against the United States for not altering their laws in order to expel or imprison the Irish agitators of New York, is strictly analogous to the angry feelings felt in the society of Vienna in regard to our own Government for allowing London to become the home of the Italian refugee. When the moment of Italian triumph came the London conspirator vanished, and when Home Rule is given to Ireland the Irish-American plotter will disappear. A national movement of the kind in question often attracts to it unselfish fanatics and unprincipled adventurers. The fanatic descends to evil deeds because he loses his self-control, and the adventurer is glad to shelter his wickedness under the goodness of the cause; when victory comes both are forgotten. This Irish agitation will probably be no exception to the rule; and those who will obtain the confidence of the Irish people, when it is successful will not be the Irishmen of New York.

The conclusion to which these considerations point is that the large measure of self-government which would be conferred by Mr. Gladstone's proposals would result in the gradual creation of a law-abiding national character in Ireland, and the formation of a Government as strong and wise as is possible under democratic institutions, and that the real control of the Imperial Government would be thereby increased. It is frankly conceded that these hopes are founded on a favourable view of the potentialities of the Irish character. But it is also urged that

if they are falsified the position of England is not materially weakened. If the Nationalist demands should be persisted in, if the point should be reached at which the patience of British statesmanship is exhausted, and the only resource is an appeal to arms, the arrangements under Mr. Gladstone's scheme are such as to make our success a foregone conclusion.

7. THE EXCLUSION OF THE IRISH MEMBERS.

No part of the Bill of Mr. Gladstone has excited more general discussion than the provision of section 24 for the exclusion of the Irish members from the Imperial Parliament. Upon the principles laid down above, this section would in no wise affect the legal position of Parliament; and its importance, as bearing on the future relations of Ireland with the Empire, if it should become law, appears to be much exaggerated. The cessation of Irish representation as it now exists in the Imperial Parliament is the natural consequence of the creation of an Irish Government of the colonial type; for that Parliament, while sovereign for the Empire, is also the domestic Legislature of Great Britain, and the retention of Irish representation in any form must give rise to great, though not perhaps insuperable, difficulties. Assuming the Bill to pass, with the 24th section simply omitted and all absolutely necessary changes in the language of the

Bill made, the following are some of the anomalies and inconveniences which would arise:

(I.) The Irish members would be entitled to take part in legislating on purely English, Scotch, and Welsh affairs.

(II.) The Irish members would inevitably form opinions and take sides on matters in dispute in the Irish legislative body; and the parties thus formed would probably insist on fighting out these matters at Westminster as well as Dublin.

(III.) Some Irish members would constantly endeavour to criticise the acts of the Irish Ministry in power for the time being, and the conduct of the Lord-Lieutenant on matters arising out of his relation to that Ministry, in order that party capital might be made out of the debates they might manage to provoke.

(IV.) The temptation to English parties to bargain for the votes of Irish members on English issues would probably be too strong to be resisted, and to secure these votes the interference of the English Cabinet in questions which might be wholly settled at Dublin would be induced, and the settlement of Irish affairs be made more difficult.

(V.) The evils of the excitement of double elections would be great, and their expense an unbearable burden to Ireland.

(VI.) The strength of the Irish legislative body would be seriously diminished, and its importance as the source of law in the eyes of the Irish voters

lessened; for it would not be possible to secure the attendance of one hundred and three competent Irish representatives at Westminster without seriously reducing the number of fit members of the Dublin Legislature, and probably some of the men best qualified to sit in the latter body would prefer to come to the House of Commons.

On the other hand, if Irish representation entirely ceased, it is said that Ireland would lose all voice in regard to the sphere of legislation reserved to the Imperial Parliament and all control over the general affairs of the Empire. To this the reply is that the Irish members accept this loss with equanimity; that the condition of Ireland is such that her interests must and ought for years to be absorbed with her own local concerns; that the wishes of the Irish people would necessarily be taken into account by the English Cabinet in determining Imperial policy, and could always be ascertained with sufficient accuracy on the responsibility of the Dublin Cabinet; and that Ireland would be in no worse position than the colonies.

Again, it is urged that the retention of legislation as to customs and excise by the Imperial Parliament, and the collection of duties of that kind on its authority, infringe the principle that taxation and representation should go together. It must be admitted that principle is not adhered to by the proposed Bill. But the seriousness of the infraction is much diminished by the fact that the taxation

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would be indirect and in the form least overt and oppressive; that the taxes in question are imposed by acts permanent in the sense that they are not reenacted every year; * that the liability would be in the nature of a fixed charge on Ireland, the continuance of which was one of the conditions of the grant of Home Rule and the justice of which could not therefore be fairly disputed by any Irish Ministry. That some politicians might try to make a grievance of it is very likely, but whether the bulk of the Irish people would think it worth while to sustain them in their objections depends on much the same conditions as the question briefly discussed above of the permanency of a demand for independence. The probability is that Irish leaders would find it to their advantage to abstain from raising any cry about the matter; and even if they did not so abstain, a firm attitude on the part of the Imperial Government would be an answer the Irish Government would be forced to accept, unless they were willing to proceed into a hopeless struggle. It must not be forgotten too, that though the principle "that taxation and representation should go together," is as a rule sound, it has no necessary application to the relations of an Imperial and subordinate Government; and it is probable that if a federation of the British Empire is accomplished, its financial basis may rest on contributions in proportions levied by the federal administration on each state of the Union,

*See Customs Tariff Act, 1876. Stephen's Comm. ii. pp. 565 et seq.