the mind, and the perfection of them, SER M. which requireth our chief application as be- II. ing our principal concern and ultimate happinefs. That inferior part of our conftitution, in itself innocent and neceffary for such beings, yet giveth the occafion whereby we, abufing our liberty, are drawn away and enticed to evil by various ways; fuch as, vehement defires beyond the real value of the objects; an immoderate indulgence in the gratification of thofe defires, either in inftances which are prohibited by reason and the laws of God, or even within the licensed kinds, above the proper limits which the end of fuch gratification hath fixed; all tending to weaken the devout and virtuous affections which are the glory of our nature and the distinguishing excellence of man; to enervate the mind, and violate confcience, or that fenfe of right and wrong which God hath placed in us as the guide of our actions. Other affections alfo tempt us, as forrow, which often through our weakness exceedeth in proportion the event which is the occafion of it; fear of fome future apprehended calamity or distress, often magnified by the imagination; and anger, which ought only to aim at our own defence against injuries, but for the most part is accompanied

SERM. with a keen defire of hurting the injurious, II. All these, when entertained and refting in the mind, break its compofure, marr its enjoyments, unfit it for its beft exercises, and frequently precipitate men into thofe actions and courfes which their own confci. ences difapprove.

We may farther obferve, that befides the original affections, appetites, and paffions, planted in our nature, of the lower kind, and relating only to the animal life, and the present outward ftate of things, whence temptations arise, luft alfo comprehendeth fecondary defires, and which may be faid to be contracted, being occafioned by observation, experience, and custom. And the principal objects of them are those things which we find, or imagine, to be the means of gratifying our original defires, or which are fuppofed to have fome connection with the objects of our original affections. For example, as wealth and power are known to afford various enjoyments, and the more plentiful means of gratifying all the defires of men, both of the private and public, the virtuous and the sensual kind, therefore are they the objects of defires, which become ftrong lufts, whereby multitudes are drawn away and enticed to evil. To conclude this

head,

II.

head, I think the apoftle St. John's divifion SER M. of luft is the most useful to the purpose of inftructing chriftians how they should conduct themselves fo as to avoid temptations. He exhorteth us, 1 epift. ii. 15. not to love the world, neither the things of the world; and what those things are, he explaineth in the following words, ver. 16. for all that is in the world, the lufts of the flesh, the lufts of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. What in the present state of trial and weakness you ought to guard against an exceffive fondness for, as being ordinarily in the greatest danger from it, which worldly men eagerly purfue, but they are mifled by it from the love and imitation of God, and obedience to his laws; that is, either fenfual enjoyment in any. branch of it, the gratification of carnal defires, whereby you may be led into a vo luptuous courfe of life, intemperance of any kind, luxury or lafciviousness, making provifion for the flesh to fulfil the affections of it; or filver and gold, ftately houses, fine equipage, and gay apparel, or any thing of a like kind, which pleaseth the eye and the fancy; or, lastly, worldly honours and grandeur, the applaufe of men, high stations, fplendid titles, and places of power, whereVOL. IV.

D

A

by

SERM. by fome are raised to a condition of emi

II.

nency above others: Thefe are the lufts of men's hearts, by which they are drawn away and enticed to fin. It is not neceffary to enlarge on the other affections and paffions of the human nature, which are in a different manner the fources of temptation, on thofe forrows which work death, on those fears which bring them into snares, and that wrath of man which worketh not the righte oufnefs of God; nor yet on the inclinations and propenfities of various kinds which cannot be called fo ftrictly natural, but are contracted and acquired from different occafions and causes, as education, customs, and opinions which men have gone into. What hath been already faid may be easily applied to all these, and is fufficient to explain them fo far as the prefent defign requireth, that is, that we may underftand what is meant by luft, comprehending the whole compass of the affections, paffions, and propenfities of every kind that are in the heart, diftinct from the rational and moral powers of the foul, and whereby, as the occafion of it, men are misled from their duty. I

come now,

Secondly, To confider how men are tempted by luft, being drawn away and enticed.

And

II.

And here what I would principally obferve SER M. is, that lufts are only the occafions or temptations to moral evil, not neceffitating causes. The mind is free, and voluntarily determi neth itself upon the fuggeftions of appetites and paffions, not irrefiftibly governed by them; to fay otherwife, is to reproach the conftitution and the author of it; and for men to lay upon him the blame of their own faults, which yet their confciences cannot help taking to themselves. But experience fheweth, that whereas the motions of appetite and paffion are common to men, some fuffer themselves to be hurried away by them without any restraint, always to their felf-condemnation, and the difapprobation of the rest of mankind who know it, while other men of like paffions peremptorily reject their folicitations in forbidden instances, always to their praise and the inward fatiffaction of their own mind. Let us reflect on what passeth in our own heart on such occafions, to which none of us can be ftrangers; and we fhall be convinced that we have the power of controuling the inclinations and tendencies which arife in our mind, or not confenting to them, and a power of fufpending our consent till we have farther confidered the motives of action,