I observed before, that the words in, over, contiguous and near to the tract of the road, extended as well to the road itself, as to the adjacent grounds from whence the materials were to be procured, as to the damage done to the inclosure; so likewise I consider it to extend to both, as to making amends for any damages done to the improvements thereon: and if it has in any case been found necessary to pull down houses, destroy orchards, or spoil grain in the tract or route of the road, the company are undoubtedly bound to make compensation to the owners, as well as for the adjacent ground from whence they are to collect the materials. In the present case no such damage is found; and on the whole case it is our unanimous opinion, that judgment should be entered for the defendant.
ABANDONMENT.
See INSURANCE, 1. 19, 20. 29. 31. *. APPLICATION, 9. IMPROVEMENT, 5.
An abandonment of land by a person who has paid part of the purchase money, or the surveying fees, is never to be pre- sumed. Lessee of Davis v. Keefer, iv. 165
ABATEMENT. See PARTITION, 2.
See WARRANT AND SURVEY, 23, 24.
See ORPHANS' COURT, 3. Qu. Whether when goods are delivered to an agent to sell and remit, the law raises a promise by implication to account, so that an action on the case will lie for not rendering an account, although no ex- press promise was made. Schee v. Hus- singer, ii. 325
ACCOUNT RENDER. 1. Joint partners in a mercantile adventure may have account render against each other by the common law; tenants in common, by the 27th section of 4 Ann. c. 16., which section has been adopted in Pennsylvania. Griffith v. Willing et al.,
2. Exceptions to the report of auditors in account render, are too late after a judg ment nisi upon the report has become absolute by the expiration of the term in which it was entered. Qu. Whether such exceptions ought not to be taken before the auditors, and prior to any re- port. Gratz v. Phillips, iii. 474
3. In account render, the course of the ac- tion is to take issues before the auditors, upon all matters in discharge of the ac-
count, alleged by one party, and denied by the other, which issues are certified to the Court by the auditors, and accord- ingly as they are of law or fact, are de- cided by court or jury. The auditors then regulate their account by the result, and report it to the Court. Exceptions taken to an account reported by auditors, after the same has been returned, are irregu- lar, and of no effect. Crousillat v. M'Call, v. 433
4. In actions sounding merely in damages, the rule is that the plaintiff cannot reco- ver more than the damages laid in the declaration; but this rule is not applicable to account render, in which the main ob- ject of the action is to obtain an account, and judgment for the arrearages, and in which damages are given only ratione in- terplacitationis. A plaintiff in account ren- der may therefore have judgment for the arrearages to a greater amount than the damages laid in the declaration. Gratzv. Phillips, v. 564
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
See BARON AND FEME; 3. 5. 8, 9. 11. NOTICE, 1. 2.
Where a deed has been acknowledged before a magistrate appointed by law to take and certify the acknowledgment, in order that the deed may be recorded, the parties have no right to make the most trifling alteration in it. Moore v. The Lessee of Bickham, iv. 1
2. It being the intention of the act of 6th April 1802, to prohibit the recording of any deed for land under the Connecticut title, (with the exception of land within the townships, submitted under the act of 1799) the acknowledgment of a deed for land both within and without the townships is wholly void, and cannot be given in evidence, even as to the land within the townships. Irish v. Scovill,
tions must be precisely pursued. Young v. The Commonwealth,
See FRAUDS AND PERJURIES. The act of frauds and perjuries of the state of Pennsylvania does not prevent a de- claration of trust from being made by parol. Hence in an ejectment by the de- visees of A against B, it is competent to give parol evidence of the declarations of A, that the land she had purchased in her own name, was bought for the use of B, with money in which her husband had given her only a life estate, and had devised it to B after her death. Lessee of German v. Gabbald, iii. 302
1. Letters of administration granted under seal in a sister state, are a sufficient au- thority to maintain an action in this state. M'Cullough v. Young, i. 63 2. In order to reach the estate of a deceased partner, an action for a partnership debt lies against his executor, if the surviving partner be a certificated bankrupt before action brought. Lang v. Keppele, i. 123 3. One partner cannot maintain assumpsit against the other for the proceeds of a partnership adventure, unless they have settled their accounts and struck a ba- lance. Ozeas v. Johnson, i. 191 4. To support an action on the case for da- mage occasioned by a common nuisance, it is not necessary that the damage sus- tained was immediate; it is sufficient if it was consequential. Hughes v. Heiser, i. 4631. 5. The Prothonotaryof a Court cannot main-
3. The want of an actual settlement within two years from the pacification with the Indians, cannot be set up against the title of a warrantee under the act of 3d April 1792, by a person who has taken wrong- ful possession of the land, and before the expiration of the two years has refused to deliver it up to the warrantee. A bare refusal is enough to estop the possessor, without the threat or use of actual force. Lessee of Patterson v. Cochran, i. 231
tain an action for the recovery of his fees in a cause which is still pending. Lyon v. Мастапив, iv. 167 6. The house of A and B at Madeira, ship-2. ped two pipes of wine to Philadelphia, for account and risque of S, to whom a bill of lading was sent. The wine did not arrive until after the death of S, when his executors declined taking it, and re- quested C, who was concerned in the Madeira house, to keep it till it was paid for. It remained in the cellar of C until after his death. It was then delivered by the agent of the executors of C to the wife of S, upon her alleging that it was her property, and that Chad kept it in his cellar for her use. The wife of S sold the wine, and received the price. Held, that the executors of C could not maintain an action against the wife of S, for the pro- ceeds of the wine. Wells v. Stewart, v. 325 7. A agreed with B a common carrier, for the carriage of certain goods. B without the direction of A, agreed with Canother carrier for the carriage of the same goods; and C without the knowledge or direc- tion of A, agreed with D a third carrier. Dlost them. Held, that 4 might main- tain suit against D, and that by bringing his action he affirmed the contract made with him by C, and could not after that recover from B or C. Sanderson v. Lam- berton. vi. 129
ACT OF ASSEMBLY. When an act of assembly makes innovations on established rules, its positive institu-
4. When an actual settler, who has made some improvements, has been deterred by the violence of a younger settler from completing his settlement, and has for several years neglected to take steps for the recovery of his possession, it is a fact for the jury to decide whether he has not relinquished his settlement. He does not stand in the situation of a person hav ing a legal title, who may bring eject- ment at any time within twenty-one years. Cosby v. The Lessee of Brown, ii. 124 5. An actual settler cannot support an ejectment without a survey, ib.
6. A made application to the secretary of the land office for a tract of land particu- larly described, lying north and west of the Ohio &c. On the 3d of April 1792, a warrant issued, which by mistake of the
office was filled up with lands lying else- where On the 10th of April 1792 the warrant was delivered to the deputy sur- veyor of the district, who, perceiving the mistake, did not enter the warrant in his book according to its description, but ac- cording to the description in the appli- cation, and surveyed it on the 29th of August following. Prior to the survey, but subsequent to the 10th of April, B made a bona fide actual settlement upon the same land. Held, that the entry made by the deputy surveyor, had no effect against third persons, and that B was entitled to recover. Lessee of Dawson v. Bigsby, v. 204
7. An actual settler cannot maintain an ejectment for his improvement without an official survey, or a private one, if by due exertion he was unable to obtain the v. 211 former. Stockman v. Blair,
ADMINISTRATOR.
See DEBTS.
JUDGMENT, 2.
1. Letters of administration granted under seal in a sister state, are a sufficient au- thority to maintain an action in this state. McCullough v. Young,
2. An administrator is chargeable with in- terest, where he has been guilty of ne- glect in not putting out the money of the intestate, or has used it himself; and it lies upon him to shew what has been done with it. But he is not liable for in- terest until after twelve months from the intestate's death. Fox v. Wilcocks, i. 194 3. Judgments obtained before a justice of the peace, when filed in the common pleas or made known to the administra- tors, must be paid by them pro rata with judgments in courts of record. Scott v. Ramsay,
i. 221 4. Where there is a naked power to execu- tors to sell, and they renounce, adminis- trators cum testamento annexo, have not, either at common law, or under any act of assembly prior to that of the 12th March 1800, authority to sell, though the object of a sale be the payment of debts. iv. 31 Lessee of Moody v. Vandyke,
against creditors in equal degree, when there is a deficiency of assets. Ex parte Meason,
mon Pleas to regulate its practice, it has 1. Under the general power of the Com- authority to make a rule, requiring of defendants an affidavit of defence, and authorizing a judgment, if it is not filed within a certain time. Fanatta v. Anderson, iii. 417
2. Where there has been an award of arbi. trators, finding that the plaintiff has no iv. 428 cause of action, an affidavit of defence is not required. Gregg v. Meeker, 3. The rule for affidavits of defence does not apply to a case in which the defen- dant is an infant. Read v. Bush,
See FRAUDS AND PERJURIES, 3. INSURANCE, 10. AGREEMENT, 6.
1. If an agent indebted to his principal, ships property to him on board a vessel belonging to a third person, (although bound to conform to the agent's orders) and the captain signs a bill of lading de- liverable to the principal, the property thereupon vests in the principal, and the i. 106 agent cannot countermand or disturb the shipment. Summeril v. Elder, 2. The secretary of an incorporated com- pany, who as such signs a lottery ticket for the company, is not personally res- ponsible to the holder. Passmore v. Molt, ii. 201
3. The supercargo of all the shipments but one on board a vessel, and having also the management of the vessel, joined with the captain in putting in a claim for the ship and entire cargo, on their being captured and libelled as prize; and upon the acquittal of that particular adventure, he received it subject to the payment of all the costs, expenses, and counsel fees, arising from the capture and trial, which he disbursed out of the proceeds. Held, that he was intitled to an allowance of those costs &c., although the owner was in law chargeable only with a part of them. Delaware Insurance Company v. De- iii. 295 launie,
5. Administrators, who for their own inte- rest, contest the claim of persons assert- ing themselves to be heirs to the intes- taté, are not intitled in case of failure, to charge the expenses of the suit to the intestate's estate. It seems otherwise, if the defence is made from a sense of duty as trustees. Hartzell v. Brown's heirs, v. 138 | 5. 6. Since the act of 1794, an administrator
has no right to retain his whole debt
event not contemplated at the time the A deviation from orders excused by an orders were given. Dusar v. Perit, iv. 561. A and B his wife, on the 12th of Decem ber 1797, by letter of attorney authorised C and D jointly and severally to make
leases of a large estate belonging to the wife in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia. This power was recorded on the 15th of September 1799, and C acted separately under it, making various leases for 99 years, and receiving the rents. On the 30th of November 1801, A and B executed another power to the same effect, to C, D, and E, or any two of them jointly, but not severally. This power was known to Con or before the 5th of May 1802; D declined acting, and E accepted the power merely to prevent C from acting alone; but the power was never recorded, nor any public notice given of it, nor was any lease or conveyance ever made under it. C resided on the estate as usual, collecting the rents, and making leases as formerly; and on the 9th of June 1802, he leased the premises in the ejectment, to the defendant, for ninety-nine years, reserving a fair rent at the time. Held, that as between the principals and their attorney C, the second power was a revocation of the first; but the defendant being a bona fide purchaser without notice, and the principals being guilty of great negligence in taking no steps to give notice of a revocation, when the first power was so notorious, it was not to be considered a revocation as to him, and therefore he was intitled to hold the land. Morgan v. Stell, v. 305 6. Damages incurred by an agent, without his own fault, in the management of the principal's affairs, or in consequence of such management, must be borne by the principal. Hence, where A, the agent of B, recovered certain of B's goods in Cape Francois, by the decree of a competent court there, (the same having been attached by C for the debt of D and Co. in whose hands they were, and claimed in court by A) and then sold them and remitted the proceeds to B; and was afterwards in a suit instituted by C, and connected with the first proceeding, compelled by the threats of the president Christophe, to confess, contrary to the truth, that at the time of receiving the goods, he promised to pay C a sum of money on account of D and Co., and to let judgment go against him, it was held, that A might recover from B his principal the amount thus paid, it not exceeding the estimated value of B's goods. D'Arcy v. Lyle,
7. It seems that an attorney who is not authorised by writing under seal, cannot execute a deed of release under seal, in the name of his principal; but if he does execute such a deed, though it cannot
be given in evidence against the princi- pal under the issue of non est factum, yet it may be under the issue of non assump- sit as amounting to an agreement not to sue. Cooper v. Rankin, v. 613
A charter party was entered into by B, acting on behalf of the owners of the ship, almost all the covenants in which were expressed to be made by him as agent for the owners; but the owners were not parties, nor were they named in any part of the instrument. At the conclusion the charter party said, "for the "performance of all the covenants before "mentioned, the said parties respectively "bind themselves personally each to the "other." The vessel, her tackle, and apparel, were bound for the due performance of her owners and agents or agent to the charterer, and her freight was made payable to the agent or his order. Held, that the agent was personally responsible for his covenants. Meyer v. Barker, vi. 228 9. If a person, who is under no obligation to execute an order of insurance, nevertheless undertakes it, and executes it defectively, he is answerable for the loss. French v. Reed, vi. 308
10. If the general agent of ship and cargo, covers enemy property on board, the warranty of neutrality in a policy on the ship, is violated. Schwartzv. Ins. Co. N.A, vi. 378
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