1707 THE ACT OF UNION WITH SCOTLAND. 107 V. want of tolerance but because the prospects of such a pro- CHAP. posal were hopeless. The bill introduced by the primate, which was afterwards incorporated in the Act of Union, provided for the perpetuation of the Act of Uniformity and all other laws "for the establishment and preservation of the Church of England and the doctrine, worship, discipline, and government thereof ". same. In both houses the proceedings upon the union were the The most substantial objections went upon finance. and representation. Throughout the divisions in both houses the government had ample majorities. Ministers had resolved to carry the bill substantially as it left the Scots parliament, for amendments would involve endless wrangles and final discomfiture. The knowledge of this fact and the popular feeling in favour of union knocked the heart out of the opposition. The bill was carried in the commons by 274 to 116 votes on February 28, 1706-7. Taken up to the lords on March 1 it passed rapidly through their house. A final protest was signed on the 4th by Nottingham, and seven tory peers of little note. On the 6th, the queen attended the house in person and the bill for a union of the two kingdoms of England and Scotland received the royal assent.1 The interval of nearly two months before May 1, 1707, when the union was to take effect, furnished occasion for the first quarrel between the two nations. Scottish merchants took advantage of the lower range of customs duties in Scotland to accumulate foreign imports in order to pour them into England. For this purpose vessels were freighted in Holland and even in France. On the other hand, English merchants who had paid an import duty of sixpence a pound on imported tobacco obtained a drawback of fivepence on exporting it to Scotland with a view to a subsequent reimportation free of duty across the border. Those of the commercial classes who could make a profit out of neither operation were exasperated. The English customs officers in June seized the cargoes of a fleet of forty sail, "mostly loaded with wine and brandy," carried from Scotland to the Thames. Only the prudence of Godolphin in waiving the rights of the crown averted a dan 15 Anne, c. 8. V. CHAP. gerous collision. Eager to catch at grievances, the Scottish malcontents next clamoured at the delay in the payment of "the equivalent". Even as early as June 5 a supporter of the union writes that the want of "the equivalent" was contributing with the intrigues of the Jacobites to render the union a failure. On July 8 twelve waggons were dispatched to Edinburgh with £100,000 in bullion, under convoy of a troop of horse. The procession was greeted in the High Street with shouts of "Judas money". When it was found that the residue was offered in exchequer bills there was a fresh outburst against English perfidy. Public confidence was only restored through the acceptance of the bills by some large shareholders of the African Company. The distribution of the money involved bitter wrangles and recriminations between the commissioners of union, to whom it was entrusted, and the public, and among the commissioners themselves, for whose indemnification large sums were appropriated.2 Nearly twenty years passed before any portion was allotted for the encouragement of the fisheries or manufactures. The introduction of the English system of raising internal revenue excited fresh dissatisfaction. English highwaymen, it was said, in anticipation of Swift's sarcasm on Irish bishops, migrated to Scotland as excise officers. They were pelted in the streets and compelled to walk for protection with the town officials. The increase of duties at the ports gave a stimulus to smuggling, and the customs officers and riding surveyors of the coast were driven to fulfil their functions under military escort. The fruits of the union in the eyes of the masses were increased cost of living and the influx of a horde of objectionable English officials. 1 Lord Anstruther to the Duke of Montrose, Montrose MSS., p. 368, Hist. MSS. Comm., 3rd Rep., App. 2 Burnet; Seafield MSS., p. 222, John Earl of Mar, Secretary of State for Scotland, to James Earl of Seafield, Lord Chancellor. 3 Earl of Glasgow to Duke of Montrose, June 3, 1707, Montrose MSS., P. 376. CHAPTER VI. THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1707-1708. VI. WITH the crushing defeat of the Frencn before Turin by CHAP. Eugene on September 7, the supremacy of Austria in Northern Italy was assured, and this involved a revival of the territorial disputes between the emperor and the Duke of Savoy. The emperor, in order to get possession of Mantua without a conAlict, presently ventured on a grave perfidy. Without the knowledge of the allies, he entered into a treaty with France on March 13, 1707, known as the treaty of Milan, allowing the return home of the isolated French garrisons in Italy. His own troops, now set free, he destined, notwithstanding the protest of the allies, for the conquest of Naples. With the capture of Madrid in June, 1706, the hopes of the allies rose high. The French, on their side, made extraordinary exertions to reinforce their troops. After the release of their garrisons from Italy by the treaty of Milan, they transferred a strong force to Roussillon for operations against Catalonia from the north. Philip, Duke of Orleans, was appointed to supersede Berwick in the chief command. On February 7, 1707, the belated expeditionary force under Lord Rivers arrived at Alicante. Originally numbering 10,000 men, it had already been reduced through sickness and privation by a fourth. The arrival of Rivers added fresh flames to the heartburnings which during the winter had raged at Valencia. On the one side was Galway, supported by General Stanhope, the English envoy-extraordinary to Charles, on the other the Dutch general, Noyelles, Liechtenstein, the archduke's principal Austrian adviser, and Cardona, the Spanish viceroy of Catalonia. The two English generals were for adopting the advice of Marlborough, who could scarcely have been CHAP. accurately informed of the state of the country, and for marchVI. ing at once on Madrid in concert with an advance expected from Portugal. The others were for a defensive war maintained by garrisons dispersed through Valencia and Catalonia. To these last Rivers and Peterborough, who had returned from Genoa on January 6, allied themselves. From divided counsels came divided action. In the middle of March Charles, accompanied by his ministers and escorted by Noyelles with the Spanish and 800 Dutch troops, left Valencia and returned to Barcelona. A partial dispersion of the army among neighbouring garrisons took place. Galway's forces were now reduced by some 10,000 men. Two compensations fell to him; the peremptory recall of Peterborough by Sunderland on the archduke's complaints, and the resignation of his command by Rivers, who also returned home. Galway's plan was to march through the hilly country of the south of Aragon, where Berwick's superiority in cavalry would be rendered ineffective, and throw himself into Madrid. He began his march on April 10, at the head of about 15,500 men, half of them Portuguese, the rest including 4,800 English, besides Dutch, Germans, and Huguenots, but no Spaniards. On April 24 news was brought to the camp of the allies, who were besieging the small fortress of Villena, that Berwick was advancing, presumably to its relief. At a council of war the allied generals unanimously agreed to take the aggressive, before Orleans, who was on the march, could effect a junction with Berwick. Berwick was in command of 25,400 men with a good train of artillery. Of these troops, 11,900 were French and the remainder Spanish. On the 25th, apprised of the approach of the allies, Berwick, who had reached Almanza, had distributed his forces in two lines, with the town at their His cavalry were at the wings. Between his army and that of the allies lay the plain of Almanza, swept by the fire of his artillery. Galway adopted a similar disposition of his men. The attack began with a charge by General Carpenter's cavalry upon the Spanish horse posted at Berwick's right wing. This was followed up by the advance of the English, Dutch, and Huguenot foot, who drove the enemy's infantry towards the walls of the town. But a charge of the French cavalry of Berwick's left wing against the Portuguese horse threw them rear. 1707 DEFEAT OF THE ALLIES AT ALMANZA. III VI. into a panic and exposed the victorious foot to being cut to CHAP. pieces by an attack on their right flank. Galway having been temporarily deprived of sight by two sabre cuts over his right eye, there was no one to give general directions, and each section of the army fought independently. Under cover of a charge by Carpenter at the head of the Huguenot dragoons, Galway drew off the left, over which he had command, numbering 3,500 men. After a retreat of eight miles, the fragments of the centre were compelled next day to lay down their The total loss to the allies was 4,000 killed and wounded and 3,000 prisoners. I cannot," wrote Galway to Sunderland, "but look upon the affairs of Spain as lost by this bad disaster." arms. The news of Almanza revived in the minds of Godolphin and Marlborough the policy of a diversion in the south of France. It was still the belief in England that without French troops Philip would be unable to maintain himself on the Spanish throne. Reluctantly yielding to the importunities of the English ministry, Prince Eugene consented to serve in an expedition against Toulon. At the beginning of July the Duke of Savoy and Eugene took the field at the head of 35,000 men. A fleet under Shovell was ready to co-operate. The army arrived before Toulon on the 26th. But the invaders were, as the letters of the English envoy, Chetwynd, disclose, in no condition for a successful campaign. Their march had been through a country bare of provisions, amid a hostile population. Discipline had given way before privations. Desertion was rampant. Nor was it easy to compensate for the ineffectiveness of the land forces by the operations of the fleet. A gauntlet of forts would have to be run before, with its limited range, the fleet could bombard the town, while the space between the fleet and the army was commanded by French fortified posts. Between the allies and the town walls lay Tessé in an intrenched camp, daily receiving reinforcements. It speedily became apparent that the army was inadequate to the task of investing Toulon, perhaps even of defending itself. Time was needed for the siege and time was working on behalf of the enemy. On the 22nd the allies turned their backs upon Toulon. The disorderly retreat was impeded by a revengeful peasantry, but unmolested |