Review-Brown's Prize Essay. acuteness of the man as a philosopher, and of his attainments as the Principal of a University, who could give the following account of conscience, and endeavour to confirm it by the illustration with which it is concluded! "By conscience, or a moral sense, I understand that internal perception which we have of right and wrong, of moral good and evil, of virtue and vice, antecedently to any reasoning concerning the more remote consequences of habits and actions, either to individuals or to society. This internal sense furnishes principles for judging of moral subjects, as intellect affords principles for truth and error. The exercise of the moral faculty, however, it is to be remarked, is always accompanied by certain feelings either of complacence or disgust." "We feel contempt or indignation rising in our minds towards those who have acted - in an unworthy and base manner, and love and esteem for such as maintain a conduct just and beneficent. These principles, whether of morals or of speculative reason, are not the mere effect of education, but are implanted in the soul. For without study or inquiry they present themselves to the mind. Nay, what is more, if they were not innate principles, education could no more be carried on, than a building could be raised without a foundation, or a tree produced without its original seed. that education does is to direct, improve and enlarge these original principles, and to lead them to their proper results. Whoever contests this affirmation, may try to instruct a dog or a horse in morality !”Pp. 112. 116. All Here the learned Principal affirms that conscience, or as he terms it the moral sense, is an innate principle; and his proof is that if it were not so, education could no more be carried on than a tree could be produced without its seed and why? Because do what you will you cannot instruct a dog in morality! But the worthy Principal would find it rather a difficult task to teach a dog mathematics, or even to make it enunciate his favourite proposition that the whole is greater than a part: yet because his labour would be entirely thrown away upon such a pupil, but would not be wasted upon a boy, the learned Principal must admit, upon his own showing, that mathematics and even the very faculty of speech are in the boy innate principles. Passing over the chapters on the proof of the being of God, from the 537 almost universal assent of mankind to this opinion, which is not a very solid argument; from the appearance which the world exhibits of a recent origin, and from the tradititions concerning it, which is equally equivocal and inconclusive; from the Scriptures, which in this argument cannot be referred to as affording any proof without really, not apparently, reasoning in a circle; and omitting also the chapters on the conclusion which follows these various proofs of the existence of God, and on the causes of Atheism, which are the commonplace observations of a thousand sermons expressed in a most commonplace manner; we come to the Second Book, which treats of the perfections of the Deity, namely, his infinite power, wisdom and goodness. And here we are happy to say the author writes with somewhat more closeness and accuracy. He scens to have formed in the abstract a just conception of the divine goodness, for he defines it to be "That affection and habit of mind which prompts to communicate and to diffuse happiness, which is gratified by the contemplation of it; and is averse from the infliction and the view of misery.". attribute strictly moral must be a constant "The goodness of the Deity being an and immutable disposition to communicate and extend the highest measure of happiness to all his creatures. This definition when applied to omnipotence and infinite wisdom implies the commmunication of all possible happiness to the whole and to every part of his sensitive creation.”— "If it could be shewn that in any case such faculties were clearly designed for misery, and the beings to which they belonged were irresistibly impelled to the exercise of them, the inference would be unavoidable that the Supreme Power was malevolent. But the first branch of this supposition is contrary to universal fact, and the second is in itself incomprethat any being, endued with activity, hensible. For it is impossible to conceive would delight to exercise powers which were constantly attended with pain and misery. Inactivity must in this case be the inevitable result. We must therefore conclude that he also has bestowed on every sensitive being its powers of perception and action; must desire those to be exercised and to produce their natural results; and since in the exercise and gratification of those the happiness of every such being 538 Review.-Gilchrist's Philosophic Etymology. in reality consists, that he intended the utmost happiness of which every living creature was susceptible; that is, he is infinitely good."-Pp. 222, 223, 228. After this will any intelligent person believe that Principal Brown advocates the cause of Endless Torments, and endeavours to show that it is not inconsistent with the infinite goodness of him who possesses Almighty power, while the very notion of infinite goodness comprehends, according to Doctor Brown, the design to promote the ntmost happiness of which any living creature is susceptible. Admitting the sincerity, what can be thought of the understanding of a man who can assert with all the gravity of the philosopher such a palpable contradiction. In the senseless declaimer of the tabernacle, who despising the aid of human learning and reflection to qualify him for the office he assumes, and following only "the inspiration from above," suspends his hearers nightly over a bottomless gulph, foaming with fire and brimstone, prepared for all who despise the message of the man of God, for all heretics of all sorts, as well as for all who plume themselves on being adorned with "the whitewash of morality;"* in this man we do not wonder at inconsistencies and contradictions, for we know that they have taken such possession of his mind that he does not perceive even the impieties which he continually utters, and that he has most solemnly and piously renounced reason; but in the man who pretends to have taken her as his guide and by the light with which she has illumined his mind to have investigated the wonders of nature, to have looked through them up to their great Author, and to have contemplated. his excellencies till he has come to the sublime conclusion that it must be his constant and immutable disposition to communicate all possible happiness to the whole and to every part of his sensitive creation,-for him to affirm that it is perfectly consistent with this constant and immutable disposition to doom myriads and myriads of his creatures to unutterable torments in hell-fire for ever, awakens our pity at the weakness which can thus permit A favourite phrase of the Rev. Rowland Hill's. " his prepossessions to impose upon his own understanding, or our indignation at the insult which he presumes to offer to that of his reader. But the occasion on which these absurdities are affirmed, together with several others connected with them, much more than the ability with which they are defended, appears to us to justify a more particular comment; and we shall endeavour to show the utter fallacy of the reasoning, if reasoning it can be called, attempted by Doctor Brown. The learned Principal of the University of Aberdeen has undertaken the task of clearing up all the difficulties which rest on the works and the dispensations of the Deity, and of reconciling with his constant and immutable disposition to communicate all possible happiness to the whole and to every part of the sensitive creation, the doctrine of the endless misery of the great majority of mankind, by the aid of free agency! We shall see what he makes of it. [To be Continued.] S. S. ART. II.-Philosophic Etymology, or out, intends it should be understood that Grammar is no where else to be found in company with reason. Perhaps, there is not in the history of letters an instance that can parallel the arrogant manner in which Mr. Gilchrist advances to demand audience of the public. He steps forwards with an air of bold superiority, plants himself firmly at the bar of opinion, and requires that his book be "rigorously examined, well and truly tried."" This indeed is right; but if his own book should not have a fair and impartial trial, he will have principally himself to blame. Mr. Gilchrist's peculiar manner has made it impossible that his work should be tried dispassionately by many of those who are (if any are) qualified to sit in judgment upon it. He who writes for the instruction of the public must chuse his own manner, or rather if he possesses original powers, nature has determined it for him ;-but it is unfortunate for the writer, and for the reader too, when instruction is given, Review-Gilchrist's Philosophic Etymology. if the manner be such as must disgust many and offend all. Our author's manner is precisely of that kind, and in so remarkable a degree as to make it probable that the merits of his production may never be fairly examined. It is the insolence of triumph before the battle is won. Such vaunting of his own powers and contempt of all who have gone before him or who stand beside him, have made it impossible that he should fail without utter disgrace. For him ayaλws απολιςθάνειν ομώς ευγενες αμαρτημα would be an insufficient apology, and one which he would disdain to make even if it had not classical authority. Like some performers whom we have seen, he moves to the front of the stage with so confident an air, that wonder or ridicule, applauses or hisses st pursue him as he withdraws. We introduce our notice of this extraordinary production with these remarks both from regard to justice, and with a view to prevent those who may open the book from throwing it down instantly in disgust. As to the writer himself, we fear that animadversion will be lost upon him. His feeling is that of a man, who has risen upon a dark world to enlighten and astonish it by his brightness. The voice of rebuke may provoke a smile at the admonisher; but the man who thinks it an act of condescension on his part to instruct his kind, is a hopeless subject of correction. Indeed, Mr. Gilchrist appears to anticipate with great satisfaction censure and condemnation from the greater part of literary men. "I mean to use great freedoms with some of the literary idols; and to deliver some very illegitimate doctrines concerning style: the giants of taste, criticism and learning may be expected to rise in a body; if, however, they will stipulate to keep lightness and delicacy out of the fray, I will undertake single-handed to put them all down with such weapons only as etymology supplies: I have some confidence in myself-much confidence in my weapons-very great confidence in the goodness of my cause."-P. 204. Again, in yet more chosen phrase: "I expect a thousand classical tongues to be darted at me for my provoking doctrines; and much literary dribble-many roted niorsels and critical crudities, with the very quintessence of established 539 opinion and general consent to be spitefully spit in my face: but delicate mouths never spit fire; and the saliva of polite taste has the singular property of taking away all the dangerous and deadly qualities of the venom of classical hostility; so that the bite of a well-trained literary viper is as harmless as the hiss of a goose. Perhas some great critical gander will come flapping and flourishing out of the flock to but a single kick or two (and it cannot peck at the legs of the present author; surely be unpolite to kick gander-champions), will send the hero back into his own crowd and muddy hole. I know what courtly simperers will think and say (or rather hint for the timid things dare not speak out), of this contemptuous, uncharitable, unpolite, unphilosophic style of writing; but I should despise myself if I could admire what they admire, or praise what they praise; and I should loathe my existence with consciousness of hypocritically cloaking my real opinions and feelings to appear orthodox, or become popular among a canting, mystical, visionary race of roters, eternally saying after consecrated authorities."-Pp. 216, 217. If the present volume had contained nothing better than invective of this sort against schools and scholars, we should have left to others, if any should think it worth their while, to invite attention to such odious effusions of angry vanity. But the author believes that he has made a great discovery, that he has solved the problem of language in all its varieties, that, in short, he has in his hand the key of grammar, and he is graciously willing, though in a most ungracious manner, to put it into the hands of as many as are not too much stultified by scholarship to make use of it. Our readers will not be displeased to hear him speak for himself on this subject; for though, meaning to be the plain blunt man he continually violates the there is matter in him, and his coarserespect which man owes to man, still ness is not without originality. Mr. Gilchrist has introduced his discoveries by a history of his own mind in its progress to knowledge. "When the author of the following work began to study philology, it was with a logical rather than grammatical view. He had found his learning, such as it was, an inconvenience and intellectual cumbrance: nor was it merely foreign speech that he found as a vail of obscurity or net of entanglement upon his understanding; even the English language 540 Review.-Gilchrist's Philosophic Etymology. was to him as Saul's armour to Davidcumbersome because it had not been proved. He had wandered ten years (for he became a student somewhat late in life) in the wilderness of words; often looking wistfully up the hill of knowledge, but as often despairing of climbing to the summit. Frequently indeed he returned to his fruitless efforts with a kind of desperate courage; but as frequently did he retire from the hopeless contest, under a mortifying sense of disappointment and useless effort. "The truth is, he at last sunk into despair of ever knowing even the English language to his own satisfaction; or so as to be able to experiment with it accurately as an instrument of science; and it had 'actually become one of his fixed opinions, that man is fated to be the dupe of his own inventions; that language of which he so much boasts is the greatest of all impostors; and that no remedy could be found for verbal, that is metaphysical deception and mischief. Thus for a considerable time he heartily despised not only the systems of learning that owe their origin to language, but language itself, as a mere Babel-jargon intended or calculated to be a curse rather than a blessing-the parent of error, metaphysical nonsense, false-reasoning, endless controversy, contention and animosity. "With this opinion and contempt of language, it is probable that the author would have been content to pity and deride the learning that prevails, without endeavouring to rectify it, had not an incident which it is unnecessary to name, roused him into a resolution of attempting to rid the world of intellectual bondage He had and metaphysical imposture. always (he means from the time he became a student) a kind of intuitive perception and conviction that all the systems of grammar, rhetoric, logic, &c. which prevail, are wrong; but believing the origin of all learned absurdities to be language itself, he perceived not how the evil could be remedied; and supposed that learned men must go on as they had done, boasting of their technical nonsense. He at last, however, perceived, he thought, how the labyrinth might be demolished, and the Babel-systems confounded into silence. As the radical evil was perceived to be in language, it was evident that there the remedy must be applied. He resolved therefore to create another kind of grammar and lexicography than had hitherto prevailed; in attempting which, the principles he laid down were as fol low: 1. That language was a human inven2. That it was a simple invention. 3. That the true nature of true philology tion. must lie on the very surface of obviousness. "As the author continued to study his subject, it became progressively more simple to his perceptions than he thought it could possibly be in its own nature; for we are so educated and disciplined into the belief of abstruseness and ingenious mysticalness, connected with learned and philosophic questions, as to be constantly overlooking obvious truth, or deeming it not worth finding and raising into the dignity of science. Every man of any pretension to philosophic thinking, would blush to refuse for his motto: Simplicity is the seal of truth. But who does not seem to consider it the badge of intellectual poverty? Frequently has the author felt over his discoveries as Bruce did at the source of the Nile. Frequently has he been ready to exclaim with the good Parisians, who had anticipated a grand spectacle at the entrée of the allies: Is this all! "As may be supposed, the more that he studied words in different dialects, the more did he ascertain their true nature and origin. It was not, however, till he analized the alphabet and resolved its diversities into their primary form, that he could experiment with certainty on It was now discovered and etymology. proved at every step, that as men have few ideas, few senses, and are familiar with few objects, so there are few primitive words."-Introd. pp. v. vi. That our readers may see at once the object of the present work, we shall lay before them the author's analysis of his philological principles," which, he says, he has given in his introduc tion, that they may be seen and examined in their most naked form." "1. There is nothing arbitrary about language. 2. All the dialects as Hebrew, Celtic, Greek, Latin, &c. are essentially. but one language. They have such diversities as may be termed idioms; but with all their circumstantial varieties, they have substantial uniformity: they proceed on the same principles and have the same origin. The philosophic grammar and lexicography of one, is in reality . Review-Gilchrist's Philosophic Etymology. 541 that of all. 3. There are no words and not more guilty of fanaticism primarily and properly insignificant. than our author is of modesty, that 4. There are many words that have ceased language had a divine origin. Since to be significant, as they are commonly it is plain that man must soon have. employed. Many of the particles, inclu- perished had he been thrown at his ding affixes and prefixes, conjunctions, creation naked upon the earth, abanprepositions, articles, &c. are of this de- doned to the unassisted efforts of his scription, and may be termed the mumown untutored powers, it might seem mies of language. 5. Every word that cannot be identified with the name of a believe that the Being who fostered to require no great stretch of faith to sensible object, is either partly or wholly him, gave him also language. But an opinion so unphilosophical and childish our author has refuted in his arrogant and easy way, simply by declaring that "as for those who still continue to consider language as arbitrary, or as invented and taught by the Deity, they must not be offended if I tell then that they are unworthy of notice." mummified. 6. The use of insignificant words, or using words insignificantly, is the chief, if not the only cause of verbal, that is metaphysical imposture; and all unintelligible or false reasoning is merely metaphysical imposture. Metaphysics as a science could have never existed but for the mummies of language, and the relics and ghosts of meaning. 7. All words are primarily and properly metaphorical; or to vary the expression,-language whether spoken or written, originated in simile; and metaphor is commonly explained to be" a simile comprised in a word." The author does not wish to dispute about such unmeaning or half-meaning terms as metaphor, &c.; but he wishes it to be distinctly understood, that the vulgar errors-he means the errors of the literary vulgar, respecting metaphorical and literal terms, are the cause of much metaphysical imposture, much critical, logical, gram-; matical and rhetorical nonsense. What are called literal terms, such as time, space, mind, spirit, &c., are like worn out coin, or effaced inscriptions, the meaning or value of which, being never ascertained, occasions everlasting conjecture and controversy. 8. Almost every sentence is elliptical. 9. Almost every word is put elliptically. 10. Almost every word is a compound of two or more words. 11. All words are resolvable into a few primitives; or thus, all the seeming multitude of words are merely various spellings and pronunciations of the names of a few striking and familiar objects; as the head, foot, hand, eye, ear, mouth, &c. 12. As all words are resolvable into the letters of the alphabet, so all the letters of the alphabet are resolvable into one primary form. 13. That primary form was employed as a sign or representation of visible objects. 14. This method of significancy by similitude, is the origin of all written language. 15. There are very few words, which were primarily unwritten, or which originated in an imitation We may venture to assure the writer that they will not be offended. Their vanity must exceed, if possible, the measure of his own, could they be offended, that they are not thought worthy of notice by a man of such lofty genius that to his mind " Virgil is a dull versifier, and Tully a petty rhetorician;" and whose taste is so exquisite, that he is able to say— "Twenty times have I attempted to read the writings of Addison, but I could never succeed in getting through a single volume. I did get twice through Virgil by the gracious aid of an etymological motive; but I believe twenty etymological motives would not drag me through the volumes of Addison; and I declare, upon my honour and conscience, as an author, that I would rather fairly eat them up and digest them down, (all, saving and excepting the boards,) than give them my precious days and nights."-P. 215. In reviewing a work written in the intolerant and supercilious manner of our author, it is difficult to refrain from making at every step such remarks upon the spirit and style of the production as may create prejudice against the substance and argument of the book. Since, however, it is to the interest of knowledge, that, if any advance has been made in illustrating the principles and history of language, the discovery should be known, and circulated as as possible, we shall present our readers with a few extracts that will shew what has been done or attempted in the present treatise on grammar; having first taken leave of the writer by recommending to his notice what his faith and calling must have taught him to re soon |
