this is indeed an exacting of irrational belief; a stifling of our understandings and muzzling our judgment; a requiring of men to yield their consent to innumerable most palpable falsehoods and inconsistencies. The teachers and defenders of Christianity proceeded otherwise: confiding in the truth and reasonableness of their cause, they excited men to lay aside all unreasonable prejudices; to use their best understandings; to apply themselves to an industrious and impartial search of the truth: hear Lib. ii. c. 7. Lactantius speaking for the rest; Oportet in ea re maxime, in qua vitæ ratio versatur, sibi quemque confidere, suoque judicio ac propriis sensibus niti ad investigandam, et perpendendam veritatem, quam credentem alienis erroribus decipi tanquam ipsum rationis expertem : dedit omnibus Deus pro virili portione sapientiam, ut et inaudita investigare possent, et audita perpendere: that is; We ought especially, every one of us, in that matter, which chiefly concerns our life, to confide in ourselves; and rather with our own judgment and our proper senses strive to find out and weigh the truth, than, believing other men's errors, to be deceived as men void of reason: God hath given all men their share of wisdom, that they might both inquire into what they hear, and weigh it. So he disputing against the heathen credulity.

Thus doth Christianity call upon men to inquire into itself; yea it obliges them thereto : it propounds faith as a virtue highly commendable, (supposing it therefore voluntary and managed with reason;) for all virtue is ἕξις προαιρετικὴ μετ ̓ ἀληθοῦς λόγου, it is ÉKOÚσIOS σVYKATάdeos, a voluntary assent, promising ample rewards thereto; and infidelity it propounds

as a vice very blameable, (and consequently very irrational,) threatening very severe punishments thereto it doth not inveigle men by sleight, nor compel them by force; but fairly persuades them to embrace it: it doth not therefore avoid examination, nor disclaim the use of good reason; but seeks and procures the one, cheerfully and confidently appeals to the other.

Indeed after it hath convinced men of its truth in general, having evidenced the truth and certainty of its fundamental principles, it then requires a full and cordial consent (without exception) to all its particular doctrines grounded upon them: when, I say, it hath propounded sufficient reason to satisfy men's minds, that is grounded upon most solid principles, it then requires men to surcease further doubt or scruple concerning what it teaches: which is a most reasonable proceeding, and conformable to the method used in the strictest sciences: for the principles of any science being either demonstrated out of some higher science, or evidenced by fit examples and experiments to common sense, and being thence admitted, it is afterward unlawful and absurd to refuse the conclusions deduced from them: so it having been proved that our principles are true; (viz. that God is perfectly veracious; and that Christian religion did proceed from him, and is built upon his attestation ;) it is a part of absurd levity and self-contradiction then to question any particular proposition evidently contained therein: and in this sense it is true, (and thus I take those Christians to be understood who commend immediate faith, and exclude. Vid. Orig. reason from being too busy in matters of religion, pag. 9. and discountenance curious inquiry;) thus, I say, it

is true, that Christianity engages us to believe, without reason or dispute. It will allow (yea it invites and exhorts) an infidel to consider and judge of its truth; but it will not allow a Christian to be so vain and inconstant, as to question any particular of its doctrine: by doing so he renounces his faith, at least ceases to be a steady Christian.

Now the first principle of Christianity (common thereto and all other religions) is, that there is one God: the next, (which also no religion doth not acknowledge,) that God is perfectly veracious; or, that whatever appears to be asserted or attested to by God is certainly true: which two principles we have already proved by reasons proper and sufficient, we conceive, to satisfy any well-disposed mind. A third principle is, that God is the author of the Christian doctrine in general; that it hath been revealed and imposed upon mankind by divine authority. And a fourth is, that those authorities and traditions upon which we ground, and by which we prove, (mediately or immediately,) the particular doctrines of Christianity to be truly such, (that is, admitting the former principle to have come from God,) are proper and sufficient to that purpose. These two latter principles involving matter of fact, and consequently being not evident in themselves, do (for a full conviction of a man's mind, and producing therein a solid persuasion) require a rational probation; and that it may appear we believe like reasonable men, not upon wilful resolution, or by mere chance, (as Pagans and Mahometans, and other ignorant opinionists do,) as also to confirm the grounds upon which the subsequent articles or doctrines of faith are built, I shall endeavour briefly to

shew the reasonableness of them; beginning with the first, and advancing my discourse by several steps or degrees. And I observe, that,

1. It is reasonable to suppose, that God should sometime reveal unto men the truth concerning himself, and concerning them, as they stand related toward him; (his nature and will; our state and duty;) his prime attributes persuade thus much. It is most evident to common experience, that mankind, being left to itself, (in matters of this nature especially,) is very insufficient to direct itself; it is apt to lie under a woful ignorance; to be possessed with vain conceit; to wander in doubt, and fall into error: it is subject to all kind of delusion, which either the malice of wicked spirits, or the subtilty of naughty men, or the wildness of its own unruly passions and desires, can bring it under; and consequently it is liable to incur all those sins, (dishonourable, hurtful, and destructive to its nature,) and all those miseries, which from ignorance, error, and sin, do naturally spring; (an estrangement especially from God, and his grievous displeasure :) we see that not only the generality of mankind did sometime lie in this sad condition, but that even the most elevated and refined wits, those among men, who by all possible improvement of their reason did endeavour to raise and rescue themselves from the common ignorance, mistakes, superstitions, and follies of the world, could by no means, in any good measure, attain their end: what did their diligent studies and inquiries produce, but dissatisfaction and perplexity of mind? wherein did their eager disputations conclude, but in irreconcilable differences of opinion, and greater uncertainty, than at first? most were plunged into

a desperate scepticism; (a doubt and diffidence of all things;) none arrived higher, than some faint conjectures, or some unsteady opinions, concerning those Rom. i. 21. matters of highest consequence: èuataιbnoav év toïs Eph. iv. 17. diaλoyoμois: they were, as St. Paul observed, made vain (were frustrated and befooled) in their reason1 Cor. i. 21. ings, and their foolish heart was darkened, &c. The world by wisdom did not know God: could not attain to a requisite measure of knowledge in divine things. This being the natural state of men, destitute of divine help and direction, doth it not, I pray, greatly need another light to guide it in this darkness, a helpful hand to relieve it from these inconveniences? Can then that infinite goodness hear mankind groan under so lamentable oppressions, and not pity it? Can he behold his own dear offspring, the flower of his creation, lying in so comfortless, so remediless a distress, without affording some relief? Can such a spectacle delight that gracious eye? or can he forbear long to remove it out of his sight? His goodness makes it highly improbable that he should we account it great want of goodness, not to direct a bewildered traveller; not to relieve, if we can, a person greatly distressed? And if we, being bad, often perform such good offices to one another; how much more ready should we think him, that is goodness itself, to do the like, for all mankind so much needing it! His wisdom also gives us to suppose the same: if God made the world to express his goodness and manifest his glory, is it likely he should suffer himself to be utterly frustrated in his design, by letting men continue in ignorance and doubt concerning who it was that made it, and how he governs it? who but men can