SALMON V. RANDALL. [ *449 ] effected. But that is not the question here: the question is, assuming the power of purchasing to be within the provisions of the Acts, has the vendor a right to say, "Let me know exactly where the money comes from, and how it was got, which you mean to apply in completing this purchase?" The cases cited have a reference to no such right, and proceed on totally different principles. Now, although there is, on the affidavits, very great difficulty in ascertaining how the Commissioners are, within a reasonable period, to raise the money for completing this purchase, yet I do find that there is a power to raise money. I know not what the value of the property may be: that is a matter of total uncertainty. The affidavits on the different sides differ extremely, as one might expect, with respect to the supposed value of the premises. I cannot tell what the jury may assess as their value; and I am equally unable to ascertain how much money the Commissioners may be able to raise by the 1s. rate, or by the 1s. rate and the 3d. rate, which they are authorised to raise, or by the tolls; all of which are within their power by the terms of the Acts of Parliament; and, according to the construction I put *upon the Acts of Parliament, whatever moneys may be raised in that way, and which they are authorised to raise, may be applied to the purposes of the Acts. I entirely abstain from going into the question, how far the Corporation or the University may be liable to contribute; but I find a power, beyond all doubt, vested in the Commissioners under the Acts of Parliament, by which they are enabled to raise money for these purposes, and I am left entirely in the dark as to what amount of money is required. What ground, then, is there for the interposition of this Court, to prevent the Commissioners from exercising their legal right? Assuming that the VICE-CHANCELLOR and myself are correct in our construction, there is no doubt that they have the power, and no question as to their legal right to purchase. They have given a notice; the Act of Parliament is imperative, that the jury shall assess the value; and the Commissioners must tender the value so assessed. The owner is to hold, until the value has been assessed by the jury, and the tender made: then, upon the tender, certain acts are to be done, which will vest the premises in the Commissioners; but till then the property remains in the owner, untouched. The order of the VICECHANCELLOR prevents them, therefore, from having the property vested in them, or acquiring the dominion over the premises; but it still leaves the parties in the situation of vendor and purchaser, inasmuch as the Commissioners have given the notice; and the VICE-CHANCELLOR's order cannot disturb the position of the parties. I find no authority in the cases referred to which distinguishes this case from any other in which parties are exercising a legal right. The parties, I conceive, are put into the situation of vendor and purchaser by the *notice (1); and like every other vendor and purchaser, they must of course complete their purchase, according to the provisions, not of the contract, but of those arrangements which the Act of Parliament has substituted in lieu of the contract, in a case where no contract can take place. It would, as it seems to me, be most inconvenient for both parties if the Court were to leave them in their present position; a position in which neither of them can interfere with the property, the notice effectually preventing them. It is vain for the owner of the property to suppose that he is at liberty to go on dealing with this land, and expending money upon it, as if it were his; because if the Commissioners complete their purchase, he is building not on his own land, but on the land of the Commissioners. It is impossible to say what view the jury may take of the matter; but I apprehend, that if they take a correct view, they will look at the situation of the property, and fix the value as it stood at the time when the notice was given; from which time it was the property of the Commissioners, and ceased to be the property of the vendor (1). While, therefore, it would be most inconvenient for the owner to be left in his present situation, it would be also most inconvenient for the Commissioners; because the only thing they could do would be to make a rate to enable them to complete the purchase of the property; which property they are, by the injunction of this Court, restrained from purchasing. (1) Le., for certain purposes, but the quasi contractual relation is not complete until the purchase-money SALMON v. RANDALL. [ *450 ] SALMON RANDALL. [ 451 ] If any case arises after the jury has assessed the value; if payment is not made; or if any other difficulty occurs, that will form the subject of a new and distinct case. I am only considering now how far the Court ought to interfere by injunction between the parties, to prevent the jury from assessing the value. I am of opinion that it is not only consistent with the rights under the Acts of Parliament, but the most convenient course for all parties, that the jury should go on to assess the sum at which the Commissioners may purchase these premises; and whether they can, or whether they cannot, purchase them, still it is necessary that the jury should tell them what the sum is which they will have to pay. Upon these grounds, I am of opinion that the order of the VICE-CHANCELLOR, for the injunction, should be discharged; and as the motion on the part of the plaintiffs for extending the injunction of course necessarily fails also, that motion must be Refused with costs. 1838. Feb. 8, 9. Nov. 13. Lord BOOTH v. LEYCESTER. (3 My. & Cr. 459–470.) [SEE the report of this case before the Master of the Rolls, COTTENHAM, 44 R. R. 75, 77 (1 Keen, 247) where a note of the judgment upon this appeal will be found.] L.C. 1838. Nov. 14. Lord COTTENHAM, L.C. ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. CORPORATION OF EAST RETFORD. (3 My. & Cr. 484-490.) [SEE a note of this appeal in 39 R. R. at p. 128, n. (2 My. & K. 39).] 1837. Nov. 24, 25. 1838. Nov. 17. Lord COTTENHAM, L.C. [490] CLOUGH v. BOND. (3 My. & Cr. 490-499; S. C. 8 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 51; 2 Jur. 958.) On the death of an intestate, administration to her estate was granted to her son and daughter. The daughter being then under coverture, the assets were, in May, 1831, paid into a banking house, to the joint account of her husband and her brother, the administrator; and the whole of the fund, with the exception of the share of one of the next of kin, who was abroad, was soon afterwards paid away among the several parties entitled, by means of cheques signed by the two persons in whose names the account stood. The husband of the administratrix died in December, 1831, and, ten months afterwards, her brother and co-administrator drew out the balance, and, having applied it to his own use, absconded: Held, that the estate of the husband of the administratrix was answerable for the loss. ANN DIXON died in the month of November, 1829, leaving certain testamentary papers, but intestate as to the bulk of her personal estate, which, therefore, became distributable among her next of kin, who were very numerous. Letters of administration, with the testamentary papers annexed, were granted to her two surviving children, Emily Bond, then the wife of John Bond, and Thomas Reup Dixon. The residuary estate consisted chiefly of Government stock. This stock *was sold in the month of May, 1831, and, with a view to distribution among the several persons entitled, the proceeds, to the amount of about 18,000l. were paid into the banking house of Child & Co., and there placed to an account in the joint names of John Bond and Thomas Reup Dixon. At the same time it was arranged that all cheques drawn on Child & Co. upon that account should be signed by both the parties in whose names the fund stood. In the course of a few months afterwards, the whole of the respective shares of the next of kin were duly paid or provided for, by means of cheques drawn in that form, except the share of Louisa Revell Clough, the wife of John Clough, who, with her husband, was then expected very shortly to return from India. The value of Mrs. Clough's share being one eighteenth of the clear fund, amounted, after deducting the duty and costs, to 9881. 6s. 8d.; and this sum, together with a further sum reserved to answer the expenses of administration, and making a total of 1,3481., remained in the hands of Child & Co., upon the joint account, down to the death of John Bond, which happened on the 15th of December, 1831. In the months of October and November in the following year, Thomas Reup Dixon drew out, by cheques, the balance of the account at Child's, and applied the money to his own use; and shortly afterwards he absconded and left the kingdom. Mr. and Mrs. Clough did not arrive in this country from India CLOUGH v. BOND. [ *491] CLOUGH v. BOND. [ *492 ] [494] 1838. Nov. 17. [495] Soon after their return they filed account of Ann Dixon's personal until the end of the year 1834. The decree of the VICE-CHANCELLOR, made at the hearing of the cause, after directing a general account of the estate, and an account of Mrs. Clough's share, went on to declare that the defendants, the personal representatives of John Bond, were personally chargeable with the sum of 1,3481., admitted by their answer to have been drawn out of Child's Bank by Thomas Reup Dixon, together with interest at 41. per cent. upon that sum from the time when the same was so drawn out. And it reserved the consideration of the question, how far the defendant Emily Bond was answerable for the said sum, until the Master should have made his report. The defendants, Emily Bond and the personal representatives of John Bond, appealed against this part of the decree. Mr. Jacob, Mr. Whitmarsh, and Mr. Whitmarsh, junior, for the appeal. * * * Mr. Wigram, and Mr. Walker, in support of the decree. * Mr. Jacob, in reply. [The principal cases cited by counsel are referred to in the judgment.] THE LORD CHANCELLOR : The facts of this case are short and simple. The question raised upon them is important in principle, but, in my opinion, not difficult of solution. The plaintiffs are, under the will of Ann Dixon, or, rather, as her next of kin, entitled to an interest in her personal estate. Letters of administration of the estate of Ann Dixon, with her |