CHRISTIAN ETHICS. LECTURE I. ON THE RESPECTIVE PROVINCES OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY. I AM at a loss, my friends, to determine to which of the two charges I should be most unwilling to expose myself;-whether, on the one hand, to the charge of presumption, in having consented to undertake the task assigned me, of delivering the first series of the "CONGREGATIONAL LECTURE," or, on the other, to the charge of affectation, which might attach itself to any apology I might now, however sincerely, attempt to frame for such presumption. I deem it, therefore, preferable to proceed at once, without any apologetic preamble, to the task itself; leaving the merits or demerits of the execution, whatever they may be, to the candid and liberal judgment of my audience. The general subject of the proposed series of discourses, has already been announced to the public, under the title of "Christian Ethics; or, B LECT. I. LECT. I. Moral Philosophy on the principles of Divine Revelation:" and the first topic in the series, to be discussed in the present lecture, (a lecture which may, in a good degree, be considered as introductory,) is,-" The respective provinces of Philosophy and Theology." I take for my text the words of the Apostle Paul— Treatment of human wis dom by the inspired writers. 1 COR. I. 20.' "Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" Is this the language of a weak enthusiast, depreciating human science, and treating with disdain what he does not himself possess? Is it the utterance of a vain-glorious pretender, who, in the loftiness of his spiritual empiricism, looks down, with a scornful pity, on uninitiated minds ? It is neither. It is the deliberate verdict of one who "speaks forth the words of truth and soberness:" of one who, himself propounding views of Deity,-of his character, his administration, and his will,-incomparably surpassing aught that the unaided wisdom of man had previously produced, had, in this very fact, his divine warrant for the low estimate of that wisdom, which, in this passage, he pronounces. The estimate relates to the exercise of the human intellect, not in any of the departments of natural science, but in regard to what this same writer denominates "the things of God;" and the truth of it is established by an appeal _LECT. I. to the experience of all the preceding centuries of the world's history: "For after that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God, by the preaching of foolishness, to save them that believe." * Most assuredly, the sacred writers do not express themselves in terms of submissive deference to the wise men of this world. If they were inspired, how could they? The incongruity would have been monstrous. It would have been the intellect of the infinite Creator bowing to that of the feeble and fallible creature! I do not mean to say, that the mere circumstance of their disparaging what those wise men themselves honoured with the designation of * The words in the original are ambiguous-διὰ τῆς μωρίας той кηρууμатоs. Our translators have rendered them "by the foolishness of preaching." The difference, as to the sense, is not material. It may, however, be observed, that the foolishness (in the estimate of men, for that is what the Apostle speaks of) did not lie in the preaching, but in the doctrine preached. And to this, accordingly, it is that the term, immediately afterwards, is applied:-" But we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness; but to us who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men :"—that is, those divine discoveries, contained in the Gospel, which by men were esteemed foolishness, were indeed true wisdom; wisdom infinitely surpassing, in its principles and in its practical efficiency, all the results of human intellect of which philosophers had been accustomed to boast. LECT. I. "divine philosophy," is itself to be regarded as an evidence of their inspiration. Far from it: the disparagement might have been of such a kind as, instead of furnishing proof of their inspiration, would only have made manifest their self-conceited presumption. It is not, we are all aware, the first nor the thousandth time that ignorance has talked disdainfully of knowledge, and meanly depreciated what it could not attain. Vanity has been the attendant of limited, and humility of enlarged attainments; the one, the characteristic of a little, the other, of a great mind. While, therefore, deference to the wisdom of men is incompatible with the possession of inspiration, contempt of that wisdom is perfectly compatible with the want of it. All, in such a case, depends upon the manner. And surely, with confidence might we put it to the candid judgment of philosophy itself—even notwithstanding its rising indignation at the unceremonious refusal of its authority-whether, in the style of these writers, there be any thing discernible, in the remotest degree indicative, either of the littleness of elated vanity, or of the chagrin of mortified envy ;-whether, on the contrary, in its unostentatious simplicity, its calm, dispassionate, dignified, conscious authoritativeness, their whole manner be not in admirable congruity with the hypothesis of their inspiration whether, that is, on the supposition of their being inspired, they could, in this |