seamen wounded; and the Russel, one lieutenant, 1797. (David Johnson,) her master, (Thomas Troughton,) Oct. one master's mate, (George Taylor,) her boatswain, (John Brooks,) two pilots, (Thomas Abbot and Thomas Sherrard,) and one sergeant of marines wounded: making a total of 203 killed, and 622 wounded.* So say the returns in the London Gazette; but, according to the report of "the committee appointed to manage subscriptions raised for the relief of the wounded, and the families or relations of those who were killed," the loss in this action amounted to 228 killed, and 812 (including 16 mortally) wounded; total 1040. The captured ships were all, either dismasted outright, or so injured in their masts that most of the latter fell, as soon as the wind and sea, in the passage home, began to act powerfully upon them. As to their hulls, the ships were like sieves, and only worth bringing into port to be exhibited as trophies. The loss on board was proportionably severe. The dutch vice-admiral and the two rear-admirals were all wounded, more or less; and admiral De Winter died in London, shortly after his arrival there, not, however, of his wound, but of a chronic disease. Captain Holland, of the Wassenaer, was mortally wounded early in the action; and admiral De Winter's captain, Van-Rossem, had his thigh shot off, of which wound he afterwards died. Many other officers suffered; and the total of killed and wounded in the dutch fleet, including the loss on board the Monnikendam frigate, amounted, according to the dutch returns, to 540 killed, and 620 wounded. + Our next business is to show the force of the rival fleets, in this their sanguinary engagement. The long-gun force, as established upon british ships in general, has already been so often adverted to, that * See Appendix, No. 6. + This noble subscription, so characteristic of british feeling on such occasions, amounted to 526091. 10s. 10d, See Appendix, No. 7. 1797. we have only to point out any exceptions that may exist in reference to the particular individuals composing admiral Duncan's fleet. Oct. Although early in the present year an order had issued establishing carronades very extensively upon line-of-battle ships, yet, as it was restricted to ships coming forward to be fitted, the order of November, 1794,* must still be our guide. The only ships out of the 16, that appear to have been armed differently from the November establishment, are the Venerable and Ardent. The latter had been ordered, in July, 1795, four instead of two 24-pounder carronades for her forecastle; and the former, in June, 1794, two 68-pounder carronades for her forecastle, and two 32-pounder ones in lieu of two of her quarterdeck 9s. We have reason to think that the two 50gun ships did not mount any poop-carronades, and shall therefore assign them none. To allow, also, for such of the other ships as may have taken on board less than their established number, or, as was often the case, had not been supplied with any carronades at all for their poop, we will fix the total amount of 18-pounders at half what it otherwise would be, that is, at 42 instead of 84. In stating the crew of each british ship at her net establishment, we are satisfied that the amount will be rather over than under rated. We know, for instance, that the Ardent was 70, and the Lancaster 72, men short of their proper number; and it is probable, from circumstances to which we need not recur, that few if any of the ships in admiral Duncan's fleet had their complement on board. The gun-force of the dutch ships may be stated without much difficulty. Of the seven that escaped from the British this time, five were subsequently captured: hence, there remain but two of the 16, the States-General and Brutus, whose armaments have not been obtained by actual inspection. The Vryheid and Jupiter respectively mounted, on * See Appendix, Annual Abstract No 3. their first and second decks, the same nominal nature 1797. of guns as an english small-class 18-pounder 74, Oct. as O, for instance, in the first annual abstract. On the quarterdeck and forecastle the Vryheid mounted, when brought into port, sixteen 12-pounders; making, in the whole, two guns short (perhaps disabled and thrown overboard) of the number assigned to her, as well as to the Jupiter, by the dutch admiral himself. The Jupiter arrived with ten 12, and four 8 pounders, instead, probably, of six of the latter, and 12 of the former, as afterwards found on board the Washington, of the same nominal force. The Wassenaer, Devries, and Hercules appear to have each mounted twenty-six 32-pounders, and each of the four remaining 64s, the same number of 24-pounders, on the first deck, with twenty-six 18s on the second. On the quarterdeck and forecastle, the three firstnamed ships carried, of 8-pounders, 14, making a total of 66, and the four remaining ships, 16, making a total of 68 guns. The four 50s mounted 56 guns each: twenty-four 18, twenty-four 12, and eight 8 pounders; and the Mars, formerly a 60-gun ship, mounted, on her main deck, twenty-six 32, and on her quarterdeck and forecastle, eighteen 18 poundSo that, although nominally a 44-gun frigate, the Mars, in broadside weight of metal, rather exceeded a british 64. With these explanations, the following will be the account of the number and nature of mounted by the two fleets: ers, guns 32 pounders 216 Total.... 1150 Total.... 1034 1797. The complements of the dutch ships may be stated Oct. as they were returned by their own officers. From being expressed in round numbers, they were probably the full establishment of each ship; but any deficiency in that respect is more than counterbalanced by the liberal allowance made on the other side. Having thus analyzed the armaments of the different ships engaged, we can, with more confidence, proceed to our next task, that of exhibiting, in one view, the When it is considered, that the Dutch had placed their frigates and ship and brig corvettes, (even the latter carrying long 12, and some of them long 18 pounders,) abreast of the intervals in their line, and that many of the british ships, in the van, centre, and rear, were much annoyed, as they luffed up to-leeward of their opponents, by the raking fire of those vessels, the above statement, which excludes the whole of them, must appear, if favouring either party, to favour the Dutch. We might perhaps, fairly enough, owing to their active interference, have included in our comparative statement the three remaining dutch frigates; and then, in all the items except the first, that statement would have shown an exact equality of force. But, if even there was a slight superiority on the part of admiral Duncan, the battle of Camperdown, as a fleet-action, possessed the merit of being (to use the emphatic language of the Broughtonian school) the second stand-up fight of the war. Admiral De Winter, it will be recollected, in the account he transmitted to the batavian government, and a copy of which appeared in all the London journals, attributed his failure to four causes: first, the numerical superiority of the British as to ships of the line; secondly, their having been at sea together Oct. for 19 weeks, and hence become known to each 1797. other; thirdly, the advantage of the attack; and fourthly, the early retreat of six of his ships, and the bad sailing of four of those that remained. And he concludes with expressing a belief that, had his signals been obeyed and executed, with the same promptitude that admiral Duncan's were, some of the british fleet would have reached the Texel, "as a memento of Batavian prowess, and a monument to the memory of the 11th of October, 1797." Had the dutch admiral wished to afford an additional cause of triumph to his adversary, he could not have succeeded better, than by inviting a discussion on the very points, on which he seems so confidently to rely for producing an opposite result. If admiral De Winter withdraws the Mars from his line, because she passed for a frigate, why may not admiral Duncan leave out the Adamant and Isis, which also were not strictly line-of-battle ships; and neither of which equalled, by a third, the Mars in force? The numbers then would be, 14 english and 15 dutch. So far from the british ships having been "nineteen weeks together," many of them had but recently joined; and some, as appeared on captain Williamson's court-martial, were actually unknown to others of them in the fleet. Was it an "advantage," while bearing down to the attack, to be exposed to the raking fire of the dutch line? It is true that the dutch ships bravely withheld their fire, until their adversaries were quite near; but the british ships had no right to calculate on such forbearance. Was it an "advantage" to be unexpectedly assailed by a second line, formed of nine frigates, heavy corvettes, and brigs, drawn up in the rear? Unexpectedly, we say, because it is not customary for frigates to fire; or, while they remain neuter, to be fired at. Although none of the british ships "retreated," some of them, without doubt, were backward in advancing; otherwise, a part, if not the whole, of those six ships, of whose misbehaviour admiral De Winter |