concession made must be such as fairly meets the requirements of that party and affords satisfaction to the No half-and-half measure of local So also no half-and-half measure To give the Irish members a

national sentiment. government will do. of coercion will do.

place in the House of Commons and to expel them when they carry out the wishes of their constituents,

to give the franchise to the Irish people and at therical & same time to pass for their governance Peace Preser-alsund en vation Acts and Coercion Acts affecting the primary

constitutional rights, is illogical and absurd, and, as experience shows, is useless.

There is, however, a method of government which, so far as the mere preservation of order in Ireland is concerned, might be superficially successful. That method is the government of Ireland as a Crown colony. Let the legislature give to an Irish Council nominated by the Crown absolute powers of legislation for Ireland, let Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament be suspended, let the Council have the control of an army of 30,000 men, and it is probable that before long such a government might produce quiet in Ireland; but the quiet so produced would not be the peace of an orderly, progressive, and civilised people, but the peace of premature decay and national death. So far as one can see, that is the only policy of coercion which is likely to succeed. Such a policy is not openly advocated even by Lord Salisbury, and it has no practical chance of adoption

by the English people. Assuming then, as most thoughtful writers seem to do, that Home Rule in some form is inevitable, the first question that is asked about any suggested scheme is naturally, Does it impair the unity of the Empire?

Mr. Gladstone in introducing his Bill laid it down as an essential condition of any plan that Parliament could be asked or could be expected to entertain, that the unity of the Empire must not be placed in jeopardy; the safety and welfare of the whole, if there should be an unfortunate conflict, which he did not believe, must be preferred to the security and advantage of a part. Now it so happens that most of the speeches delivered by those who were opposed to the scheme of the Government mainly rested on an attempt to prove that this condition was not fulfilled. And it happened also, as might indeed have been expected, that much of the argument against the Bill depended on the legal and constitutional effect of its different clauses. I propose to inquire whether the scheme of Irish government disclosed in the Bill satisfied the test to which Mr. Gladstone voluntarily submitted it.

It may perhaps be objected that such an inquiry is useless because of the result of the general election. But very little consideration will convince any one who attempts to think in what form Home Rule can be granted, that any scheme which is likely to command the assent of the Irish members,

and at the same time does not involve very sweeping changes, not only in the relations of Great Britain and Ireland, but in the form and law of the whole constitution, must follow the "main outlines" of the Gladstone-Morley Bill. Stated very generally, the effect of the Bill would have been 'to create in Ireland a subordinate government for Irish affairs of the same type as the governments of those colonies which have representative institutions and responsible governments. It adopted the division of political powers into legislative, executive, and judicial; and seemed to intend that the relations of these powers in Ireland should be similar to those which exist in the Imperial government. If this type be departed from, it will be found that either the new Irish government will be little more than a mere local government, or that great changes in the constitutional law of the Empire must be made.

But in any case the Bill is a useful "draft for discussion," and the inquiry whether it did or did not impair the unity of the Empire illustrates the principles on which the solution of the same problem in regard to any other Bill or new scheme must depend.

§ 1. THE UNITY OF THE EMPIRE.

In making the inquiry which I have mentioned as the purpose of this essay, it is necessary to give to the

term "Unity of the Empire" some more precise meaning than it has in ordinary conversation. The word "empire" and the ideas it has from time to time connoted have played a great part in political history. But we need not now concern ourselves with tracing back its meaning to its application to the special powers of certain Roman magistrates. An empire now means either the territories governed by a person styled emperor," or more generally any extensive political dominion. The ideas which upon analysis it involves are these:

(I.) It is a society of men permanently established for a political end by common subjection to some sovereign authority.

(II.) It possesses a definite territory.

(III.) It is independent of external control, i.e. its sovereign authority is not subject to any other political authority.

These three ideas are essential; but they are common to the conception of an empire and any other sovereign state. As generally used, the term empire is only applied to sovereign states large in point of population and extent of territory, with a monarchical form of government, generally having under their control subordinate states.

Now if this analysis is considered, it will be found that the unity of an empire in the last resort depends on the common subjection of all its members to a supreme political authority. It is this subjection

which forms the connecting link between all its parts. The rules of conduct which the Sovereign lays down are laws, and a common obligation to obey these laws is the most salient tie between the different men coming within the scope of the Imperial authority. Identity of laws is not necessary; for the Sovereign may enact one set of laws for one part and another set for another part of the Empire. It is, then, a legal bond which unites an empire. Common subjection to a sovereign authority is the mark which distinguishes an empire or state in modern times from other societies of men.

These remarks are of course elementary to the jurist trained in the school of Austin; but it is very surprising to observe how little they are understood or borne in mind by those who attempt to enlighten the public mind on political questions, and for that reason it has been deemed well to state them clearly at the outset. If this analysis is applied to the British Empire, it will be found that the Unity of the Empire really means the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. But for practical purposes it is, owing to the peculiar theories of the Constitution, better to amplify the matter a little and say that the Unity of the Empire means:—

(I.) That allegiance is due from all British subjects to her Majesty.

(II.) That all executive and judicial power is derived from the Queen in Council.