ceedings of France towards neutral nations, but as a ground of her proceedings towards Tuscany itself in subsequent periods of the war, particularly in the invasion of Leghorn, and the seizure of British property there in 1797. He had already, he trusted, done away the impression of the hon. gentleman's argument in the former respect, by showing that Great Britain had not conducted herself so flagrantly as was represented, and that, in the instance in which her minister had outstepped the line of his instructions, he had, with the condescension becoming a great country in its intercourse with a weaker state (whose very sense of its own weakness might, perhaps, make its feelings the more irritable, and its honour the more jealous), done every thing in her power to atone for the offence. In other respects France can derive no defence from the conduct of Great Britain; for, subsequently to all that passed on this occasion through the medium of lord Her. vey, and, consequently, to Tuscany's be ing considered by France as having become a party in the war, against her, a separate treaty of peace was concluded at Paris between the grand duke and the French republic. And it was in violation of this treaty, that the French army under general Buonaparté took possession of Leghorn, and seized and confiscated British property to an immense amount, deposited there under the protection and guarantee of Tuscan neutrality; a violation of the laws of neutrality almost unparalleled in extent and atrocity, except by other examples to be found in the conduct of the French themselves, and an outrage for which the government that permitted, or, what is in strictness the same thing, could not prevent it, is responsible to the government whose subjects have suffered by it; which, therefore, gave to his majesty, if he had chosen to make use of it, full right of reprisal, and which gives to the moderation observed since in the conduct of Great Britain towards Tuscany, a character of the greatest magnanimity, generosity, and forbearance. and thus the best and most satisfactory reparation was made to the government of Tuscany, and the character of the government of England completely cleared. Nor was this, however, all: the conduct of lord Hervey, though admitted to be such as to occasion this complaint of the court of Tuscany, and to draw down upon him, in consequence, this mark of disapprobation of his own court, was yet not entirely such as it is represented in certain publications, from which, in this, as in other instances, the hon. gentlemen on the other side of the House probably derived the information, on which they thought it expedient to ground their charges against the powers at war with France. In the same collection of state papers, which contains the treaty of Pavia, and the secret articles of the treaty of Pilnitz, both gross and impudent fabrications, without the shadow of foundation, or the pretence of authority; in that same publication, resting on similar grounds of authenticity, is even to be found a pretended note from lord Hervey, addressed directly, and personally, to the grand duke of Tuscany, of which it was sufficient to say, that no such note ever was presented; no such note ever was transmitted from lord Hervey to this court; nor was it ever heard of by any person connected with the government of this country, until it made its appearance in the same volume with the treaty of Pavia and Pilnitz [Mr. Canning here read a copy of a paper, purporting to be a note from lord Hervey to the grand duke of Tuscany, dated September 2nd, 1793]. He read this note, he said, not as conceiving that the circumstance of such a fabrication having been contrived, did away all ground of complaint against lord Hervey. The complaint he had admitted to have existed; and it had been satisfied by lord Hervey's recall. But he did think that this, coupled with the other instances to which he had referred, of the spurious treaties of Pavia and Pilnitz, might have the effect of making gentlemen a little cautious in future how they adopted, and relied upon as authentic state papers, whatever trash it might please the friends of France to publish as such, for the justification of her cause. He had one word more to add upon the subject of Tuscany. The hon. gentleman had appeared to rely upon the conduct of Great Britain, in this instance, not only as a set-off against the outrageous pro[VOL. XXXIV.] After all, however, if it were in other respects proper and reasonable to retrace the conduct of France at former periods of the war, and if the conduct of Great Britain, in regard to other nations, left them at liberty to do so, the hon. gentleman had contended, that the ministers had given up all right to look back, by [4 M1 entering into a negotiation at Paris, and afterwards at Lisle. And he had farther insisted, that the declarations published in his majesty's name, at the conclusion of each of those negotiations, had bound the government of this country to enter into negotiation anew, at least to receive overtures for peace, whenever the enemy might show a readiness to treat with them. The reasoning (Mr. Canning said) seemed to him to be by no means correct. This pledge given by the declarations of his majesty could in no fair construction be made to apply so widely and so eternally as the hon. gentleman was desirous of having it believed. As to the declaration made after the Paris negotiation, whatever might be the promises held forth in future negotiation, they were fully and entirely satisfied, and the pledge contained in them entirely redeemed, by entering into the negotiation at Lisle. And as to that which was published after the negotiation at Lisle, it was not only not of the vague and unlimited nature, which the hon. gentleman described, but it was in truth more limited by circumstances, and more precise in the extent and duration of its obligation than the former. For what was the state of the circumstances under which that declaration was published? Lord Malmesbury had been empowered to offer the terms of peace at Lisle, so liberal, so advantageous to the enemy, that nothing, in fact, but the real and pressing necessity for peace which was felt in this country, could have justified the government in foregoing them; and that it was not unreasonably to be apprehended, that any favourable change in the circumstances of the country might induce the government to seize an opportunity of departing from them. Such, however, was not the intention or the policy of government. A favourable change had taken place in the circumstances of the country; for, soon after the breaking off of the conferences at Lisle, and the sending away of lord Malmesbury, it had pleased Providence to bless his majesty's arms with a signal victory over the fleet of one of his enemies. The effect of this victory was, to secure, in a great measure, the safety of the country, and to raise the spirits of the people certainly in a very considerable degree. But still the king's ministers thought peace upon the whole desirable; and feeling this, and apprehending, at the same time, that the enemy would naturally conclude that the advan tage so recently gained must of necessity have raised our terms, they thought it expedient to give them to understand that such was not the case-that even after the victory of lord Duncan they were ready to make peace upon the same terms which they had offered before, and, for this purpose, the declaration was published. The enemy might have taken them at their word at the time: fortunately he did not. But was it to be ar gued, that such a declaration, made under such circumstances, and with such a view, was to be everlastingly binding? That because one victory, because a favourable change, in one particular, of the situation of this country, did not alter the opinion of ministers as to the preferableness of peace to war (a choice of evils, God knows, as such a peace must have been), and did not affect the moderation of their terms, therefore they were to be held for ever to the words, not the spirit, of their proposition; were never to be at liberty to vary their tone with the variation of circumstances, both in this country, and in the situation of the enemy, but were bound to be always forthcoming, when the enemy pleases to call upon them, and to make at all times the worst terms possible for Great Britain, because there had been a period when a peace, even on terms so bad, was thought preferable to the continuance of the war? Surely there was not common fairness, or reason, in such a mode of argument; nor would there be common sense in such a mode of conduct! As little could it be argued, that the having treated with revolutionary France at all, precluded ministers for ever from considering the internal state of that country as a discouragement to negotia tion. What! because they had already felt, in the abrupt and insulting termination of the negotiation at Lisle (of Paris he would say nothing), what it was to treat with a revolutionary government; were they, therefore, of course, bound to treat immediately and eagerly with every new government the instant that it presented itself to their view? Was the mere fact of an experiment having been tried, and having failed, of itself a suffi cient inducement to try it again? Were the government bound to this, if circumstances continued the same, and afforded, therefore, only the same chance of success? And were they equally bound to it in case of a change? Was there now Whether or no any such fortunate and promising alteration had been effected in the principles and temper of France, by the alteration of form of government and of persons, was precisely the question upon which the government of this country had to make up its opinion,, before it could safely, or prudently, or consistently, entertain any proposal for negotiation. It was precisely that upon which it was impossible to make up any rational opinion, until they should have seen trial of the new establishment; a trial only to be decided by what was so justly insisted upon in the official note returned in answer to general Buonaparte's letters to his majesty, "experience and the evidence of facts." a change in the circumstances or disposi- | nish their influence and operation, if such tions of the enemy, which warranted the a race of madmen yet were to be found, expectation that the chance of success whose eyes and understandings, the whole would now be greater? And if there series of tyrannies from Robespierre and were so, how were, they to ascertain it, Buonaparté bad not been sufficient to but by that very examination and compa- open; with them, he must confess that rison of the present situation of France, the expression of a wish for the restora and the French government, with that tion of the old legitimate government which had before baffled their endeavours might be unpopular; their feelings such a after peace; which examination and proposition might irritate. But, he concomparison the hon. gentleman had warned fessed, he could not easily persuade himthe House not to pursue? self that such a race of men could be very numerous either in France or elsewhere. And if, as was more probable, the general and prevailing feeling throughout France, was that of weariness and disgust at the scenes of horror and calamity through which they had passed; if they now began to see, with regret and compunction, that, after ten years of sufferings and of crimes, of miseries inflicted upon others, and heaped upon themselves, after wading through seas of blood in pursuit of the empty form of liberty which still eluded their grasp, the sole result of their endeavours to shake off the govern ment, which they were once taught to think so oppressive, had been no other than the subjecting themselves to a tyranny ten thousand times more galling; that they had succeeded only in exchanging the sceptre for the sword; that, instead of eradicating monarchy, they had stripped it of all that made it venerable, and of all that made it useful, of all that recommended it in theory, and ali that softened it in practice; had stripped it of its stability, its legitimacy, and its limitations. If such were now the reflexions of all thinking men in that unhappy country, what reason was there to apprehend that they would shrink from the mention of their ancient government? That they would withhold their homage from a known and mitigated monarchy, to pay it to a frightful and jealous usurpation? That they would hold sacred their allegiance to a shapeless mockery of royalty, with "the likeliness of a kingly crown' upon its head, and refuse it to that substantial and protective power, under which they have flourished for ages, in respect abroad and in happiness at home? Was it not rather to be presumed, that they had now began to look with anxious desire for a termination to their calamities, in such an order of things as alone could terminate them in peace and security? Was it not probable-was it not certaindid not every man who heard him, know But this distrust of the new government the hon. gentleman professed to believe to be in a great measure effected, and to be put forward only in order to afford an opportunity for declaring the marked and exclusive predilection of ministers for the ancient monarchy of France; and nothing could, in the hon. gentleman's opinion, be more impolitic, as well as more outrageously insulting to the feelings of the people of France, than the avowal of a desire to see the ancient monarchy restored. Un doubtedly such a desire was plainly and distinctly avowed;, and, for his part, Mr. Canning said, he was at a loss to conceive what there was in the avowal that could irritate the feelings of Frenchmen., If, indeed, it was possible to imagine, that there still existed in France a large body of sincere, bigotted, fanatical lovers of republicanism, of persons who gravely believed in the purity and perfection of the republican principle, as applicable, or as ever having been applied to the government of France, under any of its successive revolutions, who still looked with faith and hope to the preservation and propagation of their principles, and considered nothing but the return of monarchy as likely to oppose their progress, or dimi from his own experience, that the first | France, and the government of this counidea suggested by Buonaparte's successful try had undoubtedly a common object, usurpation, was, that it was a step to the but they had different degrees of interest restoration of monarchy? Was it not in the attainment of it, and proportioned obvious to every person, that from the to those different degrees of interest government of one man, to that of a lawful might be the degrees of their respective king, was a transition neither so strange exertions and perseverance in the pursuit. nor so difficult, as from any of the more So far, however, as they were both to complicated constitutions which had risen proceed, they might safely and beneficially and fallen in France since the abolition of proceed together. It was a partnership the monarchy? And, even now, though in which the royalists had necessarily emto point out the pacific stages by which barked their whole fortune; this country, the change was to be brought about might a part only; and the terms of the conbe by no means easy, was there any human nexion resulting from these combined, but being who did not feel that monarchy unequal interests, were distinctly underwas brought more within view than it had stood. If we could bring the royalists been at any period since the beginning of through by the same efforts by which we the revolution? That those who wished were working for our own advantage, it felt it more confident in their hopes; surely it was highly useful, and honourthat those who dreaded its return yet able, and humane, to do so: but we were thought it more probable, and might be not pledged to persevere beyond what we more ready to compromise with it: and thought prudent on our own account; we that, therefore, to put the case of the re- might withdraw at any time, when our establishment of monarchy as that in own objects were accomplished, or when which peace would become easy and cer- we saw, or thought we saw, that they tain, was to specify not only the most de- were unattainable, without greater risk sirable but the most probable termination than it appeared to us adviseable to incur: of the war, and that which, according to and we might withdraw without reproach, all human calculation, might be most near and without dishonesty. We had no at hand. share in bringing the royalists into the contest, though finding them at our side, we were bound in honour and humanity to assist them, as far as our ways lay together but while we owed thus much to them, we did not, nor did they, forget that we owed all to ourselves. But an apprehension was expressed, that in stating the desire of this government for the restoration of monarchy in France, a pledge was given to the royalists that peace should never be made at all, until monarchy was retored. It was feared, that government were thus making common cause with the royalists, and implicating the fortunes of this country in the issue of a contest in which substantially it had no real concern. Not so the language of the official note was guarded carefully in this point; and so little did it justify the conclusion that common cause was made with the royalists to the extent described, that in other comments upon the note, which he had seen, a directly contrary effect was stated as likely to be produced by it; namely, that the intimation of other possible cases in which peace might be made by this country with France, would prevent the royalist party from building any hope at upon the good wishes of Great Britain. The truth, however, lay between both; and it might, perhaps, be sufficient to answer to both objections, that the royalists were not deceived as to what was the true intention of government, and that they were satisfied with it. The royalists of all : Next, however, according to the honourable gentleman's arguments, it was to be considered that this country had, in fact, no interest whatever in the re-establishment of monarchy in France: nay, that it was rather an event to be looked at with jealousy and apprehension. This assertion, though he had heard of its being made and maintained in other places, Mr. Canning said, he could hardly believe to be made with seriousness. Good God! Had Great Britain, had the world no interest in the re-establishment of order, of a known, defined, understood, experienced, legitimate order of things, in the room of a system of disorder, anarchy, and impiety, not more afflicting to France, than it was incompatible, as had been proved by long and painful experience, with the security of every other government upon earth? Was it nothing to this country, looking to peace as its object, whether she should be able to conclude a peace on which she could rely, and under which she could repose with confidence; a peace | period much to praise; wisdom and firmwhich should bring with it the renewal of safe communication, of commercial intercourse, of reciprocal trust and benefit; or, whether she should only rest on her arms in hourly expectation of being again summoned to war, in defence of her dearest interests? And did the honourable gentleman suppose, that such a peace as was alone worth having, as alone could be maintained without all the cost, and more than all the dangers of war, could rest on any other grounds than the restoration of such an order of things in France as might ensure the return of credit and stability to the government, and of security for property and of honest industry, and commercial morality amongst the people? ness in our councils, skill in our generals, valour in our armies: but he found nothing that delighted him more, or that he would rather recommend to the admiration of the honourable gentleman, and his friends, than the cordial support afforded by the Commons of Great Britain to their sovereign, in the prosecution of a war, carried on for the true interests, the honour and safety of their country, against the rapacious, insolent, and domineering ambition of France. [Mr. Canning here read an address of the House of Commons to king William, in the year 1696, the 8th year of the war, containing expressions of their determination to support his majesty to the utmost, "till he should be able to obtain by war, a safe and honourable peace."*] This example was, indeed, he said, worthy of being quoted, and worthy of all the praise bestowed upon the exertions of that reign, by the honourable gentleman. But, after all, what did the honourable gentleman gain to his argument, by referring to the days of Louis 14th, and by citing the precedent of the noble struggle maintained by this country, during the reign of king William, and his successor, against France? He reminded us, it was true, what were the efforts, and what were the sacrifices which the people of England had thought themselves bound to make in that contest. What was the inference? Why, that in a contest, incalculably more arduous, and involving in its issue interests infinitely more important, we should wake, at least, The expression, therefore, of an anxious wish for the re-establishment of the French monarchy, did not appear to him to be either so dangerous in the effect that it might produce in France, nor so extravagant with respect to the interests of Great Britain. But here the honourable gentleman had taken a very extraordinary ground indeed; and in his zeal to combat the idea of restoring monarchy, he had far outstepped the rule of forbearance, with respect to the past conduct of France, which he had prescribed for those who differed from him upon the question, and had gone into a laboured dissertation on the dangers with which monarchy, in the House of Bourbon, had in old times threatened this country and all Europe. The mind of that man must be singularly constituted, who, living in such times as the present, could overlook all the dan-equal efforts, and display, at least, equal gers actually impending, and all those which had recently overwhelmed the world from the profligate aggressions and tyranny of republican France; and who yet trembled with apprehension at the recollection of the ambitious projects of Lonis 14th. The honourable gentleman had referred to the projects of that monarch, which had threatened the independence of Europe, a hundred years ago; and had spoken of them in a tone which showed, that he thought the independence of Europe matter of concern, and the overweening ambition of France, matter of dread to this country and he had spoken, in the manner which it deserved, of the stand made by king William in defence of the liberties of this country, and of Europe. He agreed with the honourable gentleman, in looking back with pride to that distinguished period of English history. He found in that perseverance? What was at any time the specific danger from the ambition of Louis 14th, that called forth all the energy of this country? First, generally, his unprincipled ambition; latterly, war was carried on against him because there was a danger that France would acquire an influence in the councils of Spain. An influence in the councils of Spain! Would to God such were the only danger that we had now to apprehend! Yet for this, the hon. gentleman thought war was justly and nobly carried on! And now--Oh! now, there was no reason, no pretext for carrying on war at all; no danger now of French influence in Spain!-France intermeddle in the concerns of Spain now! France command the treasures, dispose of the fleets, direct the policy of the *See Vol, 5, p. 996. |