only state which extends its jurisdiction to every country; and permits its citizens to bring foreigners before a French tribunal, although they have neither residence nor property in the realm; and no delay of trial takes place in favor of a foreigner, residing in his own country, if accused before a French tribunal by a citizen of France. (Code civil, art. 14.) This course is the more dangerous for foreigners, as it is possible for them to be summoned before the court, and condemned, without the slightest knowledge of what is going on. The summons is delivered to the state attorney, to be sent to the minister of foreign affairs, who transmits it through the diplomatic authorities to the accused. If the summons is delayed or miscarried (examples of which are known to have taken place) the trial still goes on; and the proceedings of the court, and the sentence it passes, lose nothing of their validity. If the stranger comes to France, or has property there, he may be immediately arrested and imprisoned, though a Frenchman could not be. (Law of Sept. 10, 1807.) The double injustice of this system appears from the fact, that the French do not acknowledge the jurisdiction of foreign tribunals in the case of their own countrymen, even though this be based on the universal principles of right. It is, therefore, very desirable that all governments should protect their subjects by strictly maintaining the law, that no one shall be accused except before his proper judges. This universal rule has been acknowledged by France only in relation to Switzerland, by various treaties, old and new, and, finally, by that of Sept. 27, 1803.-With this subject is connected the authority allowed to the decisions of the courts of foreign countries. The imperial constitution in Germany, under which all the states considered themselves as members of one whole, accustomed them to regard foreign judicial decisions, in private causes, as binding; and the tribunals were held bound to carry into effect such decisions whenever required to do so. The same custom prevails in England as to chattels, but in regard to real estate, no foreign jurisdiction is acknowledged. In France, since 1629, the decisions of foreign courts have had no force. If a judicial process is carried on against a French citizen, it is required to be reviewed before a French court, at least as to its most essential features, unless the French party chooses to go over the whole again from the beginning (comme entier); and, if both parties are foreigners, a petition for the attach

ment of the property of the debtor, in France, is never granted. (Sirey's Journal de la Cour de Cassation, viii, 453, and xviii, 58.) Similar laws were established in the kingdom of Westphalia and some of the German states; for example, Bavaria began to refuse all authority to the decisions of foreign courts; but it soon became evident that such a system would introduce great confusion, as there was so lively an intercourse between the different German states, and the old rules were in a great measure restored. (A decree of the Bavarian government, dated June 2, 1811, gives authority to the decisions of foreign courts, in civil causes, only when no property can be found on which to levy execution in the state where the suit has been carried on, and where no equal or superior claims exist to the property of the debtor in Bavaria. This system, however, is by no means free from objection.) As the relations of the German states, as members of the empire, have ceased, and the unconditional admission of the validity of the decisions of foreign courts would be attended with many disadvantages, it is highly desirable that a uniform rule on this subject should be introduced throughout the German confederacy.-The authority to be given to sentences of foreign courts, in criminal cases, is a subject of great delicacy, and involves the difficult question, how far states are required to deliver up accused persons who have fled to them for protection. The law of nations, on this point, is nearly uniform. The substance of it is, that, in criminal cases, one country has nothing to do with the sentences of another, either for or against the accused. The confiscation of property, in particular, which is decreed in one state, is absolutely disregarded in every other. The punishment of crimes committed in foreign lands is a matter still more disputed. The various theories on penal law present each a different view of the subject. It should always be remembered, in discussing this question, that the administration of the penal law has a higher object than the acquiring or securing an advantage to the state, and a better foundation than the caprice which threatens this or that action with punishment, and which would suffer the most infamous crimes to pass unpunished if they are inadvertently omitted in the penal code. The penal laws, more than any other branch of legislation, should have regard to those eternal principles, which are older than any laws. They intimately concern all mankind; they are the great

support of moral order: every state, therefore, should lend to others all the assistance, in executing these laws, which accords with its convictions of right. A state which tolerates a criminal in its bosom unpunished, wherever his crime has been committed, partakes of his guilt. He should be punished according to the laws of the land (for each state must regard its own penal laws as the most just); but only for acts which are criminal in themselves and universally; such as murder, robbery, fraud, violence, which may be styled crimes against the law of nature (delicta juris gentium). Acts which are prohibited by particular states for particular reasons, and violate no universal laws of morality and justice, are to be viewed simply as violations of the peculiar organization of certain states; and no other state has good reason to punish them; for, before this can properly be done, it must first be decided, that the prohibitory laws of the states supposed accord with the higher demands of justice, and a different state has neither the means nor the right to make this decision. For this reason, it is the universal practice of nations to pass over crimes which merely infringe the positive regulations of other states (delicta juris positivi); such as violations of financial laws, laws against contraband trade, police regulations, ecclesiastical ordinances, &c. In fact, one state could not, consistently, punish such offences against the laws of another; for foreign states often encourage such transgressions of positive law to advance their own political views. But if a subject of one country, while abroad, commits an offence of this class against the laws of his own country, he is properly liable to punishment on his return. The citizens of a country, while they are abroad, are subject to the laws of their native land. This is the rule in England, France (Code d'Instruct. crim. art. 5), Prussia (Allgemeine Landrecht, ii, 20, sect. 12-15), Austria (Strafgesetzbuch, s. ii, sect. 30). In this case, as in those before mentioned, France extends its jurisdiction beyond the proper bounds. It assumes the right of punishing strangers who violate the laws of the state abroad (Code d'Instruct. crim. art. 6); and, on the other hand, it refuses to punish crimes committed by its own subjects in foreign lands against foreigners (Code d'Instruct. crim. art. 7, 24). As offences committed abroad are not to be considered as an immediate violation of the penal code of the country where they are brought to justice, the punishment inflicted on a foreigner ought not to be

severer than that provided by the laws of the country where the offence took place; and, as the punishment cannot be more severe than that imposed by the laws of the country where it is inflicted, the milder rule should be followed. This is in accordance with the statutes of Prussia (Allg. Landr. ii, 20, sect. 15). To adopt the punishment imposed by the laws of the country where the act took place, without regard to circumstances, is contrary to all correct theory, and would lead to the greatest inconsistencies. This would require the application of the most absurd laws that were ever framed-the penal laws of England, for instance, where death is the punishment for cutting down a tree, or wearing a mask in a wood; and the religious laws of Spain are equally severe. If the liberty of selection, among the punishments imposed by foreign laws, be allowed, this would lead to the most pernicious uncertainty and caprice.

COURTS. [In the following article, we shall give, at some length, a view of the courts of England, followed by an account of the courts of the U. States.] COURTS OF ENGLAND. Inferior Courts. In describing the courts of England, it will be sufficient to take a cursory view of those of inferior and limited jurisdiction; among the most inconsiderable of which is the pipowders court, which is commonly said to derive its appellation from words signifying the dusty foot, either in allusion to the suitors who frequented it, or, as some say, because justice was as speedily done in this court as the dust could be shaken from the feet. Barrington, however, derives the name from the old French pied-pouldreaux, a pedlar, because the chapmen frequented these courts. The pipowders court is incident to fairs and markets, having two branches, one held by the lord of the franchise or his steward, the other by the clerk of the market. In this court are settled all disputes respecting contracts made, and all suits for injuries and offences committed during the fair. An appeal lies from this court to those of Westminster hall. The pipowders court has fallen very much into disuse.-Courts of manors and hundreds. The lord of every manor is entitled to hold a court, not of record, called a court baron, by himself or his steward, having a civil jurisdiction. A hundred court is similar, only embracing a wider district.-The coroner's court is held by a coroner, who assembles a jury to inquire concerning the death of any person, wherever any violence is suspected. (Coroners hold similar courts in

the U. States). The sheriff's court. The sheriff of each county formerly held a court, called the sheriff's tourn or torn, twice a year, in each hundred of his county, at which every person over 12 years of age, and not specially privileged, was obliged to attend, for the reformation of common grievances and nuisances, the trial of offences, and the preservation of peace and good government. It has also a considerable jurisdiction in civil suits. Though the jurisdiction of this court remains, its business has, it seems, long since ceased, except in regard to actions of replevin, which, professor Wooddeson says, are frequently commenced in the sheriff's torn, and almost as frequently removed into a superior judicature. The court leet has the same jurisdiction, in particular districts, that the sheriff's court has in the county, and, like the sheriff's court, is now almost obsolete.-Justices' court. The jurisdiction of justices of the peace has superseded that of most of the small courts. These officers are now the conservators of the peace, scattered in every town and parish of the kingdom. We have a minute account of the qualifications and powers of these officers in Burn's Justice. A justice of the peace is required to have a yearly income, clear of all encumbrances, of £100, or property estimated to be equivalent. The justices are commissioned by the king, their appointment being made through the lord chancellor. A justice is a judge of record, and causes are removed from his court to the superior courts by certiorari. The justices of each county hold quarterly sessions; but any justice is empowered to hold a court at any time for the examination and committing of of fenders, and also for the trial of such actions as come within his commission.The quarter sessions, as well as the individual justices, are instituted for the suppression and punishment of offences, and their power extends to the committing to prison for trial for crimes, with but few exceptions. Two justices may determine the settlement of a pauper, but an appeal lies from their decisions to the quarter sessions. Assizes. Courts of assize and nisi prius. are treated at length under the article Assizes. (q. v.) These courts are branches of those of Westminster hall, the great centre of the judicial administration in England, according to the forms of the common law. Besides the above courts, there are others of a limited and special jurisdiction; namely, three in London-1. the hustings court, which has a jurisdiction in civil actions, and at which some of the city 50

VOL. III.

elections are held (among others, that of members of parliament from that city), and from which an appeal lies to certain justices of the city; 2. the sheriffs' courts; 3. a court of conscience, of summary jurisdiction in actions under 40 shillings, held by the lord mayor:-the court of commissioners of sewers, to provide for the repair of sea-walls, ditches, sewers, &c.—the court of stannaries, for the tin mines in Cornwall and Devonshire, for the trial of suits in which the tinners are parties:courts of the forest, having jurisdiction over the royal forests :-the court of the royal franchise of Ely, belonging to the bishopric of that name, but held by justices, not by the bishop himself, and having jurisdiction of causes arising within the bishopric:-courts palatinate, of the counties palatine of Durham, Chester and Lancaster, which are courts of record, of superior jurisdiction, commensurate with that of the courts of Westminster, from which writs do not run into these counties palatine:-the court of the Marshalsea and of the palace, still held weekly at Southwark, whose jurisdiction embraces a circuit of 12 miles about the king's palace, for the determination of causes arising among the servants of the king's household; and the court of the earl marshal, authorized by the statute of 13 Richard II, chap. 2, to take cognizance “of deeds of arms and war out of the realm, which cannot be discussed by the courts of the common law:"-besides the ecclesiastical courts and those of admiralty and chancery, of which a more particular account will be given.

The Superior Courts of Westminster hall are the courts of exchequer, common pleas, and king's bench. These three courts, and also that of chancery and the house of lords, are the remains and successors of the great court established in the Norman period, under the title of aula regis, which was divided, very naturally, into several departments, for the trial of different kinds of pleas; and, at length, these several branches of one jurisdiction became so many distinct courts.

The king's bench is considered as the most direct successor to the aula regis, in Westminster hall. In this court, the sovereign is, by a fiction, supposed to preside in person, and the writs are, accordingly, made returnable "before the king, wherever he may be in England," because the court formerly followed the king to different parts of the kingdom, and was once held, in the 21st year of Edward I, at Roxburgh, in Scotland; but, for many centuries, its sittings have been held in Westminster hall, and the king never pre

tiff is the king's debtor, and the less able to discharge the dues to the king, because his own debtor, the defendant, neglects to make the payment or do the act demanded; the fact whether the plaintiff is, as he alleges in his writ, the king's debtor, being never inquired into. One of these courts of exchequer chamber is merely an assembly of all the judges of the three superior courts, for consultation in matters of law. The court of exchequer chamber, for the correction of errors in the common law courts of exchequer, constituted by the statute of the 31 Edw. III, chap. 12, consists of the lord chancellor, the lord treasurer, and the judges of the king's bench and common pleas. The other court of exchequer chamber, for the correction of errors in the king's bench, in certain cases, is constituted by the statute of 27 Elizabeth, chap. 8, and consists of the judges of the common pleas and the barons of the exchequer. We have seen that the three courts of king's bench, common pleas and exchequer have, all of them, by means of the fictions above mentioned, concurrent jurisdiction of civil actions in general; and, if there were no higher tribunal for the supervision and correction of their decisions, they might diverge into different principles of adjudication, so that what was law in one would not be so in another, and thus uncertainty might be introduced into rights and obligations of every kind. Accordingly, every community requires to have one ultimate tribunal of appeal on all questions of the same description; and the judicial system of Great Britain is constituted upon this principle. The king's bench may, on writ of error, revise the decisions and correct the errors of the common pleas; the exchequer chamber, consisting of the judges of the common pleas and court of exchequer, may revise those of the king's bench; and the court of exchequer chamber, consisting of the lord chancellor and lord treasurer, with the judges of the king's bench and common pleas, may revise those of the common law courts of exchequer; and from all these, as also from the court of chancery, the equity side of the court of exchequer, and from the superior courts of Scotland and Ireland, actions may be carried, by writ of error or appeal, to the house of lords, the highest judicial tribunal in the kingdom. The judges of each of the courts of king's bench, common pleas and exchequer are usually four; and this number is so well established by usage, that the expression the "twelve judges of England" is used to signify the court of exchequer

chamber already mentioned, including all the judges of these courts. But the number of these judges has, as we learn from Mr. Wooddeson, sometimes been five, and again, at others, less than four, there having been but two in the beginning of Trinity term, 1655, in Cromwell's time, in the king's bench, then called the upper bench. The judges anciently held their office during the pleasure of the king; but now, by the statutes of 12 and 13 of William III, chap. 2, and 1 George III, chap. 23, during good behavior; and their commissions do not expire on the demise of the crown. When the judges of either of the courts are equally divided, a meeting of the twelve judges is held in the exchequer chamber, to consult on the matter.

The house of lords, in its character of a judicial court, is the highest tribunal in the kingdom, to which civil actions are carried, by writ of error, from the two courts of error already mentioned, as held in the exchequer chamber, and from the court consisting of the twelve judges; also from the king's bench, from which latter court some actions may be carried, as we have already seen, to the court of exchequer chamber; but the party aggrieved by the judgment of the king's bench has his election, in actions of that description, to go immediately to the house of lords, if he so chooses. So civil actions may be brought before this court by appeal from the chancery and the equity side of the exchequer, and by writ of error or by appeal from the highest courts of Scotland and Ireland. Actions were formerly brought, in the first instance, before the aula regis, to which, of all its surviving successors, the house of lords bears the greatest resemblance; and petitions continued to be presented to the house of lords, from the reign of Edward I to that of Henry VI, to take cognizance of suits in the first instance; but the lords uniformly referred the petitioners to the other courts; and they entertain no civil action except on appeal or writ of error. The practice of bringing cases, by writ of error, from the courts of common law, has prevailed ever since the establishment of those courts; but appeals from the court of chancery are of later date, having commenced in the latter part of the reign of Charles I, after the court of chancery had succeeded in establishing its present extensive jurisdiction against the opposition of the common law courts. The reason commonly given in favor of this right of appeal is, that it ought not to be left to the chancellor to bind the whole property of the kingdom, by his de