of printing and publishing was thus held by ninety-seven stationers, who formed themselves into the Stationers' Company, with power to seize all publications by persons not belonging to their guild. (c)

In addition to this restriction, the Star Chamber claimed the regulation of all press matters, and press offences were tried by that court without a jury and heavy penalties inflicted. In 1586 a regular system of press censorship was established by the Star Chamber, and no book could be published unless previously read over and licensed by various authorities.

The restriction on the number of printing presses eventually broke down, but the rules as to the licensing of books before publication were made more stringent in 1637, and put upon a statutory basis by the Licensing Act, 1662, (d) and this continued until the Act expired in 1693. An attempt was made to renew it in 1695, which was, however, unsuccessful.

A previous licence is therefore no longer required for any publication, but by the Theatres Regulation Act, 1843, (e) the Lord Chamberlain may forbid the acting or representing of any play or part of a play, for the preservation of good manners, decorum, and of the public peace; (f) and by Lord Campbell's Act (g) the magistrates are empowered to seize all the stock at the publisher's and bookseller's and prevent the further issue of any copies of books proved to be obscene.

Further, the Court of Chancery and the House of Lords occasionally exercise by injunction the right of restraining the publication of libels amounting to contempt of court, and under special circumstances the courts will grant an injunction restraining the further publication of defamatory libels. (h)

The provisions of the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 24 (i) may also be (c) See Odger's Libel and Slander, p. 11 et seq.

(d) 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 33.

(e) 6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 14.

(f) The same Act requires all theatres to be licensed either by the Lord Chamberlain or justices; the powers of the latter with regard to the licensing of playhouses have now, however, been transferred to the County Council.

(g) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83.

(h) See Odger's Libel and Slander, p. 383.

(i) Re-enacting a similar provision contained in the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 12, s. 2.

noted, by which every paper or book intended to be published or dispersed must bear upon it the name and address of the printer; and of the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, (k) by which all newspaper proprietors must register their names at Somerset House, with the object of enabling persons libelled to ascertain who is responsible.

The position of the press in England, therefore, at the present day is that any person may publish what he pleases (subject to the regulations noted above) without obtaining any previous licence. He may, however, be proceeded against for libel, and in both civil and criminal cases he will only be liable where a jury of twelve persons have, by their verdict, declared him guilty of libel.

The Right of Public Meeting.-The right of public meeting, like that of freedom of discussion, is not recognized in terms either by the statute or common law of England. What is meant by the right of public meeting simply amounts to this: that people may meet together when and where they please so long as they do not by so doing commit a trespass or a nuisance, or so long as the meeting does not constitute an unlawful assembly. With regard to trespass, little need be said. It is obvious that even if there be no other place available for the purpose of public meeting, that fact would not justify the infringement of another's private rights, and all persons who commit a trespass for the purpose of holding a meeting are liable to be mulcted in damages.

With regard to nuisance it may be noted that the law does not recognize any specific locality, such as Trafalgar Square, as being a public forum where people may meet and discuss public questions; it is true that the streets are open to the public, but they are to be used by the public for purposes of traffic only, and any one who, by holding a meeting or otherwise, interferes with the right of every individual to use the streets for purposes of traffic, commits a nuisance, which constitutes a misdemeanour for which he may be fined. (1)

Any person taking part in an unlawful assembly is guilty

(k) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 60, s. 9.

(1) Ex parte Lewis (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 191.

of a misdemeanour for which he may be punished on indictment or criminal information, and an unlawful assembly is one which (1) assembles to commit, or when assembled does commit, a breach of the peace; (2) assembles to commit a crime; (3) assembles for any purpose, lawful or unlawful, but (through the conduct of those engaged in it, such as carrying arms or the like) in such a manner as to cause reasonable persons to fear that a breach of the peace will be committed. (m) All persons may, and must when called upon to do so, assist in dispersing an unlawful assembly; and when a meeting becomes riotous, any amount of force may be used according to the necessity of the case, and it is not necessary that the Riot Act (n) should first be read. The only effect of the reading of the Riot Act is that any twelve persons not dispersing within an hour of the reading of the Act are guilty of a felony.

Magistrates not only may disperse an unlawful assembly, but they are guilty of criminal negligence if they do not make use of every means in their power to do so. (0) That persons, however, who meet to carry out a lawful purpose in a lawful manner do not constitute an unlawful assembly because they may by so doing provoke others to commit a breach of the peace, is shown by the case of Beatty v. Gillbanks. (p) In that case the Salvation Army had been in the habit of parading the streets of Weston-super-Mare carrying banners and singing hymns. Their proceedings caused much annoyance to the residents, and a body calling themselves the Skeleton Army had declared their intention of opposing them and breaking up their meetings, and this was well known to the Salvationists, who, however, persisted in holding meetings and processions, with the result that serious tumult and disturbance took place. A public notice signed by two Justices of the Peace was accordingly posted up and served upon Beatty, the leader of the Salvationists, calling upon all persons to abstain from assembling to disturb the (m) Reg. v. Neale (1839), 9 Car. & P. 431.

(n) 1 Geo. I. c. 5.

(o) As to the duty of a magistrate in suppressing riot see Rex v. Pinney (1832), 5 Car. & P. 254; and as to dispersing unlawful assemblies see the judgment of Littledale, J., in Reg. v. Neale (1839), 9 Car. & P. 431.

(p) (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 308; and see Reg. v. Justices of Londonderry, [1891] 28 L. R. Ir. 440, at p. 461.

public peace. In spite of this notice, however, the Salvationists continued to parade the streets, with the result that Beatty and two of his companions were arrested and convicted at petty sessions of having taken part in an unlawful assembly. On a case being stated, however, by the magistrates, the Court of King's Bench held that the conviction was wrong on the ground that a man cannot be convicted for doing a lawful act even though he knows that his doing it may cause another to commit an unlawful act. The recent case of Wise v. Dunning (q) must now be read in connection with this, which shows that if persons meet to carry out an otherwise lawful purpose in an unlawful manner, such as holding meetings and using language. slanderous of Roman Catholics in Liverpool, being a district largely inhabited by persons of that religion, they would be guilty of an unlawful assembly, or at least a magistrate would be justified in binding them over to keep the peace if there is evidence to warrant the apprehension that a breach of the peace would be committed. (r) In an older case (s) a constable was held to be justified in taking an orange lily from a lady who was wearing it under such circumstances as to cause tumult and excitement, and to lead to the fear of a breach of the peace being committed. But, as was said by O'Brien, J., in that case, such an extreme case of interference with the private rights of individuals can only be justified by the strongest necessity.

A proclamation by a Secretary of State or by a magistrate cannot make an otherwise lawful assembly unlawful; the only effect of such a proclamation can be to make people thoroughly cognizant of what is likely to occur, and therefore to militate against their chance of escaping liability on the ground of non-participation in the event of an unlawful assembly actually taking place and their being charged with the offence. (t)

(q) [1902] 1 K. B. 167.

(r) A local Act in force in Liverpool prohibits the use of threatening, abusive, and insulting words or behaviour in the street; but this fact does not appear to have influenced the decision (see the judgment of Darling, J., at p. 177).

(s) Humphries v. Connor (1864), Ir. C. L. R. 1. (t) Rex v. Fursey (1833), 6 Car. & P. 81.

Where, however, a breach of the peace has actually occurred through the attacks of wrongdoers, a meeting perfectly lawful in its inception and in the manner of its carrying out, may be called upon by magistrates and constables to disperse. But this is only justifiable by necessity, and the constables ought first to arrest the wrongdoers. (u)

How far persons who are taking part in a lawful assembly are justified in resisting the efforts of the police or other persons to disperse them seems open to doubt. But, as was pointed out by Wilde, C.J., in Reg. v. Ernest Jones, (x) it is obvious that in all cases they are not justified in using extreme measures and must only act in self-defence; their duty is evidently to retreat where possible rather than by standing their ground to cause a breach of the peace, and their proper remedy is an action for damages for assault or false imprison

ment.

(5) The Adoption and Observance of Conventions in Addition to Laws Proper.

This is one of the most important of the characteristics of the English Constitution, but as this topic has already been discussed, (y) nothing further need be said here.

(6) The Non-taxation of British-born Subjects without Adequate Representation in Parliament.

This feature of the English constitution is founded upon the provision of Magna Carta, by which King John promised not to levy any aids or scutages, except the three recognized feudal aids, without the consent of Parliament. It forms the great keynote of English liberty, the grand foundation-stone of the constitution, the struggle to establish which has in bygone days occasioned so much bitter strife between the Crown and Parliament; and to the violation of this principle is due the one great blot upon the history of our colonial (u) See O'Kelley v. Harvey (1882), 14 L. R. Ir. 105.

(x) (1848) 6 St. Tri. (N. S.) 783; and see Rex v. Fursey cited above. (y) See ante, p. 3.

C.L.E.

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