the Committee of Fourteen, had that report been understood to sanction the removal of the appointing power from the sole control of the General Conference. We have shown that they never did consent to this point of the report; but that an overwhelming majority in its favor made their attitude toward it of no account. We are told, also, that Jesse Lee's argument against the report was, not that it affected his favorite measure of an elective Presiding Eldership, but that seniority should be the test of membership in the General Conference. This remark implies two absurdities: first, that Jesse Lee said nothing through the long debate on Ezekiel Cooper's resolution in favor of an elective Presiding Eldership; and, secondly, that he would be likely to make further opposition on that ground after a majority of twenty-one had declared against it. He, therefore, made his attack on the point of seniority, merely because that was the only plausible ground left for opposition. Soule's amendment instantly destroyed that ground, and left Cooper and Lee to decide what course to adopt. There was no hope that the majority of twenty-one against an elective Presiding Eldership could be overcome, and the point of seniority had been wisely yielded, so that further opposition would have seemed factious. They dared not in prudence carry their opposition further, for that would have been the ruin of their own. influence. Wisely for themselves and the Church they forbore further opposition. Jesse Lee moved the passage of the third restrictive rule, and it was carried. From this act of Jesse Lee's it has been supposed he was the author of that rule, and, therefore, it could not have been in opposition to the election of Presiding Elders. But we have Bishop Soule's word for it, that he himself drew the third restrictive rule, and that the supposition that Jesse Lee framed it, rested wholly upon the fact that Mr. Lee at last moved its adoption. Our good friends are quite aware of this fact, and in other places they make Joshua Soule the author of the rule. Thus we see Mr. Cooper and Jesse Lee at last reduced to choose between accepting the report of the Committee of Fourteen, or carrying their opposition to such a pitch as would have exposed them to the charge of obstinacy, and of such factious behavior as would have ruined their influence in the Conference without stopping the passage of the report. They gave way, and the Conference,

with great unanimity, adopted the report. It has been said that had this been their real conduct on this occasion, they would never in subsequent sessions have given their countenance to measures in favor of making the Presiding Eldership elective by the sole action of the General Conference. We answer, that men are pretty apt to find ways of doing what they wish to do. Perhaps it occurred to them, as it has to our good friends, that whatever may have been the intentions of the Committee of Fourteen, the General Conference was the proper expounder of its own action. Hence, while it would seem to them important to secure an interpretation in their own favor, they could act the more freely because they would not have the interpretations of half a century to look them out of countenance, as our good friends have to-day.

Further, while we can see a reasonable solution of the conduct of Cooper and Lee upon our view of the action of 1808, our good friends can give no reasonable account of the conduct of Bishops M'Kendree and Soule and their friends, upon their own theory. Why did Soule object to the constitutionality of the action of the General Conference of 1820 in making the Presiding Elders elective? His brethren had just elected him Bishop, and his friends were auxious to put such a man as himself into the Episcopacy as a protection against radicalism; the Bishops were ready to ordain him. Why does Joshua Soule take the decision to protest against the unconstitutionality of an elective Presiding Eldership at the very moment when his protest may arrest his ordination, or lead to the resignation of his new honors? Do men who desire a good work commonly throw away such a position, when it has honorably come to them? Do they act thus upon whim, upon uncertainty? Why does Bishop Soule wait four years longer before accepting consecration after a fresh election? Why does M'Kendree pursue his remarkable course on this question, unless he knew beyond a shadow of doubt, that the legislation he denounced as unconstitutional really was so? Such conduct upon the part of these men cannot be explained upon the theory of our good friends, without extreme violence to all the reasonable probabilities of the case. Such are our main reasons for asserting that the third restrictive rule renders it impossible for the General Conference alone to make the Presiding Eldership elective. FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XXXI.—22

ART. VI.—METHODISM AND HERESY.

A CERTAIN ambiguity of Methodist law comes into view the moment we raise the question suggested by these words, and instantly not two, but several, distinct opinions come to the front, each having many followers and much argumentation on its side. The question is just now a practical one, as there are two or three Methodist preachers under suspension for heresy, and it is quite probable at the next General Conference there will be a great legal battle over an appeal taken by one or more of these.

The constitution of the Methodist Episcopal Church secures for its ministers and members the right of trial and appeal. The book of Discipline has a section containing the rules under which such trials must proceed. For the trial of ministers there are statutes concerning immorality, heresy, inefficiency, etc. The statute concerning heresy (207) was framed essentially as we have it now in the very earliest year of the Church. The statute prescribes the Articles of Religion as the appeal and test of orthodoxy in cases of trial for heresy. And there is no authority in any of these rules for trial, or elsewhere in the Discipline, for apprehending and trying a preacher on charges of erroneous doctrine except under the Articles of Religion. The law of the Methodist Episcopal Church knows no heresy outside of the Articles of Religion. This is the thesis which is sustained in this paper.

Before attempting a discussion of the several theories of the law of our Church, it will be well to recall a few fundamental truths that bear upon the general subject. The history of human society teaches that a supreme power of government should always be exercised under well-defined principles and laws. It is an axiom in constitutional government that no man can be trusted with undefined power. Hence arise the checks and limitations of authority which are found in constitutions. Hence, also, arises the division of governmental functions into the legislative, the executive, and the judicial-where each has a limited supremacy, and acts as a check upon the others.

These principles are not less applicable, nor is their appli cation less needed, in ecclesiastical than in civil government.

All history is illustrative of man's love of power. And while the tyranny of civil rulers has proved the necessity for constitutional checks, it is a well-known fact that the most iniquitous and mischievous abuses of power that the world has known are to be found in ecclesiastical history. And the Church of Rome is not the only illustration of this truth which Christendom

furnishes.

For these reasons the great Protestant Churches of to-day are organized under well-defined constitutional laws, whereby the rights of members are carefully guarded, and the prerogatives and duties of rulers are clearly defined. It is quite certain that no Church of our time will feel itself justified in its appeal for the patronage and confidence of the general public whose form of government ignores these principles. Tested by these principles, the Methodist Episcopal Church will not be found wanting. Her government is not above law, but under law. By her constitutional law the fundamental interests of her people are guarded against abuse of power, and her statute laws prescribe not only their duties, but also their rights.

That there are anomalies and imperfections in the system is freely admitted by her best friends, more, perhaps, than is altogether creditable to us in this last quarter of the eighteenth century; but these are passing away under the vis medicatrix of her own intellectual and religions life.

In every form of Church organization there are four matters of fundamental import, all of which ought to have the protection of constitutional law. These are (1) the polity, (2) the theology of its teachers, (3) the conditions of membership, and (4) the right of trial and appeal for ministers and members. When these four interests are carefully guarded by organic law it will be admitted that a Church possesses free and constitutional government. The Restrictive Rules are the constitutional law of the Methodist Episcopal Church. These rules are above the action of the General Conference, and can only be altered by the concurrent vote of three fourths of all the members of the Annual Conferences, and two thirds of the General Conference. All of the aforementioned fundamental interests of a Church are protected by these Restrictive Rules.

Rule I guards the theology of the teachers of the Church. Rule III guards its polity. Rule IV guards the conditions of

membership. Rule V guards the right of trial and appeal for ministers and members. It is obvious that any legislation or method of administration which tends to nullify these constitutional guards is destructive of the system, and unconstitu tional.

Let us classify the opinions that are entertained in the Church on this subject. To help clearness, of thought let us first classify all opinions under two heads:--

I. The strict constructionists of the law, who hold that the articles of religion are the only standard of doctrine by which a minister's orthodoxy may be judged.

II. The liberal constructionists, who, by a more liberal interpretation of the law, conclude that other doctrines besides those defined in the Twenty-five Articles are included in the authoritative confession of the Church.

The liberal constructionists may be subdivided as follows:

1. Those who claim that the Bible is the standard, in addition to the Articles.

2. Those who claim that the so-called "standard authors," especially Wesley's Sermons and Notes, are the ultimate appeal.

3. Those who hold that the consensus of doctrinal opinions held generally by the Church, and interpreted by the court of triers, is the doctrinal standard and ultimate appeal. Let us examine each of these views separately.

1. The argument for the Bible as the standard is that Art. V, on "The Sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for Salvation," indorses the Scriptures as the touch-stone of orthodoxy, and, therefore, that every thing in the Bible may be imposed on the belief of an accused party by a Church court.

But this is a stretch of interpretation which the judicial mind will not readily accept. Art. V is negative in its character, and is a statute of limitation. It confers no power, but is simply and strictly a limitation of power:

V. The Sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for Salvation. The Holy Scriptures contain all things necessary to salvation; so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation.