could clearly show that greater advantages would result from punishing a few of the best men in a state, as substitutes for many convicts, and pardoning on that ground, than could possibly be derived from pardoning on condition of repentance, without vicarious sacrifice, they would naturally enlist the understandings and the feelings of their readers in their favor. Why has not this mode of illustration been adopted? Is it not a fact, that there is no writer in the country who would dare to recommend the policy of substituted suffering, as a means of improving human government? But if we have the example of God in favor of this policy, why should not Christian rulers imitate the example? As I am confident no minister can be found, who would risk his reputation, by recommending to our rulers the adoption of such a policy, may I not query, whether more prudence is not desirable in speaking of the principle of pardon on condition of repentance, lest some should be found chargeable with having reproached the only principle on which their own sins can be forgiven?

On a review, I find, that I have omitted one of the supposed cases of "legislation," referred to by Dr. Beecher, when he asked," Would not such legislation be the consummation of folly and mischief?" The case omitted is

stated in the following words :-"Let the parent say to his high-minded son, allured by temptation, and driven by passion; If you transgress, you shall be disinherited ; nevertheless, I am your father, and you are able to repent, and doubtless will repent; and if you do, you shall be forgiven.'" p. 7.

If I understand the purpose of this extraordinary language, it was to deride the idea of pardon on condition of

repentance, considered as a principle of parental government. I have, however, the happiness of believing, that the father of the penitent prodigal, in our Savior's parable, is not the only parent who has acted on the principle in question. Indeed, I hope it is a very common thing for Christian parents to act on this principle, when they have the pleasure of perceiving evidence of true contrition in a child that has transgressed. If a parent is not disposed to forgive his own children when they evince a contrite heart, how can he hope for the forgiveness of God? or how can he pray,-" Father,-forgive us, as we forgive those who have trespassed against us?" Though thousands of pious parents may have imitated the father of the penitent prodigal, yet it may be presumed that not one of them ever addressed "a high-minded son" in such a ridiculous form of words as Dr. Beecher has put into the mouth of a parent. Alas! has it indeed come to this, that a Christian minister can publicly treat with sarcastic ridicule the heavenly principle of parental forgiveness, which was sanctioned and illustrated by the Savior of the world, in one of the most impressive parables that was ever dictated by the wisdom of God!

I would here make an affectionate appeal to pious parents of every denomination of Christians, and in particular to all ministers of the gospel who are parents, and ask,-Do you not, in the government of your children, act on the principle of pardon, on condition of repentance? Whenever you perceive evidence that a disobedient son has "come to himself," and that his heart is filled with contrition for his offences, do you not take pleasure in imitating the father of the penitent prodigal, by manifesting to your child your forgiving love? Notwithstanding all that

Dr. Beecher has said against this principle, would it be possible for him to answer these questions in the negative? But it must be left for him to explain by what means or motives he was induced to treat with contumely the only principle of parental forgiveness, which is so much as intimated in the gospel. I doubt whether it is in the power of human language to inculcate a principle of parental government more clearly or impressively, than our Lord inculcated the duty of forgiveness, on condition of repentance.

66

Suppose that after Dr. Beecher had prepared his sermon, he had seriously indulged the following train of reflections: I have been writing with remarkable asperity against the principle of " pardon on the simple condition of repentance." I have endeavored to impress the idea, that this principle, if adopted in civil government or parental government, would be "the consurnmation of folly and mischief." But ought I not to be able to show, that the principle of vicarious punishment would be better in each of these cases, than the principle which I have exploded? How then would it do to punish the best child in a family, as a substitute for guilty brothers and sisters? Would it be possible for any one to discern the least benefit that could result from the sufferings of the innocent son, or from pretending to pardon the penitent on the ground of their brother's sufferings? Could such a policy excite the least respect for the father, or his precepts? Could it deter from vice, or excite contrition? Would not all the children of four years of age and upwards be shocked at the thought that their innocent brother had been punished for their offences?

Had the Doctor seasonably devoted twenty minutes to such self-interrogations, would it have been possible for

him to publish the Discourse in its present form? I think it would not.

While writing some of the preceding paragraphs, a train of thoughts occurred to my mind, which may possibly be as affecting to others as they have been to myself. History informs us that in the dark ages the papal clergy adopted the policy of selling indulgences for sin; and that some purchased indulgences for sins before they had been committed. The payment of money for an indulgence was doubtless regarded as in some sense a substitute for punishment. Whence did this policy originate? It was probably suggested by the doctrine of substituted punishment, as then understood by the Catholics.

"It was," says Dr. Murdock, "the common opinion, from the end of the second century down to the Reformation, that on a person's embracing and professing the Christian religion by baptism, all his past sins were cancelled; and that for the sins he might afterwards commit, he must suffer penance, give alms, fast, and pray, unless he could atone for them all by martyrdom." Discourse, Appendix A.

Perhaps paying money for an indulgence was regarded not only as a substitute for punishment, but for "penance," "alms," and for fasting and prayer, and, on the whole, the cheapest mode of obtaining salvation. But what must have been the effect of such substitutes for punishment in reference to future offences? Could they be otherwise than pernicious? To me there is something shocking in the idea of paying or receiving substitutes for the punishment of sins before they were committed. But does not the common theory of the atonement impute to God this policy? It surely teaches

that Christ suffered, and that God both inflicted and accepted a substitute for punishment in regard to sins past and sins future, even for the sins of a long succession of generations of men then unborn, and many, too, still unborn!

May not a considerate man be allowed to pause, prior to assenting to such a doctrine, and humbly ask,—Is it possible with God to set such an example before his children?

Even those who believe that the Mosaic atonements were substitutes for punishment, will hardly say that they were substitutes in reference to sins which were subsequent to the sacrifice. The history of military, despotic, and semi-savage governments may furnish many instances in which innocent relatives, subjects, or countrymen, were made to suffer as substitutes for guilty rulers or chieftains. But do the annals of our race furnish a single instance of vicarious suffering, inflicted prior to the existence of the beings, whose offences were supposed to be thus avenged or atoned? Barbarism itself never carried substituted punishment to such an extent. How shocking then to reflect, that to "the only wise God," this questionable policy has been ascribed !

What would Protestants not have said of the Catholic clergy, had they extended their indulgences so far, as to receive of parents substitutes for punishments, which might become due by the sins of unborn children and grandchildren!

Were there no other ground of objection to the hypothesis of substituted punishment, I should think that a pretty strong faith in the doctrine might be shaken by the dreadful thought of God's inflicting penal evils on his innocent