BRICKELL v. HULSE. [ *457 ] Here the plaintiff on the application between the parties to the former proceeding: Fry v. Wood (1), LORD DENMAN, Ch. J.: It is very important that this question should not be left subject to doubt. There can, I think, be no question but that a statement which a party produces on his own behalf, whether on oath or not, becomes evidence against him. There is nothing to distinguish it from a statement made by the party himself. Rushworth v. The Countess of Pembroke (4) at first seems opposed to this view; for there the defendant was not permitted to use any of the depositions made in an equity suit, where the plaintiff had been defendant. That decision, however, was founded on the nature of the proceedings in equity. A party who uses such depositions does not know, beforehand, what they are (5): if he did, such cases would stand on the same footing as *the present. He can only refer to what he expects will be produced: it is like the case of a witness called at Nisi Prius, whose evidence does not bind the party calling him. It is quite different from a case where a party produces, as part of his own statement, an affidavit of which he knows the contents. PATTESON, J. : The statement in the affidavit was used by this defendant for the purpose of staying proceedings. Supposing the party swearing it had been in fact an officer who merely used the defendant's name, the defendant is identified with him as far as this question is concerned. When a party, for any purpose, produces a document containing certain statements, such statements are, as against him, evidence of the facts which they contain. (1) 1 Atk. 445. (3) 1 Mod. 284. (4) Hard. 472. (5) This appears to have been a misapprehension as to the practice of the Court of Chancery. See Taylor on Evidence, § 438.-R. C. WILLIAMS, J.: Suppose this had been the statement of the sheriff himself: then it would clearly be evidence against him. It would be unimportant whether or not the measure which he wished to adopt would avail him: the question would only be, What was the statement of facts on which he claimed relief? a statement is made on oath cannot affect the case. COLERIDGE, J.: That such This is a very clear case when we attend to the facts. On one side, the defendant makes an application to a Judge, and arms himself with a statement, which he makes his own, and uses. That is clearly evidence against him afterwards of the facts in the statement. The statement may be of more or less avail : and it may be matter of remark that the person making the affidavit is present and is not called. But that is not the question here. As to the depositions in Equity, they stand on the same footing with virá roce evidence given in a court of law. A man does not make all that is said by a witness whom he calls evidence against himself hereafter. In Chancery, the depositions are sealed up from the time of their being taken until publication passes. That is like the case of a party calling a witness, whose evidence he does not hear till it is given. The present is the case of a party using a statement which he has seen before he uses it, and which is neither the more nor the less admissible for being made upon oath. Rule refused. BRICKELL r. HULSE. [ *458 ] REG. v. GEORGE WATTS. (7 Adol. & Ellis, 461-471; S. C. 2 N. & P. 367; 7 L. J. (N. S.) M. C. 72.) Appeal lies against the accounts of an assistant overseer, unless there be any limitation, in the warrant of appointment, which prevents his being accountable to the parish. And where, in a case stated on appeal against such accounts, the Sessions find that the assistant executed all the duties of an overseer, this Court will intend that the warrant was before the justices in Sessions, and was not limited as above mentioned. The appeal against an overseer's account, under stat. 17 Geo. II. c. 38, R.R.-VOL. XLV. 48 1837. Nov. 8. [ 461 ] s. 4, must be made to the next practicable Sessions after the account is published; that is, after it has been deposited with the churchwardens and overseers for public inspection, and the fact of depositing bond fide made known. ON appeal against the account of George Watts, assistant overseer of the poor of the parish of Slimbridge, in the county of Gloucester, entitled, "An account of the disbursements of George Watts, assistant overseer from April 6th, 1834, to April 6th, 1835," and containing, among other things, the following items: Paid six months pay for maintenance of the poor, as £ s. d. 174 0 0 234 0 0 The Court ordered the said items to be struck out of the account, subject to the opinion of this Court upon the following case. The said George Watts was assistant overseer of the poor for the parish of Slimbridge, from the 6th of April, 1834, to the 6th of April, 1835, and executed all the duties of an overseer of the poor. On the 2nd of April, 1835, at a vestry meeting duly held, the said account of the said George Watts was examined and allowed by James Cornock and John French, churchwardens, George Greening, overseer, William Ludlow, James Smith, and John Bailey; and on the next day, being Friday the 3rd of the same month, the account was submitted to two justices of the peace for the county, at a special sessions holden at Wottonunder-Edge, for that purpose, and was by such justices signed and allowed. George Watts did not, however, deliver over his said account until the 8th of May following, when he delivered it in vestry to the churchwardens and the person who had been appointed assistant overseer to succeed him. An affidavit of the appellant (who was a rated inhabitant of the said parish), sworn in Court, was put in; and, after objection by the counsel for the respondents to its admissibility, was received by the Court. By this affidavit it appeared that the appellant had no actual knowledge of the account until the 23rd of April, 1835. The Easter Sessions for the county, if they had been held according to the ordinary course, would have commenced on Tuesday the 7th of April; but, in consequence of the Assizes, they were held on Tuesday the 14th of April, by an order made pursuant to stat. 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 47. By the rules of the Quarter Sessions for the said county, notice of trial of an appeal must be given on or before the Tuesday in the week preceding the Sessions; and, consequently, the last day for giving such notice for the said Easter Sessions was Tuesday the 7th of April. No notice of Appeal against the account was given for, nor was any appeal entered at, the said Easter Sessions: but notice was duly given for the Trinity Sessions holden in the month of June following. The questions for the opinion of the Court, were: -First, Whether, upon the evidence, the appeal was brought in due time? Secondly, Whether an appeal lies against the account of an assistant overseer? [After argument, the COURT took time for consideration.] LORD DENMAN, Ch. J., in this Term (November 25th), delivered the judgment of the COURT: Our opinion is asked by the Sessions on three points. 1. Whether appeal lies against the account of an assistant *overseer? 2. Whether the notice of appeal was given in due time? 3. Whether the appellant's affidavit was properly received by the Sessions to prove at what time he became acquainted with the allowance of the account by two justices of the peace? On the first point, we see no reason to doubt that an assistant overseer's account may be the subject of an appeal. He is not the servant of the churchwardens and overseers of the parish, but of the vestry, from whom he directly receives his authority; an authority which may indeed be limited by the warrant of appointment, but which does not appear to have been limited in the present case. The second point may admit of some difference of opinion, but seems capable of being decided on principles of reason and convenience. Some cases have held that the time of allowance by the justices of the peace is that from which the time for giving notice must be calculated: Rex v. Coode (1), Rex v. The field, 1 Bott, 310, pl. 291; S. C. Cald. (1) 1 Bott, 307, pl. 290, 6th ed.; S. C. Cald. 464. See Rex v. Mickle 507. Justices of Worcestershire (1). The language of some others may be thought to import that every parishioner's right to appeal is kept alive as long as he is personally ignorant of the fact of such allowance. A strict adherence to either of these rules might obviously produce injustice; nor do we think that the cases, when fairly considered with reference to their circumstances, lay down either the one or the other on the contrary, the Court must, on those occasions, have had the words of the statute 17 Geo. II. c. 38 [s. 4], in their contemplation, which gave the right of appeal to the party grieved, "giving *reasonable notice," to the next General or Quarter Sessions of the Peace. The Sessions have therefore to adjudge what notice is reasonable, which must depend on their usual practice. Still the word "next" applied to the Sessions requires an interpretation Next to what period? Not to the period of examination by the vestry before allowance, because the justices of the peace, upon their investigation and before allowance, may have struck out every item to which parishioners feel an objection: not to the allowance itself, because it may be unknown to all the parties interested: nor to the fact of knowledge by any one disposed to appeal, because that would lead to an inconvenient enquiry into the particular knowledge of individuals, and might keep the officer's account subject to appeal indefinitely. The only other period, to which recourse can be had for this purpose, is that when the parish had the opportunity of knowing the contents of the account. Thus in Rex v. Thackwell (2) the time for giving notice was held to be properly reckoned from the time when the account was allowed and published. We think it may be correctly described as published at the time when it is deposited (according to the first section of 17 Geo. II. c. 38) with the churchwardens and overseers for public inspection, and the fact of depositing bona fide made known. In the present instance, the Sessions have found that this was done on the 8th of May. Therefore the June Sessions, when the appeal was lodged, were the next Sessions; and the notice was in due time. This makes it immaterial to enquire whether the appellant's affidavit *of the time when he knew of the account (1) 17 K. R. 397 (5 M. & S. 457). (2) 4 B. & C. 62; 6 Dowl. & Ry. 61, |