only could there be place for hope or fear, reward or punishment, the only proper means of governing free, rational agents; and of conducting them to their fupreme and truest happiness, which feems entirely to confift in agency; and which can only this way be excited*. This therefore is the method most agreeable to wisdom and goodnefs, and in confequence most worthy of God †.

Having thus far confidered the partial distribution of the gifts of nature, and confequent diverfity of natural religion, and offered fome hints towards explaining the reasonableness and neceffity thereof; I proceed to fhew the fame concerning revelation.

If a revelation were to be made at all, (and I must here take it for granted that such a thing is neither impoffible nor unreasonable in itself,‡) it must be conveyed in the method we are told it was, namely, at first communicated to fome few felect perfons, and by them divulged, and gradually propagated to the reft of the world (c);

or

See King. p. 216, 298, 311, 324, 335, 348, &c. with the following Note []. and Fofter's wifdom of God in the various ranks and fubordinations of human Life. Serm. viii. Vol. 2.

+ See this described more at large in Bp. Butler's Analogy, p. 93, &c. 2d Edit.

See Fenkin. Vol. i. c. 1. or Enquiry into the evidence of the Christ. Rel. § 8.

(c) Chubb (on Miracles, p. 68, &c.) objects to this firft method, that hereby it would be in the power of a few men to deprive the reft of all the benefits of this revelation.

But is not that really the cafe in all the other benefits of nature, and the ordinary gifts of providence? Are not most of the bleffings of life communicated to us by the mediation and inftrumentality of other men, who may be juft and faithful in communicating them, or otherwife? and is it not oft in the power of a fingle perfon to

deprive

or fecondly, every particular man must have it by immediate inspiration, and be at all times, and in all cafes, influenced and directed to it internally; or thirdly, it must be published again and

deprive multitudes of life itself, or any of its comforts; of liberty, peace, plenty, arts, improvements, &c? and is not all this unavoidable while men are allowed the free use of their natural powers, which he himself contends for? Men, he fays, are not to be over-ruled in either the publication or reception of religion; and if fo, he has yet to explain how that is to be given fo as not to leave it in the power and pleajure of a few, fooner or later, to reftrain and fupprefs, to difguife and corrupt it; and confequently to prevent thousands and millions of others from sharing in the benefits thereof, ib. p. 63. On a little farther confideration fuch writers may probably find, that in this scheme [of Human Liberty] it must be impoffible for any thing relating either to the minds, or outward circumftances of mankind, to remain in a ftate of perfect uniformity; and then they may be fenfible too that the fame caufes, which among other things that concern mankind, make their religion unavoidably continue in this partial and unequal way, will hold as strongly for its being originally given in the fame way.

Chubb's fecond objection, That if men could be fupposed to be honeft and faithful in the publication of a fyftem of revealed Religion, then there would be no occafion for fuch fyftem, ib. feems to be worfe founded than the other; fince this revelation, notwithftanding all the imperfections that attend its communication, may ftill be the means of conveying fuch fuperior benefits to those who do come to the knowledge of it, of making fuch discoveries in the nature both of God and Man, and of affording motives for men's attaining to fuch a degree of virtue, and true rational happiness, as all their honesty, without fuch helps, could never raise them to, at leaft the generality of them.

And whether the fole end of revelation be to bring men to a higher pitch of happiness than they could otherwife attain, or not: ib. p. 49. this author never can prove but that this may be one of its great ends; and this end is in fact obtained, to as high a degree as is confiftent with his own fcheme of perfect liberty: fo that, in the last place, allowing God to forefee all the confequences, and events attending fuch an establishment, ib. p. 62. yet this establishment, fo circumitanced, may, notwithstanding any thing this author has made out to the contrary, come from him. And indeed Chubb feems at length to be fenfible of that fame boafted objection against the divinity of a revelation from its non-univerfality being fo very much weakened, that he is grown rather weary of it, and willing to get rid of it as handfomely as he can, by pretending that he has not even leaned to that fide of the question in all his debates upon it, and will take it un kindly to have fuch a thing fo much as infinuated of him. The Author's Farewell, p. 219, note.

and again, and fresh miracles worked for the conviction of each unbeliever in every age.

In the second of these methods the inconveniences are very obvious: for Firft, This influence, of what kind foever it be, must either be absolutely efficacious and irresistible, i. e. so strong as to fubvert the natural powers of man, and take away his freedom of thinking and acting; and confequently destroy all virtue, merit, praise, reward; i. e. all that is good and valuable in religion: - or else it would not be fufficient to anfwer the ends propofed; nor could it certainly and effectually fecure the intereft and falvation of mankind.

As an illumination, it must either be distinguishable from the present effects of reason and the ordinary operations of the divine fpirit, or not; if the former, this must be by ftriking us more forcibly, and working a more affured, infallible conviction in the mind: but fo much as is added to that, above what may arife from the prefent constitution of things, just so much must be taken from the present choice, and merit of believing; and the concomitant delight and fatisfaction which we feel, and ought to feel, in giving our affent to truth (d). Such evidence must either fuper

(d) See ABp. King's Origin, N. 19. p. 108, &c. 4th Ed. compared with N. 59. p. 310. Whence it appears, that though in fome cafes and refpects the affent be unavoidable, and we merely paffive in the attainment of many ufeful parts of knowledge; which muft be attended with fatisfaction in degree proportioned to the apprehenfion of that usefulness, and of a kind perhaps very complex, as arifing from variety of caufes accidentally affociated; yet

B

neither

fuperfede all action and enquiry of our own, and overbear the judgment beyond poffibility of doubt, (which yet, from the manner of our acquiring and affociating ideas, and forming judgments, is impoffible to be conceived, without reverfing the whole frame of the human mind; neither would that appear to be at all defirable, as we have seen above) it muft, I fay, either be inconsistent with the exercife of our other moft valuable faculties,

or

neither is the kind, nor the degree of this delight fo intenfe, and exquifite, as that which ufually accompanies thofe points which we work out ourselves; which we properly make our own, by a free, fair investigation. These truths, though of no more importance in themselves, or their confequences, than any others that are either forcibly obtruded on us, or fortuitoufly thrown into our way; yet are attended with a fort of felf-approbation, and complacency, which both accompanies the first discovery, the tranfporting ivenxa; and will continue after it, and bear reflection; and which makes them infinitely exceed all others in our eftimation. The fame thing, as it is come at in the one or other of these ways, is evidently not the fame to us: which I can afcribe to nothing more than a consciousness that in the former cafe we have contributed fomewhat to the acquifition of it, and to our own improvement by that acquifition; or an idea of merit, conftantly affociated with this kind of acquifitions; and which is perhaps the very strongeft, and the most agreeable of all our affociations.

From whence alfo we may collect how neceffary it is to the happinefs of man, that he should appear to himself to be free, in the exercife of the faculties of his mind, as well as the powers of his body; to be in fome degree active in the attainment of his knowledge, as well as any other attainments; and how far this will go towards proving him to be really fo, I leave to be confidered. If he has any real liberty, there will be a good reafon for annexing this double pleafure to the exercise of it, both to excite him to action in cafes of difficulty, and afterwards to justify him for engaging in fuch; and enable him to go through all the toil, and hazard that attends them. If he has none, won't it be a little hard to point out, either the rife or reasonableness of this fo conftant, and fo general a delufion; and to account for fuch ideas as thofe of merit, esteem, reward, &c. which are intirely founded in it?

Whether the refolving all, with a late author, into the deceitful feeling of liberty, be attended with lefs difficulties, than those which this hypothefis is calculated to remove, must be submitted to the thoughtful reader. See Hume on Liberty and Neceffity, Effays on the Principles of Mor. and Nat. Rel. Part I.

or it would come to the fame thing with the prefent use of them; and prove alike capable of being equally neglected or oppofed, corrupted or destroyed: it would have no higher evidence than in some cases the common principles of reafon have; nor could it lay any stronger obligation on us to obey its dictates.

The fame will be the cafe with it confidered as an impulse, or impreffion on the mind, inciting it to follow each determination of the judgment,. and phyfically connecting thought with action; fince this connection, if much altered from that which is obfervable in the present state, or increased to any confiderable degree above that harmony which now fubfifts among our natural powers, would be attended with the very fame confequences *.

Farther; as all this must be tranfacted in a man's own breast, and so long as it is limited as above, or he retains the least degree of liberty, is capable of being stifled there; every one might, and most probably would foon disregard it, as much as he does now the many good thoughts, motions, and fuggeftions, which arise daily in his mind. Nor is there lefs likelihood of its being perverted to the worst purposes, as interest, vice, or vanity might direct: of its foon filling the world with rank enthufiafm, or the most wicked and abfurd impoftures; and when it is thus once, perverted, there feems to be no room for any remedy

&c.

*See Hutchefon on the Paffions, p. 179, 200, &c. or King, N. 28,