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P. 37. (E] It is strange to consider how much Dr. Spencer has mistaken this matter, where, in his reasons of a Theocracy er parte seculi, as he calls them, he gives the following: “ Seculi moribus ita factum erat, * ut Dii sui principatum quendam inter servos suos

obtinerent, et nomine rituque regio colerentur. Nam seculo illo Deos titulis illis Molech, Elohim, Baalim, et hujusmodi aliis, regibus et magnatibus tribui solitis, insignire solebant: eos imperii arbitros plerumque ponebant, cum nec bella gerere, nec

civitatem condere, nec regein eligere, nec grandius “ aliquid moliri solerent, priusquam Deos per oracula “ vel auspicia consuluissent.” Dissert. de Theoc. Jud. c. iii. p. 237. Ed. Chap. But these are no marks that the Pagans attributed any kind of civil regality to their Gods. As to their regal titles, those were what they had retained from the time of their real kingship in the state of humanity. And as to the consulting their oracles on all public affairs of moment, this was the consequence of Pagan religion's having a public as well as private part. But, for an acknowledged God to be chosen and received by any people as their real Monarch or Civil Magistrate, was a thing altogether unknown to Paganism. -The learned Marsham, with his usual bias, endeavours to insinuate, that the institution of a Theocracy was an iinitation of Pagan Custom : Moses pridem soxpatíay declaravit Ebræorum Rempublicam; ne sibi potestas regia deferretur : Αthenienses autem Διοκρατίαν suam ab Apolline retulerunt; ut regis nomen Jovi cederet; neque tam titulus quam potestas regia imminueretur. Sec. xiii. p. 340.-- But the question here is not about the name, but the thing. The Pagans might call their national Gods by the paine of Kings, and, by a bolder figure, might call their Government, put under the protection of a tutelary Deity, by the name of a Theocracy; but a real Theocracy is that only where the Laws of the Institution have all a reference to the actual rule of a tutelary God, whether the true God or false ones ; and such a Theocracy is no where to be found but in the land of Judea.

such

P. 64. [F] For this was the only use the Pagans ever thought of making of the Gods of their enemies when they had stolen them, or taken them away by force. Apion had mentioned one Zabidus an Idumean, who, when the Jews were warring against his countrymen, made a bargain with the enemy to deliver Apollo

, one of their tutelary (iods, into their hands; and Josephis, when he comes to confute this idle tale, takes it for granted that the only supposed cause of such pretended traffic was to gain a new tutelary Deity; and on this founds bis argument against Apion: Hou then, says he, cun Apion persist in accusing us of not having Gods in common with others, when our forefathers were so easily persuaded to believe that Apollo was coming into their service? Ti do su ūv fri καληβορεί το μη κοινές έχειν τοις άλλοις θεές, εί ραδίως έτως επείσθησαν οι πατέρες ήμων, ήξειν τον Απόλλωνα προς αυτές. vol. ii. p. 478.

P. 86. [G] I call thein licentious, principally, for the extravagant Reasonings concerning the authority of the Pentateuch, and the divine inspiration of Scriptuire. The first he retracted and confuted, when the spirit of contradiction had given way to better primciples; the other (which he had inserted into the Letters as the work of another man) he never, that I know of, atoned for, by any rctraction whatsoever.

P. 95. [I] Dr. Sykes has undertaken to confute the censure here passed upon Dr. Spencer. llere it is (says this Answerer) that Mr.Il'.attacks Dr. Spencer's dissertation on the Jewish Theocracy. Are we not more from hence to IMAGINE that Dr. Spencer was one of those writers that supposed the Theocracy to have ended with the Judges? (An exanination of Mr. W's account, &c. p. 168.) What demands of imagination

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his trade of Answering inay have upon him, I do not know. But froin my words, a fair reasoner would . imagine nothing but that I meant to prove what I said: namely, that Dr. Spencer's discourse of the Theocracy is weak and inconsistent.

His first churge. (says he) against Spencer is, that he thought the 'Ï'heocracy was established by degrees, and abrogated by degrees. “A conceit highly absurd,” says Nr. IV. But wherein lies the absurdity of this gradual progress and gradual declension ? [p. 170.] The Absurdity lics here. When God is pleased to assume the character of civil Magistrate, he must, like all other Magistrates, enter upon liis office at once, and (as common sense requires) abdicate it at once. Now the Government under such a Magistrate is what we properly call a Theocracy. Therefore to talk of the gradual, progress and gradual declension of this mode of civil relation, is the same as to talk of the gradual progress and gradual declension of Paternity, or any other mode of natural relation ; of which, I suppose, till now, nobody ever heard.

He goes on—if there be any absurdity or inconsistency in this manner of speaking, it may be JOSTIFIED by Mr. IV's own authority. That is, my absurdity will justify another Mais. But this is doing ine an honour which I do not pretend to. Well, but how do I justify Dr. Spencer? Why, I say, it seems, " That in the period immediately preceding the Jewish

Captivity, on the gradual withdrawing the extraor

dinary Providence from them, they began to entertain “ doubts concerning God's further peculiar regard to “ them as his chosen People.” So that here (says Dr. Sykes) he expressly owns a GRADUAL WITILDRAWING OF THE EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE from the Jews. And where is the absurdity of Dr. Spencer's GRADUAL DECLENSION OR IMMINTTION OF THE THEOCRACY, which Mr. IV's gradual withdrawing of the extruordinary Providence is not

liable unto? Or was not the gradual withdrawing of the ertraordinay Providence a proper imminution of the Theocracy? (p. 171.] lle is so pleased with this argument that he repeats it at p. 218. Yet who would have suspected him of what he here discovers, a total ignorance of any difference between the form of Government and the ADMINISTRATIOy of it? Now Dr. Spencer talked of the gradual decline of the form of Government, which I thought absurd : I spoke of the gradual decline of the administration of it; which, whether it be equally absurd, let those determine who have seen (unless perhaps the rarity of the fact lias made it escape observation) an administration of Government grow worse and worse, while the form of it still continued the same.

So much as to Spencer's absurdity. We come next to his inconsistency, in supposing some foot-steps of the Theocracy till the time of Christ, and yet that it was entirely abrogated by the establishment of the Kings. Of this inconsistency, Dr. Spencer is absolved, by the dexterity of our Answerer, in the following manner: Here again is Dr. Spencer much misrepresented, from not considering WHAT HE MEANT by the ABROGATION of God's Government. Not that the Thcocracy entirely ceased; but the Government receired an ALTERATION and ABATEMENT.

And therefore he uses more than once the phrase of REGIMINIS MUTATI, in this very section; Where is the absurdity and inconsistency of this way of reasoning, unless abrogation is made to signify a total ubolition, and duration is to be construed cessation?

He asks, where is the absurdity of this way of reusoning? I did not accuse Spencer of absurdity in his way of reasoning, but of contradiction in his way of expression. I see no reasoning there is, or can be, in a man's delivering what he thinks a fact: such as his opinion of the duration of a forin of Government. But he whọ cannot distinguish reasoning from

expression,

erpression, may be well excused for confounding te form of Government, and the administration of Cisvernment with one another.

However, Spencer (he says) is much misrepresentedl; he did not mean by A BROGATION U CEASING; but in ALTERATION and ABATEMENT. It seems then, a writer is much misrepresented it, when he is charged with an inconsistent expression, his meaning may be proved consistent. A good commodious principle for the whole class of Answerers! But he tells us that abrogation regimen abrogatum does not signity ceasing. Where did he get his Latin? tor' the Romail writers use it only in the sense of dissolution, abolition, or the entire ceasing of an office or comprand. What the does it signity? ALTERATION (he says) and ABATEMENT. But now where did he get his English? Our Country writers, I think, use the word alteration to signify a change; and abutement, to signify no change; no alteration in the qualities of things, but a diminution only in the vigour of their operations. What the alterution of a Theocracy, or any other form of Government is, we well understand; but what the abatement of it is, oue is much at a loss to conceive. However, this I know, that Dr. Sykes here confirms what I charge upon him, the confounding the mode of Government with the administration of it: Alteration being applicable to the former, and abatement, only to the latter.

But his inference froin this special reasoning, is worth all the rest - und THEREFORE Spencer uses, more than once, the phrase of regiminis MUTATI, in this very section. Therefore! Wherefore? Why, bccause by abrogati he meant only abated, therefore he uses mutati, more than once to explain himself. That is to say, “because, loy totum, I mean pars, THEREFORE I use omne inore than once, to explain my meaning." Well, if he did not clear.it up before, he has done it now.

And where (says he) is the absurdity or inconsistency of this way of reasoning ? Nay, for that

matter,

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