LECT. II. utility, even when the term is taken in its most comprehensive acceptation, are liable to the grand objection we are now especially considering, namely, that, although the principle of them were ever so correct, it is a principle of which a fallen nature is utterly incompetent to make the application. We might go further, and say, that the task of determining the useful, in its legitimate extent of meaning, is beyond the limited powers of any creature.-But at present, instead of insisting upon this, (as it will more than once come before us hereafter) I would rather hold up the Epicurean system, even in its most undebased form, as a sad exemplification of the tendency of human nature to a low and unworthy estimate of that happiness which the system regards as the end and the standard of moral rectitude;-and as thus affording a practical confirmation of the validity of the objection. For a just decision in a case of such momentous interest, how are we to trust to a nature, which, in this instance, bounds its ideas of the happiness of a creature like man by what contributes to the pleasure of his little span of life on earth; and which, moreover, by excluding Deity from the government of the world, at once sets aside the first and highest of the elementary principles of goodness in the heart of the creature, a due regard to God,and the greatest, by infinite degrees, of the ends which utility ought ever to be considered as

embracing, the glory of the infinite Creator! LECT. II. I do not now, therefore, contend against this system, on the ground that utility cannot be the foundation of virtue, but rather as affording proof that human nature cannot be the judge of utility. We see in it one of the results (and it does not stand alone) of leaving the decision of such a point with such a judge. Even were utility admitted to be the foundation and standard of virtue, still what is included in utility must be determined by a different authority,by a mind, not only free of all the biassing influences of moral corruption, but above all the necessary limitations of created being, and capable of comprehending both the vastness of the universe and the infinitude of the Godhead.

We shall pursue the application of the same principle to other systems, in our next Lecture.

LECTURE III.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

LECT. III.

Cudworth,

1 TIM. VI. 20.

"Science falsely so called.”

THE same general principle of objection, which, in the close of last Lecture, was applied to the moral systems of the Aristotelian, the Stoical, and the Epicurean schools, that, namely, derived from the present fallen state of human nature, as both rendering that nature a deceitful standard of moral goodness, and the possessor of it a corrupt and prejudiced judge,— we now proceed to consider in its application to certain other systems of more modern origin, though some of them bearing resemblance, in their leading principles, to one or other of the systems of antiquity.

4. System of I begin with the system which resolves virtue Clarke, and into agreement with THE ETERNAL FITNESSES OF THINGS. To enter at large into illustration of the principles of this system, as introduced by

Price.

CUDWORTH, and ably taken up and defended by

CLARKE and PRICE, would be foreign to my pre- LECT. III. sent purpose. It is only necessary to state them so far as to make the bearing of my general objection manifest. According to it, then, the right and wrong of actions are to be regarded as ranking amongst necessary or first truths, which are discerned by the mind, independently of all reasoning or evidence; so that the perception of right or wrong, along with the consequent sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, is as unavoidable as the perception of the truth or falsehood of self-evident propositions, propositions which are never obscured more than by attempts to prove them, and which we believe, simply because we cannot but believe them. The system maintains an absolute and eternal distinction between right and wrong,a distinction which the mind intuitively discerns; the right consisting in correspondence, and the wrong in contrariety, to the eternal fitnesses of things.*

I am far from intending to deny that this phraseology, about fitnesses, and eternal fitnesses, has any meaning. I believe it to have a meaning, and an important meaning too. I have no hesitation in admitting, that there do exist such fitnesses as the definition assumes, and that virtue may with propriety be regarded as consisting in conformity with these fitnesses;

Notes and Illustrations. Note D.

LECT. III. whence this is to be considered as arising, we

may hereafter see. Suppose, then, we grant that the moral fitness of the action of an intelligent agent lies in its congruity with the true nature, circumstances, and relations of things; a general idea may be given of this congruity, and consequently of the moral fitness of which it is the assumed standard, from that relation which is obviously the first and highest of all that are possible the relation, namely, in which such a creature stands to the author of his existence. There cannot surely be any hesitation in assenting to the proposition, that in moral science, the unfitness of profanity in the speech or conduct, or of irreverence or hatred in the mind, of such a creature towards Deity, is as real and as palpable as, in the science of physics, would be the unfitness of a cube to fill up a spherical case.* However inconsistent with this maxim may be the behaviour of mankind in general,-behaviour indicative of that estrangement of affection from God which is the essence of their depravity,—yet we cannot imagine a man in the possession of a sound mind, and understanding the terms of the proposition, who will withhold from it the assent of his judgment. If hesitation ever appears in avowing such assent, it must be the hesitation which a man naturally feels who is

*Notes and Illustrations. Note E.