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direction and use of this force the Lord-Lieutenant would in no wise be subject to the control of the Irish Ministry as to it, but to the control of the English Cabinet. The only police forces which could be created in Ireland would be purely local bodies and under the control of local authorities. It follows then, from the consideration of the scheme, that the only organised armed forces that could lawfully exist in Ireland would be subject, not to the discretion of Ministers answerable to the Legislature of Ireland, but to the Lord-Lieutenant or other officer whom the British Ministry might appoint.

The conclusion therefore to be drawn from the consideration of this Bill, in the light of what has been before said, is that the control of the English Cabinet over Irish affairs-so far, that is, as they are matters we be of Imperial concern-would not be sensibly diminished keme by the changes which would take place should this Bill become law.

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§ 5. THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL AUTHORITY.

There is one other function of sovereignty which in the consideration of any scheme of Irish government has to be taken into account, and that is the position of the judicial authority. In England the separation between the judicial and the executive power is toler

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ably complete, though it has yet to be proved how far
the existing laws in regard to the matter would stand
the test of very embittered party action, or deter-
mined attempts, on the part of a large section of the
population to resist the ordinary course of judicial
decrees. The judges of England, since the Bill of
Rights, hold their offices during good behaviour, and
are only removable upon the address of both Houses
of Parliament. Now, by the Bill in question a similar
provision was made by section 27 in reference to
judges in Ireland; but it was provided that with
regard to one division of the High Court of Justice,
viz. the Exchequer Division, that it was to continue a
Court of Exchequer for revenue purposes, and that
when
any vacancy occurred in the office of any judge
of such division, his successor was to be appointed by
her Majesty, on the joint recommendation of the Lord-
Lieutenant of Ireland and the Lord Chancellor of Eng-
land. The effect of these provisions would be that
the Irish Legislature would, in determining how the
government of Ireland should be carried on, create
some office answering to a Ministry of Justice, in
which all the business transacted by the Lord High
Chancellor of Ireland and the other business pertain-
ing to the organisation of the judicial authority
would be transacted, and that the appointment of the
Irish judges (except those of the Exchequer Division)
would take place upon the recommendation of the
Minister of Justice. But upon their appointment the

judges would not be responsible to the executive Government, either individually or collectively, but would only be removable upon an address to her Majesty from both orders of the Legislature; and it is to be observed that even if both orders of the Legislature should coincide in asking for the removal of a judge, that the consent of her Majesty would also be required. This power of consenting to or refusing the removal of a judge is no doubt one of the prerogatives the exercise of which might be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant by her Majesty. If it is not so delegated, then the effect would appear to be this-the consent of the Queen to the removal of an Irish judge would have to be given through and by one of the members of the Imperial Cabinet. If it should be delegated, it would no doubt be contended that the Lord-Lieutenant would be bound to accept the advice of the Irish Ministry in regard to giving or withholding his consent to the removal of a judge. If, however, this prerogative be not delegated, the independence of the Irish Bench of the control of the Irish Ministry would be secured.

The most remarkable provision of the Bill as to the judicial authority was, however, that giving jurisdiction to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. * The practical subordination of the Irish Courts, and indeed the Irish Legislature, in case of any dispute as to the validity of Irish statutes, secured by the scheme

* See the 25th clause, providing for the decision of constitutional questions.

of Mr. Gladstone, has not received the attention which its importance warrants.

We have now briefly considered the nature of the executive and judicial authorities for the Government of Ireland which would have resulted from the passing of this Bill.

It might, perhaps, be urged that the Bill is defective because it did not more specifically and completely deal with and define the relations between the English and Irish executives, and those between officers or ministers of the Irish executive and the Lord-Lieutenant, as representing the Queen in Council. The answer to such criticism is that the Constitution of England itself is not a written Constitution; that the laws of this country have never been completely expressed in any code or Acts of Parliament; and that it would be almost impossible to create a constitutional code for Ireland without at the same time entering on the almost insuperable task of doing the same for Great Britain. The fact is, that the English Constitution has grown, and has not been made, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to write down what is the British Constitution at the present moment. "En Angleterre," said an acute observer of politics, "la constitution peut changer sans cesse; ou plutôt elle n'existe pas." Though the latter part of De Tocqueville's remark is not accurate from the lawyer's point of view-for the law does exist, and is ascertainable by the competent prac

titioner in most cases with reasonable certainty-yet the observation is substantially just, for the practical working of the political machine depends on many rules by which men allow themselves to be guided which are not rules of law recognised in the courts.

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6. THE ACTUAL EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME.

Such being the effect of the suggested scheme of Irish government from the purely legal point of view, we have to consider next whether it or any similar plan would diminish that control of Ireland, that effectiveness of sovereignty which, as has been shown above, is necessary to complete the true conception of a united empire.

It will be remembered that the very first condition of effective imperial supremacy is the maintenance of law and order in every province; and that where the form of government is democratic the creation of the law-abiding character on which the maintenance of law and order depend is only possible under at any rate the three conditions mentioned above.

In Ireland at the present time it is only too clear that the law is obeyed and respected only by a small proportion of the people. The existing government and the existing body of rulers are out of harmony with the views of the bulk of the community. The English laws are not deemed just; the Imperial Parliament, which is the source of their authority,

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