executive authority in any suggested constitution. The continual encroachment of the House of Commons, by means of questions addressed to Ministers and by motions, on the domain of the executive, may seriously raise the question whether, in regard to some of the departments of State there ought not to be a change in our own arrangements. We are apt to forget under what peculiar and exceptional conditions an executive, all the chief members of which are liable to be changed as a consequence of a division of the popular House on a question involving probably only one department, or, perhaps, simply some change in private law, has been able to discharge its duties with the measure of success which it has attained. The difficulty of devising any plan analogous to the American method, so long as the Lord-Lieutenant is appointed by the Crown, is considerable; for it must be remembered that the President of the United States derives his power from election.

But it may be taken as practically certain that any scheme on the lines of the Bill in question would result in the creation of a Ministry responsible to the Irish Legislature in the same way as the Ministers of Victoria or Canada are responsible to the Legislatures of those colonies. What would be the position of such an Irish Ministry in regard to the Imperial executive? It seems to be assumed by many of the opponents of the Bill that the Lord-Lieutenant would be in a precisely

similar position to the Irish Cabinet as the Sovereign, according to current theories, is to the English Cabinet; but this appears to be inaccurate. The position of the Lord-Lieutenant was dealt with in section 26 of the Bill, and it was there provided that his salary should be charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and that the expenses of his household and establishment should continue to be defrayed out of moneys to be provided by Parliament; and also that the existing powers vested by Act of Parliament or otherwise in the Chief Secretary for Ireland might, if no such officer be appointed, be exercised by the Lord-Lieutenant until other provisions should be made by Act of the Irish Legislature; and further, that the Legislature of Ireland should not pass any Act relating to the office or functions of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. There was nothing in the Bill to alter the status or diminish the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant; no section varied his position in regard to the Sovereign, or in regard to any of the departments of the English executive. So far as the clauses of the Bill were concerned, he might occupy a seat in any future Imperial Cabinet. But in moving for leave to bring in the Bill, Mr. Gladstone said that "he "—the Lord-Lieutenant-"would not be the representative of a party. He would not quit office with the outgoing Government.” He would therefore, according to the scheme, be a Viceroy in a position analogous to that of the Viceroy of India and a Governor-General

of Canada; and his powers would depend on the commission issued to him. According to the usage of the Constitution, all instructions from the Queen to him would have to be sent through one of the great executive departments, and on the responsibility of one of the Ministers-probably the Prime Minister. It is perfectly true that the Prime Minister, whether he be First Lord of the Treasury, or Foreign Secretary, or Lord President of the Council, might have no legal right to dictate to the Lord-Lieutenant what his course should be in regard to any matters in which, as the servant of the Queen, he would possess discretionary power. But the same observation is true of the relations between the Prime Minister and the English Secretary of State for the Home Department, or any of the other Secretaries of State. The power, such as it is, of the Prime Minister over his Cabinet is not a power given to him directly by law, but it is possessed by him with the indirect sanction of the law, through his control of the House of Commons, and through the maxims or usages of the Constitution. The sanction or force of these maxims or usages consists in this, that if any minister disregards them his position ultimately becomes untenable, because to hold it he will have to violate some rule of law, and any such violation of the law will subject him to its ordinary penal ties; or, if this is inadequate or inapplicable, to impeachment by the House of Commons.

This position of the Lord-Lieutenant, as an officer under the immediate control of the English Cabinet, would be of great importance in the preservation of the actual sovereignty of the Imperial Government. His powers under the Bill proposed would be very extensive. He would have a veto upon every Bill of the Irish legislative body, and he would be bound to use that veto in accordance with the instructions of the Imperial Cabinet, and if he were to disobey their instructions he would be responsible to them and to the Imperial Parliament; for by section 7, subsection 2 of the Bill, it was provided that he should exercise the veto subject to any instructions which might from time to time be given by her Majesty. Now it is one of the commonplaces of constitutional practice that the Queen can only act upon the advice of some responsible Minister, and therefore the instructions referred to in the sub-section just cited must be instructions given upon the responsibility of some Minister, whether the First Lord of the Treasury or the Colonial Secretary.

Under this scheme, then, the position of the LordLieutenant would be very like that of a Colonial Governor. His relations to the Irish Cabinet would be much the same as those of a Governor to a Colonial Ministry. Probably the actual influence of the Crown confidentially exercised over the Imperial Cabinet is greater than is popularly supposed; but certainly the power which can be exercised by a Colonial Governor

of ability and tact over a Colonial Ministry is very real and considerable.*

Let us consider next what would be the position of the Lord-Lieutenant in regard to those armed forces upon which in case of insurrection any Government has to rely. By section 3, sub-section 3, of the Bill, the Legislature of Ireland was precluded from making any laws relating to the army, navy, militia, volunteers, or other military or naval forces. Consequently the Irish executive could not obtain any authority from the Irish Legislature to create any force subject to such regulations as are absolutely necessary for the government of the army. Even the continuance of the Royal Irish Constabulary, or of a force similar to it, would be beyond the competence of that body. No Mutiny Act could be legally passed. The Imperial Executive would, therefore, according to the Bill, either through the Lord-Lieutenant or not as it may please, control the numbers and the distribution of any military force which it may be deemed expedient to maintain in Ireland. By section 21, sub-section B, of the Bill, the Royal Irish Constabulary, which is to all intents and purposes an army, was to "continue and be subject as heretofore to the control of the LordLieutenant, as representing her Majesty." Though the construction of this sub-section is not quite clear, it is submitted that it would be found that in the

See as to this, Mr. Todd's "Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies," c. 5.