Queen v. the Inhabitants of Clint (6). They also contended, with reference to the third ground of appeal, that it was bad, inasmuch as it set up no settlement, but merely an acknowledgment by relief, without signifying what was the kind of settlement acknowledged.

[COLERIDGE, J.-A party is bound to state his grounds of appeal; it does not follow that he can have no other ground, except specific heads of settlement elsewhere.]

The Attorney General (Sir F. Pollock), contrà, was stopped by the Court.

WILLIAMS, J.-The third ground is, in my opinion, sufficiently stated. The argument, on the other side, pushed to its utmost extent, would exclude one of the most potent heads of evidence in this province of law altogether. It is contended, that it is evidence only, and useful only, as applicable to some head of settlement which the party has established; if so, it would be altogether superfluous. What the Courts have to look to is this: that parties may not be taken by surprise, but have due notice of what it is intended to rely upon. Now, having in mind that the relief mentioned in the third ground of appeal, was furnished by the respondent parish itself, it cannot be contended, that the respondent parish did not receive sufficient notice by that ground; it would be too much to say, that more exact particularity of time and place is necessary. Possibly, then, the other grounds may be too general; but, in my opinion, this one is sufficient; and the Sessions, having declined to hear the evidence, have declined to enter into the merits.

COLERIDGE, J.-I will not say, that there may not have been apparently conflicting observations made by Judges in deciding this class of cases; but it is clear, on the great current of authority, that, as well since as before the Poor Law Amendment Act, where the Sessions have declined to hear the evidence in an appeal, and decided it on a preliminary objection, this Court has exercised the power to interfere. But if the Sessions have gone into evidence, and come

(6) 11 Ad. & El. 624, n.; s. c. 10 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 151.

to a decision, then this Court has not interfered. Now, Ex parte Broseley was a case of that description. Witnesses were called in support of the grounds of appeal, and there was a variance between their evidence and those grounds. Upon this the Sessions decided, that the appellants had failed to prove their case. That was clearly a decision on the merits. Then, secondly, are these grounds sufficient? The only difficulty suggested, arises on words reported to have dropped from my Lord Chief Justice Denman and myself, that the Justices at Sessions are proper Judges of the necessary degree of particularity; and I still feel that the question, whether a notice is sufficient or insufficient, must so far depend on the particular facts in each case, that the Sessions may often be the best Judges; but we are bound by the authorities, at least to the extent of the present case, and must go into this inquiry. Then, taking the third ground by itself, I think it sufficiently stated, as my Brother Williams has shewn. It is a ground stated in good faith, and on matters more within the knowledge of the receiver of notice than the giver; the facts and circumstances of the relief given, must all be much better known to the respondent parish than the appellant. The argument, that this ground does not set up a substantial head of evidence, has no weight. We are only to look at the act. A party is to give notice of appeal, and state the grounds of that appeal. Here he states a ground; namely, certain evidences on which he means to rely.

WIGHTMAN, J.-If the Sessions have taken an erroneous view, so as to prevent parties from being heard, we have clearly the power to compel them to hear. Therefore, the only question is, whether the statement of ground be sufficient. If the sufficiency of the second be questionable, still, with reference to the third, I cannot see how better information of that on which it is intended to rely could be given. The respondent parish could only say, after receiving it, that they were not fully cognizant of the case against them.

LORD DENMAN, C.J., absent.

Rule absolute.

Arrest-Constable-Breach of the Peace -False Imprisonment—Pleading.

False imprisonment. The plea stated, that the plaintiff committed a breach of the peace, by knocking at the door of the defendant's house, and threatening to continue to do so; that the defendant sent to a constable to arrest the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, having ascertained this, ran away; that the defendant and the constable pursued the plaintiff, and overtook him in a close near the defendant's dwelling-house, whereupon the defendant, in order to preserve the peace, &c. and to hinder the plaintiff from continuing to make the said noise and disturbance, gave him in charge to the constable :-Held, bad, on a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, inasmuch as it did not aver that the breach of the peace was continuing, or shew grounds for the apprehension of its continuance or renewal.

A person is justified in giving a charge, and a constable in arresting, without warrant, a party who has been guilty of a breach of the peace, if there are reasonable grounds for apprehending its continuance or immediate renewal, but not otherwise: and the circumstances from which such an inference is raised are for the consideration of a jury.

This was an action for false imprisonment. Pleas-First, not guilty. Second, that before and at the said time when, &c., in the said declaration mentioned, the said defendant was lawfully possessed of a certain tenement, dwelling-house, and premises, with the appurtenances, situate and being in the county of Essex, and in which he, the said defendant, and his family then resided. And the said defendant being thereof possessed, the said plaintiff, just before the said time when, &c., to wit, on the day and year aforesaid, without the leave or licence of the said defendant, and at an unseasonable hour, to wit, at nine of the clock at night, entered and came into the said dwelling-house, and then, with force and arms, made a great noise and disturbance therein, and then insulted and abused the said defendant in his said dwelling-house, and greatly disturbed and disquieted him and his family in the peaceable possession of the same, in breach of the

peace of our said Lady the Queen; whereupon the said defendant then and there requested the plaintiff to cease his said noise and disturbance, and depart from and out of the said dwelling-house, which he, the plaintiff, reluctantly, did; and therefore the said plaintiff then threatened the said defendant, that he, the said plaintiff, would stand and rap at the back door of the said dwellinghouse until the said defendant delivered up to him, the said plaintiff, a certain book, then in the possession of the said defendant. And the said defendant further says, that just before the said time when, &c., in the said declaration mentioned, the said plaintiff, having departed from and out of the said dwelling-house, stood at the back door thereof, and upon the premises of the said defendant, for a long space of time, to wit, for the space of two hours then next following; and during the said last-mentioned period, he, the said plaintiff, continued to knock and rap most violently, illegally, and wrongfully against the said back door of the said dwelling-house, and also, during the said last-mentioned period, insulted and abused the said defendant, and his family and servants, then being in and about the said dwelling-house and premises, and thereby further disturbed and disquieted them in the peaceable possession of the said dwelling-house and premises, in further breach of the peace of our said Lady the Queen; whereupon the said defendant then and there requested the said plaintiff to cease his said noise and disturbance, and to depart from and off his said premises, which the said plaintiff then and there wholly neglected and refused to do, and then continued at the back door of the said dwelling-house, knocking and rapping thereon, as aforesaid, and then threatened the said defendant to continue making the said noise and disturbance, until he, the said defendant, delivered to the said plaintiff the said book, then being in possession of the said defendant as aforesaid. And the said defendant in fact further says, that the said plaintiff having continued to make the said noise and disturbance for the said space of time as hereinbefore mentioned, he, the said defendant, then sent to one James Chatters, then being a constable of the parish of Little Maplestead, in the said county of Essex, for the purpose of arresting and taking the said plaintiff into custody, and of thereby preventing him further dis

turbing and annoying the said defendant and his family as aforesaid; and the plaintiff, having ascertained that he was about to be given into custody by the said defendant, ceased the said knocking and rapping at the back door of the said dwelling-house, but which he had violently, wrongfully, and illegally continued up to that period, and then and there ran and escaped off and from the said premises of the said defendant; when he, the said defendant, accompanied by certain persons who had been called to the aid and assistance of the said James Chatters, so being such constable as aforesaid, immediately followed and pursued the said plaintiff, and overtook him in a certain close, near to the said dwelling-house of the said defendant: whereupon the defendant, in order to preserve the peace, and to prevent the said plaintiff from continuing to disturb the good order and tranquillity of the said dwelling-house of the said defendant, and to hinder and prevent the said plaintiff from continuing to make the said noise and disturbance at the dwelling-house of the said defendant during the whole night, then gave charge of the said plaintiff to the said James Chatters, then and there being such constable as aforesaid, and then requested the said James Chatters, so being such constable as aforesaid, to take the said plaintiff into his custody, and carry him before some Justice or Justices of our said Lady the Queen assigned to keep the peace in and for the said county of Essex, to answer the premises, and to be dealt with according to law. And the said James Chatters, so being such constable as aforesaid, at such request of the said defendant, then gently laid his hands on the said plaintiff, for the cause aforesaid, and did then take the said plaintiff into his custody, in order to carry and conduct the said plaintiff before such Justice as aforesaid, to be there dealt with according to law for his said offence and breach of the peace; and because it was then late at night, and an unseasonable time, for the said James Chatters to carry the said plaintiff before such Justice as aforesaid, he, the said James Chatters, so being such constable as aforesaid, for that reason, and for the cause aforesaid, necessarily and unavoidably detained and imprisoned the said plaintiff until the next morning in the said messuage in the said declaration mentioned. And the said defendant further says, that

on the next morning, as soon as conveniently could be, he, the said James Chatters, so being such constable as aforesaid, did carry and convey the said plaintiff before such Justice as aforesaid, to answer the said premises, and be dealt with according to law; and on the occasion aforesaid, the said plaintiff was necessarily and unavoidably trespassed upon and assaulted, seized, and laid hold of, pulled and dragged about, and given. and struck the said blows and strokes, and forced and compelled to go about and be imprisoned, and kept and detained in prison, as in the said declaration mentioned, as he lawfully might have been, for the cause aforesaid, the defendant, on those occasions, doing no unnecessary trespass or damage to the plaintiff, and which are the said several trespasses in the said declaration mentioned. Verification.

The plaintiff joined issue on the first plea, and replied de injuria to the second.

The action was tried, at the Chelmsford Summer Assizes, 1840, before Mr. Baron Gurney, when a verdict was found for the defendant.

A rule nisi having been obtained for judgment non obstante veredicto,—

Gurney and Ogle now shewed cause.They contended, first, that the constable need not be more particularly described as having authority in the district where the offence was committed; and that if any of the allegations were defective, the defects were such as were cured by the verdictIngle v. Bell (1), Bull v. Steward (2), Chitty on Pleading, vol. 1. p. 679, Stennel v. Hogg (3), Whitworth v. Hall (4).

[LORD DENMAN, C.J.-That case only decided, that the learned Judge was wrong in adjourning the case from one assizes to another; and Mr. Justice Parke was only pointing out a way in which the defect might have been cured. His Lordship also referred to Timothy v. Simpson (5).]

The next objection made is, that it does not appear, on the face of the plea, that the breach of the peace was committed within

(1) 1 Mee. & Wels. 516; s. c. 5 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 85.

(2) 1 Wils. 255.

(3) 1 Saund. 228, a; 4 Burr. 2018; 3 Burr. 1725; Rep. Temp. Hard. 108.

(4) 2 B. & Ad. 695, the words of Mr. Justice Parke, p. 698; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. K.B. 297.

(5) 1 Cr. M. & R. 757; s. c. 4 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 81.