Our national conftitution having committed to us the management of our national concerns with foreign ftates and powers, it is our duty to take care that all the rights which they ought to enjoy within our jurifdiction by the laws of natious and the faith of treaties, remain inviolate. And it is alfo our duty to provide that the effential interefts and peace of the whole confederacy, be not impaired or endangered by deviations from the line of public faith, into which any of its members may, from whatever cause, be unadvisedly drawn. Let it be remembered that the Thirteen Independent Sovereign States have, by exprefs delegation or power, formed and vefted in us a general, though limited fovereign ty, for national purpofes fpecified in the confederation. In this fovereignty they cannot feverally participate (except by their delegates) nor with it have concurrent jurifdiction; for the ninth article of the confederation mot exprefly conveys to us the fole and exclufive right and power of determining on var and peace, and of entering into treaties and alliances, &c.

When, therefore, a treaty is conftitutionally made, ratified, and publifhed by us, it immediately be comes binding on the whole nation, and fuperadded to the laws of the land, without the intervention or fiat of flate legiflatures. Treaties derive their obligation from being compacts between the fovereign of this, and the fovereign of another nation; whereas laws or ftatutes derive their force from being acts of a legislature competent to the paffing of them. Hence is is clear that treaties must be implicitly received and obferved by every member of the nation; for as ftate le gislatures are not competent to the

making of fuch compacts or trea ties, fo neither are they competent in that capacity, authoritatively to decide on, or afcertain the conftruction and fenfe of them. When doubts arife refpecting the conftruction of ftate laws, it is not unusual or improper for the state legislatures by explanatory or declaratory acts, to remove thofe doubts: but the cafe between laws and compacts or treaties, is in this widely different; for when doubts arife refpecting the fenfe and meaning of a treaty, they are fo far from being cognizable by a ftate legislature, that the United States in congrefs affembled have no authority to fettle and determine them: for as the legislature only, which conftitutionally paffes a law, has power to revife and amend it; fo the fovereign only, who are parties to the treaties, have power by mutual confent and pofterior articles to correct or explain it.

In cafes between individuals, all doubts refpecting the meaning of a law, are in the first inftance mere judicial queftions, and are to be heard and decided in the courts of juftice, having cognizance of the caufes in which they arife, and whofe duty it is to determine them according to the rules and maxims established by the laws of nations for the interpretation of treaties. From these principles it follows of neceffary confequence that no individual ftate has a right by legifla tive acts to decide and point out the fenfe in which their particular citizens and courts fhall understand this or that article of a treaty.

It is evident that a contrary doctrine would not only militate against the common and established maxims and ideas relative to this fubject, but would prove no less. ludicrous in practice than it is irrational in theory; for in that case,

the

the fame article of the fame treaty might by law be made to mean one thing in New Hampthire, another thing in New-York, and neither the one nor the other of them in Georgia.

How far fuch legislative acts would be valid and obligatory even within the limits of the state paffing them, is a question which we hope never to have occafion to difcufs. Certain however it is, that fuch acts cannot bind either of the contracting fovereigns, and confequently can not be obligatory on their refpective

nations.

But if treaties, and every article in them, be (as they are and ought to be) binding on the whole nation; if individual states have no right to accept fome articles and reject others; and if the impropriety of itate acts to interpret and decide the fense and conftruction of them, be apparent; ftill more manifeft muft be the impropriety of state acts to controul, delay, or modify the operation and execution of these national compacts.

When it is confidered, that the feveral ftates affembled by their delegates in Congrefs, have exprefs power to form treaties, treaties fo formed are not afterwards to be fubject to fuch alterations as this or that legiflature may think expedient to make, and that too without the confent of either of the parties to it, that is in the prefent cafe without the confent of all the United States, who collectively are parties to this treaty on the one fide, and his Britannick majesty on the other. Were the legillatures to poffefs and to exercife fuch power, we should foon be involved, as a nation, in anarchy and confufion at home, and in difputes, which would probably terminate in hoftilities and war with the nations with whom we may have formed 1787.

treaties. Inftances would then be frequent of treaties fully executed in one ftate, and only partly exocuted in another; and of the fame article being executed in one manner in one state, and in a different manner, or not at all, in another ftate. Hiftory furnishes no precedent of fuch liberties taken with treaties under form of law in any nation..

Contracts between nations, like contracts between individuals, fhould be faithfully executed, even though the fword in the one cafe, and the law in the other, did not compel it. Honeft nations, like honeft men, require no reftraint to do justice; and though impunity and the neceffity of affairs may fometimes afford temptations to pare down contracts to the measure of convenience, yet it is never done but at the expence of that cfteem, and confidence, and credit, which are of infinitely more worth than all the momentary advantages which fuch expedients can extort.

But although contracting nations cannot, like individuals, avail themfelves of courts of justice to compel performance of contracts; yet an appeal to heaven and to arms is al ways in their power, and often in their inclination.

But it is their duty to take care that they never lead their people to make and fupport fuch appeals, unlefs the fincerity and propriety of their conduct affords them good reafon to rely with confidence on the juftice and protection of Heaven.

Thus much we think it ufeful to obferve in order to explain the principles on which we have unanimoufly come to the following resolutions, viz.

Refolved, That the legislatures of the feveral ftates cannot of right pafs any act or acts for interpreting, (G) explain:

explaining, or conftruing a national treaty, or any part or claufe of it; nor for reftraining, limiting, or in any manner impeding, retarding or counteracting the operation and execution of the fame; for, on being conftitutionally made, ratified and published, they become, in virtue of the confederation, part of the law of the land, and are not only independent of the will and power of fuch legiflatures, but alfo binding and obligatory on them."

As the treaty of peace, for far as it refpects the matters and things provided for in it, is a law to the United States which cannot by all or any of them be altered or changed, all fate acts eftablishing provisions relative to the fame objects which are incompatible with it, muft in every point of view be improper; fuch acts do nevertheless exift; but we do not think it neceffary either to enumerate them particularly, or to make them feverally the fubjects of difcuffion. It appears to us fufficient to obferve and infift that the treaty ought to have free courfe in its operation and execution, and that all obftacles interpofed by ftate acts be removed. We mean to act with the most ferupulous regard to juftice and candour towards Great Britain, and with an equal degree of delicacy, moderation, and decifion, towards the ftates which have given occafion to thefe difcuffions.

For thefe reafons we have in general terms, Refolved, That all fuch acts, or parts of acts as may be now exifting in any of the fiates, repugnant to the treaty of peace, ought to be forthwith repealed; as well to prevent their continuing to be regarded as violations of that treaty, as to avoid the difagreeable neceffity there might otherwife be of ralfing and difcuffing queftions touching their validity and obligation."

Although this refolution applies ftrictly only to fuch of the states as have paffed the exceptionable aft alluded to, yet, to obviate all future difputes and questions, as well as to remove those which now exist, we think it beft that every state without exception, should pass a law on the fubject. We have therefore "refolved, That it be recommended to the feveral ftates, to make fuch repeal, rather by defcribing and reciting the faid acts; and for that purpose to pafs an act, declaring in general terms, that all fuch acts and parts of acts, repugnant to the treaty of peace between the United States and his Britannick majesty, or any article thereof, fhall be, and thereby are repealed; and that the courts of law and equity in all cafes and queftions cognizable by them refpectively, and arifing from or touching the faid treaty, fhall decide and adjudge according to the true intent and meaning of the fame; any thing in the faid acts, or parts of acts, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding."

Such laws would answer every purpose, and be eafily formed. The more they were of the like tenor throughout the ftates the better; they might each recite:

Whereas certain laws and ftatutes made and paffed in fome of the United States, are regarded and complained of as repugnant to the treaty of peace with Great Britain, by reafon whereof not only the good faith of the United States pledged by that treaty, has been drawn into queftion, but their effential interefts under that treaty greatly affected: And whereas juftice to Great Britain, as well as regard to the honour and intereft of the United States, require that the faid treaty be faithfully executed, and that all obftacles thereto, and particularly

fuch

fuch as do or may be construed to proceed from the laws of this ftate, be effectually removed: therefore, Be it enacted by

and

it is hereby enacted by the authority of the fame, that fuch of the acts or parts of acts of the legislature of this ftate, as are repugnant to the treaty of peace between the United States and his Britannick majesty, or any article thereof, fhall be, and hereby are repealed. And further, that the courts of law and equity within this state be, and they hereby are directed and required in all caufes and queft ons cognizable by them refpectively, and arifing from or touching the faid treaty, to decide and adjudge according to the tenor, true intent and meaning of the fame, any thing in the said acts or parts of acts, to the contrary thereof in any wife notwithstanding.

Such a general law, would, we think, be preferable to one that fhould minutely enumerate the acts and claufes intended to be repealed; because omiffions might accidentally be made in the enumeration, or question might arife, and perhaps not be fatisfactorily determined, respecting particular acts or claufes, about which contrary opinions may be entertained. By repealing in general terms all acts and claufes repugnant to the treaty, the bufinefs will be turned over to its proper departments, viz. the judicial; and the courts of law will find no difficulty in deciding whether any particular act or claufe is or is not contrary to the treaty. Befides, when it is confidered that the judges in general are men of character and learning, feel, as well as know the obligations of office, and the value of reputation, there is no reafon to doubt that their conduct and judgment relative to thefe, as well as other judicial matters, will be wife and upright.

Be pleafed, fir, to lay this letter before the legislature of your state without delay. We flatter our felves they will concur with us in opinion that candour and juftice are as neceffary to true policy as they are to found morality, and that the most honourable way of delivering ourfelves from the embarraflment of mistakes, is fairly to correct and amend them. It certainly is time that all doubts refpecting the public faith be removed, and that all queflions and differences between us and Great Britain be amicably and finally fettled. The ftates are informed of the reasons why his Britannick majefty still continues to occupy the frontier pofts, which by the treaty he agreed to evacuate; and we have the strongest affurances that an exact compliance with the treaty on our part fhall be followed by a panctual performance of it on the part of Great Britain.

It is important that the feveral legiflatures fhould, as foon as poffible, take thefe matters into confideration; and we request the favour of you to tranfmit to us an authenticated copy of fuch acts, and proceedings of the legislature of your ftate, as may take place on the fubject, and in purfuance of this letter. By order of Congrefs, (Signed) ARTHUR St. CLAIR Prefident.

States, in Congrefs affembled, that conftitution which has appeared to us the most adviseable.

The friends of our country have long feen and defired, that the power of making war, peace, and treaties, that of levying money, and regulating commerce, and the correfpondent executive and judicial authorities, fhould be fully and effectually vested in the general go. vernment of the union; but the impropriety of delegating fuch extenfive trust to one body of men is, evident. Hence refults the ncceffity of a different organization.

It is obviously impracticable in the fœderal government of thefe flates, to fecure all rights of inde. pendent fovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. Individuals, entering into. a fociety, muft give up a fhare of liberty to preferve the reft. The magnitude of the facrifice muft depend as well on fituation and circumftance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precifion the line between thofe rights that must be forrendered, and thofe which may be referved; and, on the prefent occafion, this difficulty was increafed by a difference among the feveral ftates, as to their fituation, extent, habits, and particular interefts.

In all our deliberations on this fubject, we kept steadily in our view that which appears to us the greatest intereft of every true American—— the confolidation of our union, in which is involved our profperity, felicity, fafety, perhaps our national existence. This important confideration, ferioufly and deeply impreffed on our minds, led each state in the convention to be lefs rigid on points of inferior magnitude than might have been otherwife expected; and thus the constitution, which we now prefent, is the refult of a spirit of

amity, and of that mutual deference and conceffion which the peculiarity of our political fituation rendered indifpenfable.

That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every ftate, is not perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless confider, that, had her interests been alone confulted, the confequences might have been particularly difagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reafonably have been expected, we hope and believe; and that it may: promote the lafting welfare of that country, fo dear to us all, and fecure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish.

With great respect,

We have the honour to be,
SIR,

Your Excellency's most Obedient and humble fervants, GEORGE WASHINGTON, Prefident.

Ey unanimous order of the Convention. [To his Excellency the President of Congress.]

WE, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, eftablifh juftice, infure domeftic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and fecure the bleflings of liberty to ourselves and our pofterity, do ordain and establifh this conftitution for the United States of America.

ARTICLE

I.

tors