under the powers supposed to be conferred on them by those Acts.

It appears that notice had been given to the plaintiffs, by the Commissioners, of their intention to take the houses in question, and that they were proceeding to have the value of the premises ascertained by a jury; and the application made to the ViceChancellor was to stop all proceedings. The VICE-CHANCELLOR'S order was confined to their proceeding to summon, and lay the case before a jury, his Honour declining to carry the injunction any further.

The present application, on the part of the Commissioners, is to dissolve that injunction; and, on the other hand, the plaintiffs have given a notice of motion for the purpose of extending the injunction to the other objects which the Commissioners had in view, and particularly of restraining the defendants from taking possession of the premises in question.

Two grounds were laid in support of the application. The first was, that, under the Acts of Parliament, the Commissioners had no authority to take the premises in question: the second was, that, assuming they had such authority, still, inasmuch as, according to the plaintiffs' statement, it appeared they had not funds applicable to the purpose, they ought to be restrained by this Court from exercising the legal right, supposing them to have such right.

[Upon the first point his Lordship agreed with the VICECHANCELLOR that the Commissioners had the power they assumed. The judgment then proceeded as follows:]

It was argued, however, that, although they have the legal power, and although they are within the provisions of the Acts, and although the time has not gone by within *which they are to exercise the power, still they ought to be prevented from doing so, because there do not appear to be funds in their hands, that is to say, now in their hands, immediately applicable to this purpose, so as to enable them to carry their proposed compulsory purchase into effect. The VICE-CHANCELLOR clearly does not understand the object and effect of his order to be to prevent the Commissioners from proceeding at all times, but merely to prohibit this at the present time; because he contemplates

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some other mode of proceeding, some other means of procuring money, and suggests the propriety of their making a rate before they complete the purchase, in order partly to have the question raised upon the legality of the rate, and partly to put themselves in possession of funds by means of which they may be enabled to carry the purchase into effect. His Honour granted an injunction to restrain the Commissioners from proceeding to have the value of the premises assessed before a jury.

In support of his view, the VICE-CHANCELLOR referred to two cases before Lord Eldon, The Mayor of King's Lynn v. Pemberton (1), and Agar v. The Regent's Canal Company, which is mentioned in the note to that case (2). In the judgment of Lord ELDON in The Mayor of King's Lynn v. Pemberton, we have a statement by Lord ELDON himself of the ground on which he proceeded in the case of Agar v. The Regent's Canal Company. Lord ELDON there (3) said, "In the case of Agar v. The Regent's Canal Company, I acted on the principle that, where persons assume to satisfy the Legislature that a certain sum is sufficient for the completion of a proposed undertaking, as a canal, and the event is that that sum is not nearly sufficient, if the owner of an estate through which the Legislature has given to the speculators a right to carry the canal, can show that the persons so authorised are unable to complete their work, and is prompt in his application for relief, grounded on that fact, this Court will not permit the further prosecution of the undertaking." His Lordship then refers to another case which does not appear to me to have any application to the present. His words are, "So, in another case, a Mr. Taylor filed his bill, stating that, at the time of subscribing, he expected that, when he had paid the whole of his instalments, he should find the canal complete; but that, with the present fund, it would not pass to the east of Hampstead; and the Court thought him entitled to relief." That must have been upon the ground of misrepresentation or fraud practised on the party purchasing a share in the canal, and does not appear to me to be applicable.

The case of Agar v. The Regent's Canal Company, however, (3) 18 R. R. 68 (1 Swanst, 250),

(1) 18 R. R. 62 (1 Swanst. 244).

(2) See also 14 R. R. 217.

undoubtedly lays down a principle which may be extremely important in its application; and I apprehend Lord ELDON must have gone upon this ground, that where Acts of Parliament impose certain severe burthens on individuals, by interfering with their private rights and private property, for the purpose of obtaining some great public good, if the Court sees that the undertaking cannot be completed, and therefore that the public cannot derive that benefit which was to be the equivalent for the sacrifice made by the individual, the Court will protect the individual from being compelled to make that sacrifice, under the circumstances, and until it appears that the public will derive the proposed benefit from it. It is impossible to suppose Lord ELDON could have meant that, after an Act of Parliament has been passed giving certain powers, and authorising a body of persons to carry on certain works, those against whose rights such works are to be carried into effect are to come into this Court and say, "We will undertake to prove that you cannot, with the money which you have in hand, carry those works into effect;" and that therefore, and immediately, in that state of circumstances, the Court is to interfere. If that were so, it is quite obvious that, not a single bill passes the Legislature, authorising the formation of a railway or a canal, but would be brought immediately into this Court; thus making it the duty of the Court to investigate the probable expense of the speculation; and if it appeared that the money which the parties had at the time would not enable them-as in those cases, generally, it would not enable them-to carry their speculation into effect, the Court would be called upon to say they should be prohibited from going on with it altogether.

The consequence would be, that this Court would be assuming to itself a power which would be neither more nor less than the repealing of an Act of Parliament. Lord ELDON, it is clear, could never have meant that; and he must, therefore, be supposed to have put his decision on the ground I have referred to. In the case of The Mayor of King's Lynn v. Pemberton, it appears that the defendants were not working on any land belonging to the plaintiffs; and Lord ELDON refused the injunction. One reason stated in answer to the application was, that, although there

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SALMON appeared to be a deficiency of funds to enable the Company to RANDALL. Complete their work, they were applying to Parliament to get further powers-not that they had obtained further powers, but that they were applying for them. Lord ELDON upon that observed, "A peculiarity in this case is the pending application to Parliament." I do not perceive *how that could make any difference, because it is open to all companies, and to all parties, to apply to Parliament. If they got a new Act, that might alter the case; but how the circumstance of the parties applying to Parliament was to give them a right which they would not have if they had not been making that application, I confess I do not understand. I cannot but think that, on further consideration, Lord ELDON was disposed to limit, and felt the necessity of limiting, the proposition which he is supposed to have laid down in Agar v. The Regent's Canal Company.

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The question then is, assuming the rule to be as Lord ELDON is supposed to have laid it down in the case of Agar v. The Regent's Canal Company, what application it has to the present. The principle of that case, taking it in the way assumed, was, not that the Company had no power to purchase the land they proposed to purchase, but that they did not appear to have the means of carrying into effect the whole of the plan they had projected; and that, therefore, the ground on which they acted in taking from the individual the right of dominion over his own property, could not be supported; and the consideration failed. Now what analogy has that to the present case? There is no one individual object to be accomplished here: the powers of this Act are for a variety of objects, all tending to the same effect. There is no one defined purpose to be carried into effect; but the Commissioners are, from time to time, to be at liberty to exercise their powers for the purpose of widening and improving the streets of Cambridge. Every purchase they make, every house they take down, is a distinct work in itself, and to that extent accomplishes the object. The principle, therefore, of Lord ELDON'S observations does not, as it strikes me, apply in the p slightest degree to the present case. *If Lord ELDON had laid it down that, wherever a public body of this description, wherever commissioners or an incorporated company propose to purchase

or take any particular property, the Court will see beforehand, before the contract is complete, before the sum to be paid is ascertained, not only that they have the means of paying for the property so proposed to be purchased or taken, but that the money which they have, and mean to apply for the purpose, is raised according to a particular mode prescribed by the Act of Parliament, then such a proposition would come up to the present case. But no such proposition is laid down by his Lordship; and it would be quite a new principle to contend that a party who is under an obligation to sell his property, either under the provisions of an Act of Parliament or otherwise, has a right to ask the purchaser-where do you get the money from, with which you are to pay for the property you are purchasing of me?

The clauses which enable the Commissioners to complete the purchase provide that, upon payment of the sum awarded by the jury, they are to have a conveyance; that, upon the conveyance being made, they are to have a right of entry after a certain notice; and the means of payment would naturally flow from those powers which they are, by force of the Acts of Parliament, authorised to put in execution for the purpose of raising the money. But no authority is to be found, either in those Acts of Parliament or in any decision, for holding that a party, being compelled to sell his property, has a right to put to the purchaser any such question as I have just mentioned. It is not pretended that the seller has any interest in the source from which the money comes; but the argument is, that, being an owner of premises which the Commissioners wish to buy, he has a right to say “You *shall not purchase my premises except with money raised in a particular way under the Act of Parliament;" and that is the very ground on which the plaintiff, Mr. Salmon, has resisted this purchase.

No doubt the power to raise the money is extremely important, in determining the extent to which the right to purchase goes. The argument may be very sound, that if the power to raise money is limited, the right to purchase ought not to be carried beyond the power given to raise the money for the purchases by means of which the objects of the Acts of Parliament are to be

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