to a sense of right and wrong; which the apostle describes by a very bold and striking figure; "having their conscience seared as with a hot iron." 1. Tim. iv. 2. This does not mean, that they know not the rule of duty---or discern not the disagreement of their own conduct with the rule---or that they have no conscience at all;--but that they have been so long in the habit of doing violence to their conscience, that the moral sense becomes, at length, stupified, and conscience ceases to do its office, in accusing and condemning : not that consicence ceases to exist--for, conscience is inseparable from the nature of a rational being.

I shall now more particularly advert to your reasonings, and must requote your words in their order, to consider their force and application:

PHILEMON.In truth I do not call conscience natural. ARISTARCHUS. It is a truth that conscience is a natural faculty of the mind, as much so as reason or memory, and cannot be separated even in idea from a rational being. A good conscience, I grant is supernatural, or the effect of special grace. The apostle says, "We trust that we have a good conscience." Heb. xiii. 8. This surely admits the idea of an evil conscience.

Here then is the foundation of your error upon this point, and it is a fruitful source of error--I mean your not making proper distinctions. By conscience, you mean only a good conscience. An evil conscience, however, is no less conscience. But is an evil conscience, a defiled or polluted conscience--a hardened or seared conscience, supernatural to us? Not if we are naturally wicked and wholly so as has been shown. state requires no supernatural interposition to possess us of an evil conscience We do not need the mediation of Christ to obtain it. Natural, or, impenitent men, therefore, have conscience; and therefore, conscience is natural-for, natural men have no endowment that is supernatural.

This

PHILEMON. It would sound oddly to talk of the devil's conscience.

ARISTARCHUS. This is because you invariably attach moral goodness to conscience, and admit not the idea of an evil conscience. The devil has a conscience

as really as Belteshazzar had, when he saw the handwriting upon the wall and his knees smote together. "The devils also believe and tremble." which they would not do, were they not by conscience convicted of being guilty creatures, and justly exposed to divine wrath.

PHILEM. If by conscience be meant a sense of guilt and baseness, this I grant that the devil possesses.

ARIST. You then grant all that is asked; and does not the knowledge of guilt, a sense of baseness and evil desert, imply a conscience in exercise; It is an undoubted office of that monitor in the human breast, to reprove and condemn for sin. "Their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts, the mean while accusing, or else excusing one another." Rom. ii. 15, Remorse is predicable only of conscience, and the degree of it is always in proportion as conscience does its office. Why then should it sound oddly to you to talk of the devil's conscience?

PHILEM. But does not human nature through the Mediator possess something different from this?

ARIST. Yes, in a limited sense. Through the Mediator the saints possess a good conscience, and in consequence of his mediation, all men who have not a defiled or seared conscience, are in a greater or less degree under the restraints of conscience.

PHILEM. Is this all that we mean by conscience? ARIST. I have already answered this question in the negative.

PHILEM. Does not conscience prompt us to do the thing that is right when known?

ARIST. It does in good men--but conscience never prompted an impenitent sinner so as to cause him to do one virtuous action. The contrary supposition would imply a contradiction, for the impenitent heart is enmity against God. It therefore, constantly and wholly opposes the most enlightened conscience; this dictates love to God, and without it there is no moral virtue in any action whatever.

PHILEM. And upon the very principle that the understanding is sensible of a power to do it and to avoid the contrary evil?

ARIST. Yes-but not that the understanding is sensible of a disposition to do it, and to avoid the contrary evil. This is never the case with the ñatural man. His mind is not subject to the law of God, nor can be. PHILEM. This is what I call freedom.

ARIST. Natural power is no more freedom, than the body is the soul. Freedom to moral action is predicable only of the will. A natural power to do right or wrong, I grant is the foundation of freedom, or voluntary exercise; and so too the body is a vehicle to the soul, yet it is not the soul. But a natural power does not imply a disposition towards right. It is the disposition that governs the man; but that this should be equally inclined both to good and evil, at the same time, is inconsistent and absurd.

PHIL. Upon your principle, I see not but that the devil is as free to act as men.

ARIST. This ought to convince you that the principle is right-for, undoubtedly, the devil is as free to act as any other being in the universe, and is as much a moral agent.

PiL. I make no doubt, but he freely chooses evil. ARIST. But do not wicked men act as freely as the devil does in choosing evil?

PHIL. His will is thoroughly inclined to it, and he is incapable of willing any thing else.

ARIST. And just as much is the will of impenitent .men. "Every imagination of the thought of their heart is only evil continually."

PHIL. But I do not suppose this to be the case with men.

ARIST. The supposition is unsupported by scripture, reason or experience.

Yours &c.

ARISTARCHUS.

LETTER V.

DEAR SIR,

YOUR next objection is thus stated-"The impotence of mankind for which you contend, will in fact excuse them from blame; and it is idle to make any distinctions in the case. Impotence is impotence, and its effects are the same, let the kind of impotence be what it may."

Is this, my friend, a correct sentiment-one which in your cool, deliberate judgment you can adopt, and from as a true principle; that the dependence argue of the creature is opposed to his moral agency, and exempts him from blame?—and is it indeed so that the want of natural power, and the want of a moral disposition, are undistinguishable, either in their nature or effects? In this point we are far from seeing alike,— we are widely disagreed;-but let us fairly examine it.

Supposing a man at noon day, should close his eyes and exclaim, blindness is blindness, whether a man cannot see or will not see;-whether he have a cataract, or an artificial bandage over his sight, and there is no distinction to be made, the case is the same and the consequences are the same-the man is in the dark, and it is impossible for him to see;-would you not think him to be in sport or deranged in his intellects? Children see the distinction between natural and moral impotence, and practice upon it-indeed black and white are not more distinguishable. The difference is as great as this-that, the more we have of moral impotence, the more we have of blame-and the more we have of natural impotence, the less we are to blame, and the less deserving of punishment. And surely it requires no uncommon discernment to see the difference between cannot and will not.

To be dead in trespasses and sins is the highest expression of guilt-bespeaks a heart wholly devoted

to the service of satan, and under the reigning power of sin. We are guilty in proportion as we are depraved, unless some reasonable and sufficient excuse can be given, why we should not love God with all our heart. Our spiritual death is punishable. Its proper wages, and just demerit, is eternal death. The moral impotenty of mankind consists in an utter disaffection and enmity of heart, towards the character and government of God, and a life of continued disobedience to his laws; and to argue that sin is less sinful because it is sin, would be a mode of reasoning as novel as it is irrational.

PHILEMON. But it cannot be true as you have asserted, that the regeneration of the sinner is IMMEDIATELY, INSTANTANEOUSLY and IRRESISTABLY effected by the operation of the Holy Spirit.

As you advance no argument in support of your assertion, I ask, why not? Where is the inconsistency? We will take these ideas separately and examine them, and remember that we want proofs rather than opinions. And,

1. Whether the regeneration of the sinner be not effected by the immediate operation of the Spirit?

By regeneration understand me invariably to mean, change of heart, or what is called in scripture, being born of God. And here is an important distinction to be taken into view, which many do not make-and that is, between regeneration and conversion. The first I consider as purely the act of God in removing the veil of blindness,--or in making the evil tree good -or in changing the heart ;-in which, abstractly considered, the creature is no more active, than in his original creation. The latter is the act of the creature in turning to God. Conversion means turning. the exercise of the renewed mind.

It is

Now by immediate with respect to regeneration, I mean to exclude not only the efficacy but the instrumentality of means. It is not denied that God uses many and various means in the awakening and conviction of the sinner, and preparing his mind for regenerating grace. Yet these have efficacy only by the accompanying power of God. But in the act of regen