusing consciousness for which there is neither subject
398
e without qualification by memory and inference
404
PART II
410
Nor does the distinction between vivid and faint apply to such
416
But this order does not belong to or determine the matter
419
Next suppose matter to be something beyond the vivid
422
It cannot be both a cause and a state of consciousness
427
the testimony is to operation of per
431
Mr Spencers doctrine of the independence of matter as either
433
This invented relation forms the very being of things
437
Without this paralogism can experience of force be treated as
439
An abstract idea may be a simple
443
Unity of consciousness is the condition alike of succession
445
Two meanings of real essence
449
For feeling of relations cannot arise 1 from grouping
451
Can it be explained from the psychological medium or psycho
457
Two distinct senses of accumulation of feelings
465
PART IV
471
In fact he ignores the distinction between succession of feelings
477
Thus the antecedents to a state of consciousness as an event tell
479
He makes the object external to its own internal factor and
485
1 The real
491
Why nevertheless common sense identifies the real with the
498
How do I know my own real existence ?Lockes answer
502
65
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Pàgina 538 - SUNBEAM ' ; OUR HOME ON THE OCEAN FOR ELEVEN MONTHS. Library Edition. With 8 Maps and Charts, and 118 Illustrations.
Pàgina 7 - THE HOUSE OF WALDERNE. A Tale of the Cloister and the Forest in the Days of the Barons
Pàgina 109 - The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
Pàgina 283 - The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind ; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.
Pàgina 34 - When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.
Pàgina 9 - Hints to Mothers on the Management of their Health during the Period of Pregnancy and in the Lying-in Room. By T.
Pàgina 158 - If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives ; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner.
Pàgina 64 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one: each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.

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