conquered Babylon more than once. It was during one of these invasions, when treasures and spoils of war were brought from Babylonia to Susa, that the Hammurabi Stele was transferred. Modern history furnishes many parallels, as, for instance, when Napoleon took Berlin many trophies were transported to Paris; when, however, the triumphant Germans entered Paris these precious trophies were restored. It is also a noticeable fact that a greater number of objects of Babylonian than of Persian or Elamite origin were discovered in the ruins of Susa. But a word in regard to these explorations among the ruins of this old capital. They have been carried on for several years under the direction of that veteran archæologist, M. de Morgan, so well and favorably known by his remarkable discoveries in Egypt. But this last discovery of this French savant puts the capstone on his work, and places him in the very front rank of archæologists.

The monument or stele on which these laws were written or cut is a rude block of diorite slightly rounded at the top, nearly nine feet high and about seven feet wide. Both sides are inscribed. Hammurabi is represented as standing before Shamash, the sungod of Sippar, the ancient seat of the Hammurabi dynasty. The god is seated on his throne and is in the act of delivering this code to the king. Sixteen columns or lines are cut on the front side directly under the picture, and twenty-eight on the obverse. Unfortunately, five lines have been erased, so that it is impossible even to guess at their contents. Why and when this erasure was effected is also a matter of conjecture. The code as it stands contains two hundred and eighty-two distinct laws. Of these about two hundred and fifty are easy to decipher, and their probable meaning has been ascertained.

From the following extract from the code bearing his name the reader may form some idea of the esteem in which Hammurabi held himself: "When Anu, the majestic, the king of the Annunaki, and Bel, the Lord of Heaven and Earth, who established the fate of the land, had given to Marduk (Merodach), the ruling son of Ea (god of the waters), dominion over terrestrial man, it was then that Anu and Bel called me, Hammurabi, the majestic prince, who feared God, by name, in order that I might see that righteousness prevailed over the land, and that I might annihilate the wicked and the sinful, so that the strong should not prevail over or hurt the weak. . . . So that I might rule like Shamash over the black people, and give light to the land, and like Anu and Bel promote the welfare of mankind." The introduction, after a long enumeration of Hammurabi's good works and benevolent deeds, closes with the following: "When Marduk sent me to rule men, to protect the land with righteous laws, then did I proclaim righteousness and justice, and worked for the welfare of my subjects." The code has not only a lengthy introduction, but also an extended epilogue, which is like

wise quite laudatory in tone. Let these sentences speak for themselves: "Laws which Hammurabi, the wise king, decreed. He taught the land a righteous law and a pious statute. I am Hammurabi the king, who protects. I have explained difficult passages, and have thrown light upon them. I have caused pros

perity to reign over the land, and made the homes secure, and have not tolerated any disturbance of the peace. The great gods have called me. I am the shepherd, bringing salvation. . . . I have set up in Babylon before my image, as King of Justice, these my precious words written upon my monument, so that the strong may not injure the weak, and that the orphans and the widows might be protected. My words are well studied, my wisdom is beyond compare."

The Hammurabi Code, according to a conservative estimate, is eight hundred years older than the Hebrew legislation of the Pentateuch, yet in spite of this fact the Babylonian Code is in many instances much more elaborate than the Hebrew. The former is par excellence a civil and not a religious code. This accounts to a great degree for the fact that the Pentateuch is pervaded with a kindlier spirit, a higher type of morality, and a diviner authority, as well as a more humane regard for life. An awful severity permeates the Hammurabi Code. The rights and privileges of the strong are more pronounced than those of the weak. "The Hammurabi Code represents the enactments of a tyrant guided by a surprisingly high sense of justice, and influenced by a beneficent purpose; while the Old Testament contains the laws of an essentially democratic people, dominated not only by an exalted idea of justice, but also by a genuine love for humanity," at least as far as Israel was concerned. The difference between the two codes will be explained in two ways. The liberal critic will see in them a natural development of moral and religious sentiments, between the age of Hammurabi, 2250 B. C., and the date of the Priestly Code, about 500 B. C., while the more conservative critics will continue to see a higher degree of inspiration in the Pentateuch than in the Babylonian Code. A classification of these two hundred and eighty-two laws is not difficult, though we shall not attempt it at present. They cover the more common laws governing the everyday life of a people in relation to each other as well as to their rulers. The code opens with four laws against slander or false testimony. Then follows a stringent law against corrupt judges. The penalty for rendering false or corrupt judgment was quite severe. In case of a fine imposed by the judge unjustly the penalty was twelve times the fine imposed by the judge and his removal from the bench in disgrace. The death penalty was inflicted in a multitude of cases, as, for stealing sacred property or robbing temples (6, 8),* for selling or buying stolen goods (9, 10), for kidnaping (14), stealing (15) or harboring a runaway slave (16, 19), burglary (21), highway robbery (22), for refusing to

serve in the army (26-33), for conspiracy (109), for adultery of certain kind (129), for rape (130), for incest (155, 157), for building a house insecurely and which falls upon anyone and resulting in his death (229, 230). A wife who deserted her husband was likewise put to death (133, 145). There was a gradation of punishment, depending largely upon the social rank, especially of the one injured or killed. We can best illustrate this by inserting the following laws in full:

"If anyone strike the body of a person superior to himself, he shall receive sixty blows in punishment, and that with a rawhide whip in public" (202).

"If a freeborn man strike a person of like rank he shall be fined one gold mina" (203).

"If a freedman strike another freedman he shall be fined ten shekels in ready cash" (204).

"If the slave of a freedman strike a freedman his ear shall be cut off" (205).

The laws governing surgeons are quite unique. If a surgeon should successfully operate upon the eye of a freeborn man he was paid ten shekels (215), but if the patient were a freedman the fee was only five shekels (216), and only two in case of slaves (217). If, however, the surgeon should fail to save the eye, or should kill the patient, then his hands were cut off (218). In case the patient killed were a slave, the surgeon was not deprived of his hands, but simply had to replace the slave (219), and in case he destroyed the eye of a slave the fine imposed was one half what said slave was worth (220). If a veterinary surgeon should successfully operate upon an ox or an ass his fee was one sixth of a shekel (224), but should he kill the animal, then he had to pay one fourth its value (225).

There are more than forty laws regulating labor. Who shall then say that capital or labor were ever quite harmonious? The duties and pay of various laborers are clearly defined and stipulated. It seems that the pay was often in kind rather than in cash. An ordinary farmhand received eight gur of corn a year (257). The gur was probably the same as the Hebrew kor, or cor, about ten bushels. An ox-driver received six gur of corn a year (258). A farmhand convicted of stealing had his hands cut off (261). If he killed any animal intrusted to his care he had to pay for the same (263). If, however, the animal was accidentally killed, as by lightning or wild beasts, the herdsman was not held responsible (266). A day-laborer was paid six gerahs a day when the days were long, that is, from April to August, and five gerahs during the shorter days (273). In another article we shall point out the chief points of agreement between the Mosaic legislation and the Hammurabi Code.

*The numerals above used refer to the number of the law in the code.

FOREIGN OUTLOOK.

SOME LEADERS OF THOUGHT.

Heinrich Lhotzky. In the sense of intellectual leadership he would not belong here, although he does not lack intellectuality. He is to be reckoned as a leader in that he has ventured to depart from the beaten paths in theology. In a recent volume entitled Der Weg zum Vater. Ein Buch für werdende Menschen (The Way to the Father. A Book for those who are Becoming Human), Leipzig, Verlag der Grünen Blätter, 1902, he has undertaken to treat Christ as "The Way" without meddling in the theological controversies of the times. It is truly pleasing to find some one who thinks of Christ in these days as the chief factor in the religious life rather than as an object of controversy. The questions that revolve around the person of Christ are intensely interesting, and it is a strong temptation to deal with them because they are also important. But meanwhile the great purpose of Christ in the world is overlooked and the hearts of the spiritually hungry go unfed. Lhotzky well says that the life of Jesus, as such, has but little value for us; but that the course of his development, his disposition, his spirit, are significant. He is valuable to us as the one who discloses the way to the Father and who was the first to walk in that way. In order that he may not divert attention from Christ as the Way he declines to follow the modern critical method, and equally he avoids the traditional dogmatic method. All those, therefore, who take more pleasure in the discussion of Christological problems than they do in humbly following the way marked out by the teaching and example of Jesus will be dissatisfied with this book. And indeed it is impossible to accept Christ as the Way without some kind of presuppositions concerning his Person. But it is equally true that these presuppositions need not be consciously formulated or even present and self-consistent; much less need they be brought into prominence. Furthermore, if they are made prominent they hinder the proper use of the Way. This is true whether we consider the ordinary orthodox views of the Person of Christ or the newer critical view. Jesus was not a problem to be solved, but a leader to be followed. The truly religious Christian must exercise some intellectual self-restraint. He must follow Christ blindly, at least in some degree-he must follow even though he does not comprehend. The complete, or even the relatively complete, understanding of the Person of Christ may not be made a condition of following him. And, in fact, much of our assumption to the contrary savors rather of intellectual pride and obstinacy than of intellectual integrity, for we make no such demands upon ourselves in any other practical concern. And

Lhotzky points out that these questionings are often the result of a certain indelicacy, if not of impertinence and even impudence, on our part; for, as he says, those very people, persons who profess to have Jesus as their constant companion, do not hesitate to discuss in the most open manner the question of his supernatural conception. Yet any questionable fact concerning the birth of any other companion we would not think of considering in his presence. Lhotzky is on the right track. It is high time that this critical age should return, not to the age of dogma, for that is just as unfruitful, but to the age when, while the Christian undoubtedly had his doctrine concerning the Person of Christ which was necessary either as a conscious or unconscious justification to his intellect, he did not emphasize it, but took Christ for what he wanted to be taken for-the Way to the Father. That age was the age of the apostles and of Christ himself.

Herman Schell. It is always interesting to watch the methods of thought of those whose standpoint is widely diverse from our own. Schell has recently given us an opportunity to see how the Romanist differs from the Protestant in the defense of the faith. In 1901 he published the first volume of a work entitled Religion und Offenbarung (Religion and Revelation), in which he gives us his conception of the task and the methods appropriate for Christian apologetics. The first thing that strikes attention is that he defends the Romanist bondage to ecclesiastical authority. He says that there is no such thing as absolutely free investigation, but that, given a definite training resulting in a bias of mind, the outcome of one's thinking may be predicted. For example, Haeckel passes for a free investigator. He has no external authority to determine his conclusions, and yet no one expected his Welträthsel to be different from what it was. Schell is evidently in error, however, when he thinks that Haeckel is no more free than himself. Haeckel is unquestionably a dogmatist, and as such he is no more to be trusted than any other dogmatist. But he is what he is by his own volition, not by the volition of an organization to which he belongs. This cannot be said of the Romanist investigator, who reaches conclusions, not as the result of his own bias, but as a consequence of being limited by an external authority to such conclusions. Schell thinks also that he differs in no sense from the Protestant apologist in point of freedom, since the latter seeks to establish Protestant conclusions. Here again he is in error. There are two classes of Protestant apologists. One has a personal faith which is the result of his own reflection, and his apologetic consists in setting forth the grounds of this personal faith. Another sets out to examine and weigh all proposed religious phenomena, and in the process those that appear unworthy are sifted out, while those that appear worthy are upheld. It is a process of investigation pure and simple. But neither class need be, by Protestant prin