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1705

MARLBOROUGH'S FOURTH CAMPAIGN.

77

IV.

among them D'Alegre, the Bavarian general, were among the CHAP. trophies. By the queen the news was welcomed with a public thanksgiving at St. Paul's on August 23.

Since his return to the Netherlands, Marlborough had been in the nominal command of two armies. Of these the larger consisted of the English and the troops in English pay. These were absolutely at his orders. The Dutch army under Ouwerkerk remained the victim of the paralysing system of field-deputies. Its co-operation in forcing the French lines was nothing more than the execution of a feint,' of the precise object of which even Ouwerkerk was ignorant. Under such a system, Marlborough complained, it was "impossible to act offensively"; yet urgent representations to the States-general failed to extort any substantial concession.

With characteristic determination to make the best of circumstances, Marlborough resolved to resume the offensive, By August 16 he advanced from Meldert to Genappe so as to threaten Brussels from the south-east. On the 18th the army came in sight of the French forces drawn up in line of battle behind the Yssche to cover Brussels. The allied army was the superior in number. The duke and Ouwerkerk, having reconnoitred the French lines, decided upon four points of attack. To the astonishment of Ouwerkerk and the duke, the field-deputies refused their assent. "They had consulted," wrote the duke's chaplain two days later," "with their other generals, of whom that beast Slangenberg was very noisy and cried out that it was sacrificing their army and an impracticable enterprise." On no previous occasion had Marlborough pressed his purpose so vehemently. From the deputies he addressed an appeal to the Dutch generals and was met by Slangenbourg with insolence. Nothing remained but to withdraw. A war of recrimination ensued. Marlborough wrote an official letter to the States-general, in terms of studious moderation, complaining of his lack of authority over his subordinate generals. The field-deputies issued a counter-manifesto, reflecting upon the duke's concealment of his plans. In England Marlborough's enemies exulted. In France his retreat was

1Cf. Francis Hare (Marlborough's chaplain) to G. Naylor, July 18, 1705 Tirlemont, Hare MSS., p. 203, Hist. MSS. Comm., 1895.

2 F. Hare to G. Naylor, Hare MSS., p. 205.

IV.

CHAP. imputed to incapacity. But the general feeling in Holland and England was one of indignation.2 "Had he (Slangenbourg) come to Amsterdam this summer, after he hindered the battle, he would have been De-Witted." Neither the commander-in-chief nor his army was in a condition to renew the campaign that year. "Our army," wrote a field officer in October, "is now very weak, and we have lost this summer in the British troops almost as many men by marauding and desertion, though we have not fought at all, as we lost last summer though we had two bloody battles." Beginning everywhere with promise, the campaign had ended everywhere in disappointment.

During the autumn increasing dissatisfaction with the war had been felt by the Dutch. The stoppage of the exchange robbed them, they urged, of the means of contributing to the

Indeed, not even after their undertaking in 1703 was the prohibition faithfully observed, and in 1704 the States-general did not venture to extend it for another year. Unless, wrote the grand pensionary early in 1705, England wished a dissolution of the alliance it must withdraw all obstacles to trade with France. English merchants and shipowners grumbled, tory pamphleteers assailed the ministry, ministers complained at the Hague. But the Hague had its grievances also. England, it was whispered, was cajoling from the Austrian claimant the concession of exclusive trade privileges in Spain and the West Indies. England meditated the annexation of Gibraltar, of the harbour of Cadiz, and of a station on the Balearic Isles which would give her the monopoly of the Mediterranean trade. No wonder, cried the peace party of Amsterdam, that England clamoured for a war which should so richly compensate her sacrifices. But the disclosure of the misconduct of Slangenbourg and the general discredit of the field-deputies had pro

1 "J'ai obtenu urfe opinion médiocre de la capacité du duc de Marlborough." Chamillart (minister of war) to Villeroy, September 6, 1705, Von Noorden, ii., 173.

2 For the remonstrance which it was in contemplation to send to the Statesgeneral by Lord Pembroke, see The Queen to the Earl of Pembroke, August 30, 1705, Portland MSS., iv., 237.

3 Duke of Shrewsbury's Journal, December 15, 1705, Buccleuch MSS., ii., 796.

Major J. Cranstoun to Robert Cunningham, Herenthals, October 1, 1705. Portland MSS., iv., 255. Marlborough particularises fatigue and sickness. Murray, Dispatches, ii., 290.

1706

MARLBOROUGH'S FIFTH CAMPAIGN.

79

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voked a reaction in Dutch sentiment. Even William Buys, CHAP the leader of the peace party, after a visit to London in January, 1706, returned to Amsterdam fervent for the alliance.

Upon the conclusion of the indecisive campaign of 1705 Marlborough again undertook the work of a diplomatist, and as Vienna was now the weak point of the alliance, he determined in November, 1705, there to deal with the emperor personally. He assured him of an English loan, and met his difficulties by agreeing to a reduction of the imperial contingent for the ensuing campaign to 40,000 men, but he insisted that these should be punctually dispatched and adequately equipped. At Vienna he met his son-in-law Sunderland, who, in July, had been appointed envoy-extraordinary to felicitate Joseph I. on his accession, and to act as intermediary between the court of Vienna and the Hungarian insurgents. In Sunderland's company he proceeded from Vienna to Berlin. Frederick was complaining of slights offered by the emperor and threatening to withdraw his 8,000 soldiers from Italy. Not until the States - general paid his arrears would he order his regiments to march to the seat of war on the Rhine. Having effected a continuance of the agreement for the Italian campaign of the ensuing year, which was his main object, Marlborough next proceeded to Hanover. Here his manners, which the electress described as "obliging and polished," reconciled her to the English court. Thence to the Hague, where he arranged for the payment of the States-general's contribution to the supply of Prince Eugene's army, and for his reinforcement with 10,000 men, to be raised from Saxe-Gotha and the Rhenish Palatinate and paid by the maritime powers. On January 7, 1706, he resumed his seat in parliament and received the thanks of the house of commons for his services.

The spring of 1706 was marked by a distraction of counsels among the allies. The States-general peremptorily refused to listen to Marlborough's project of marching a Dutch force into Italy. If he insisted on an Italian campaign, he must forgo the co-operation of the Dutch troops and resign his position as commander-in-chief of the republic's army. The war in Italy was accordingly reserved for Prince Eugene who, by the defeat of the Duke of Orleans under the walls of Turin on September 7, dealt the third of the three great blows inflicted that

IV.

CHAP. year on France. The relief of Turin was the loss of Italy to France. Vast preparations were in the meanwhile being made by Louis XIV. Villars was entrusted with the command of an army on the Upper Rhine; in the centre of the theatre of war, between the Netherlands and Alsace, lay Marsin; on the Dutch frontier Villeroy and Max Emanuel. The Margrave of Baden, intrenched behind the lines of Hagenau in Alsace, was left with less than 7,000 ill-equipped troops, and on April 30 driven from his position with the loss of all his supplies by a surprise attack of Villars and Marsin. As far as the co-operation of the imperial forces went, the campaign was over before it was begun. At the end of May Marlborough placed himself at the head of the allied forces in Brabant, numbering 60,000 men. His immediate object was to strike a blow before Marsin, who was on the march from Metz, succeeded in effecting a junction with Villeroy. Marsin's advanced detachment of twenty squadrons of cavalry was within two days' march on May 21, and his infantry some few days' marches behind. Common prudence would have prescribed to Villeroy the avoidance of an engagement, but jealousy prompted him to precipitate one before Marsin's arrival.1

The two armies met in the neighbourhood of Ramillies, a village eleven miles north of Namur. The field of battle was a convex tract of land between the river Mehaigne on the south and the sources of the Great and Little Gheet. In the morning of May 23, N.S., the advance guards came in contact, Marlborough marching from the east and Villeroy from the north. Villeroy had time to take up the position of his choice. At his centre, Ramillies, he posted his artillery. His left wing was protected by marshy and broken ground. In front of his centre and right was a plain on which his cavalry, now joined by Marsin's detachment, could manœuvre. In advance of his right was the village of Tavier, and beyond it Franquenies, both of which would have to be taken before his position could be turned. Marlborough placed his infantry in the centre, in front of Ramillies, and his cavalry on either flank. A demonstration was made by him against the French

1" We could hardly fail of meeting, since we marched with a firm resolution to attack them, and I find they did the same out of their line to attack us." Letter of the Earl of Orkney, May 24, 1706, Engl. Hist. Rev., xix., 315.

1706

BATTLE OF RAMILLIES.

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left, the English infantry wading waist deep in water to the CHAP. attack. But a furious assault on Ramillies was repulsed, and the Dutch were scattered by the French cavalry on the plain. While rallying the Dutch horse, Marlborough was dismounted 2 and in danger of being taken prisoner. As at Blenheim, failure inspired him. He executed a change of disposition which determined the battle. Villeroy had been led by the demonstration against his left to withdraw troops from his right. As he did so, Marlborough withdrew half his infantry to his centre, rapidly transferred the cavalry to his left wing and, Franquenies having been already stormed by the Dutch, threw his reserves upon Tavier. The French were outnumbered and their cavalry routed, while at the same time the English and Dutch infantry pierced the French centre. The French right was now turned and the army driven into a retreat which became a rout. With the exception of six guns, the entire French artillery was taken. The victory cost the allies 1,000 killed and some 2,600 wounded; the French and Bavarians lost 12,000 to 15,000 men killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters. Their confidence and discipline were shattered.

After several futile efforts to rally, the defeated army dispersed among the fortresses of the French frontier. Brabant lay at the feet of the victor. Antwerp and Dendermonde were the only places of importance in Brabant which had not surrendered within eleven days of the battle. On June 6 Antwerp, a fortress of such strength that its investment had been proposed by the States-general in 1703 as the sole objective of the campaign, opened its gates, the French garrison being allowed to march out with the honours of war. In the opinion of military experts it would have been feasible for Marlborough at this abysmal crisis of the fortunes of France for the relief of Barcelona had taken place on May 12 and the French troops had been driven out of Spain-to have marched straight upon Paris. But it would have been idle for him to propose such an enterprise to the Statesgeneral. Now that Flanders and Brabant were assured to

"That post was attacked very furiously by chiefly stranger troops, except Churchil's and Mordaunt's regiments, who have suffered greatly." Lord Orkney, Engl. Hist. Rev., xix., 315.

2" My Lord Marlbro' was rid over." Ibid.

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